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THE BUSINESS OUTLOOK

The immediate effect of the Supreme Court decision is generally conceded to be favorable, with reservations as to doubts now proclaimed over how much of the current business reaction was actually caused by the gold cases. Long-run consequences depend largely on whether its effect will be to bring a halt to devaluation.



LONG-RUN effects of the Supreme Court decision are the only ones that need consideration since no one will feel inclined to file a dissenting opinion from the universal verdict that the immediate effects will be favorable to business activity. The long-run effects depend largely upon what attitude the Congress and the administration will finally take with respect to the moral defeat implied in certain portions of the decision on the Liberty bond appeal, especially the following:

To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge [of the government's credit as an assurance of payment as stipulated] is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This court has given no sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our government. * * *

"The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. After they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen." * * *

We conclude that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, in so far as it attempted to over-ride the obligation created by the bond in suit, went beyond Congressional power.

Will the Congress and the administration pay any heed to these admonitions or will they throw their hats in the air, their discretion still further to the winds and accept the popular verdict that the sweeping

nature of the victory for the government opens wide the door for further currency experiments? Specifically, will the qualified approval of the abrogation of the gold clause in government bonds bring a halt to devaluation? If so, there is considerable hope of sound business recovery in the long-run. It might even lead eventually to international currency stabilization.

Some observers believe that this aspect of the decision will have a salutary effect and that it will at least tend to make Congress and the administration pause before undertaking further currency experiments.

Others, on the contrary, point out that politicians as a rule (this does not apply, of course, to statesmen like Carter Glass) pay little attention to moral implications and that as long as they think they can "get by" with a piece of legislation they will not be deterred by any such minor incident as a rebuke from the Supreme Court. That this second view is soundly conceived is proved by the jubilation of the inflationists over the decision. If it turns out to be the correct view, and only time will tell, the long-run effects of the decision will be unfavorable to business activity.

In any case, the administration apparently realizes the futility of trying to raise the general price level quickly by decreasing the gold content of the dollar, and it is now trying to accomplish that purpose more slowly, but more persistently, by operating through the banking system. The (Continued on Next Page)

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methods being employed have been fully described in numerous articles on the subject such as the one by A. Wilfred May in THE ANNALIST of Jan. 18, and one by J. F. Ebersole on "The Mechanism and Possibilities of Inflation" in *The Review of Economic Statistics* of Feb. 15. In addition we have the banking bill now before Congress which goes much further in the same direction.

Most of these analyses of how the administration is operating through the banking system to raise the general level of commodity prices are concerned primarily with how great a rise in prices is possible or likely as a result of the inflationary measures already adopted. Mr. Ebersole's conclusions on that point are so interesting that we take the liberty of quoting an entire paragraph from his article:

At this point one is tempted to add the expansibility [of bank credit] of non-recovery conditions to that of recovery conditions, for a grand total. As if the calculations already made were not sufficiently fantastic! There are so many qualifications which could and should be made [footnote omitted]. We shall probably experience a portion of each of the alternatives. Let us suppose that recovery is delayed until we have developed one half of the non-recovery expansibility, or 32.5 billion dollars, and that we have thenceforth one half of the results obtainable from full utilization of present reserves of all banks, or 17 billions. Let us assume that sooner or later the effects of doubling of velocity will be absorbed in the increased volume of business. Then total expansibility would approximate 50 billion dollars. We should not be surprised, therefore, to see wholesale prices roughly about three times the level of the present. Any attempt to set the upper limit of possible price inflation is more interesting than dependable. We may reasonably expect that a number of opportunities will be offered us when the conjecture of circumstances will favor a stoppage of the mad race. Should these opportunities for control be neglected, however, there is no assured limit to expansion even such as the maximum which has been computed herein.

It is now to be noted that Mr. Ebersole, like most of the other writers on the subject, uses the phrase "sooner or later"; and that practically all authorities on the subject stress the practical impossibility of determining even approximately the

date when any given inflationary measure, such as those which are now being attempted through deficit financing and the banking mechanism will "take," i. e., will actually become effective in raising the wholesale price level and the cost of living. That this is a serious disadvantage to those who have the means and the desire to protect themselves against inflation is self-evident, but if concrete evidence were required one need only refer to the (partly) inflationary rise in stock prices which occurred in the Spring and early Summer of 1933, when people who switched from bonds into common stocks at or near the top of that rise were dismayed to discover later that they would have been better off to have stayed with their bonds.

An attempt to remedy this deficiency of any basis for forecasting the timing of the effects of inflationary measures has now been made by Mr. Ficek in an article on other pages of this issue. We should, perhaps, warn against accepting his findings too dogmatically so far as the question of what the individual can do to protect himself against inflation is concerned. Some economists and statisticians, moreover, will undoubtedly question the validity of some of the methods he employs in arriving at his conclusions. Is it correct, for example, to subtract bank loans and discounts from money in general circulation (i. e., from the sum of bank deposits and currency in circulation) and call the remainder the "inflated" portion? Are not many bank loans, especially loans on securities, essentially inflationary assets? Is the method of fitting trend lines by exponential equations, especially to the commodity price index, sound? And if so, is it logical to project those trend lines into a future in which conditions are bound to be greatly different, under the strange banking and money system now established, from those which prevailed under the gold standard prior to the beginning of 1933? Is it permissible to neglect entirely non-monetary influences on the price level?

Nevertheless Mr. Ficek's article will appeal to most readers as an exceptionally careful piece of research work of the type of which more is needed in times like these. It therefore deserves careful consideration and we hope that those who disagree will come forward with whatever criticisms they feel are justified.

In any case Mr. Ficek's conclusions with respect to the impossibility of controlling inflation, based on purely mathematical correlations, confirm the opinion

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
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FINANCIAL MARKETS

STOCK prices have fluctuated widely during the past week, a sharp advance on the gold decision being followed by a reaction in which most of these gains were canceled. On the day following the decision volume of trading increased sharply, expanding to the highest level since last July. Bond prices have advanced during the week, averages of prices of high grade issues establishing new high records.

The week under review began with a moderate advance which, however, gathered little following. A mildly reactionary tendency set in Friday afternoon. The downward trend continued until the



Supreme Court decision in the gold cases was announced on Monday when a very sharp rise occurred, accompanied by heavy trading. This spectacular uprush, however, was soon followed by reaction. The general trend of the market continued downward through the remainder of the week.

The most important gains on the Monday rally were in Chrysler, Bethlehem Steel, American Can, du Pont, the mail-order stocks, Continental Can, American Smelting & Refining, the rails, Allied Chemical, Western Union and the farm equipment issues. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator advanced to a new high record. Less substantial improvement occurred in Union Carbide, General Foods, Corn Products Refining, National Biscuit, the non-ferrous metal stocks, Goodyear, Pullman, Columbian Carbon. On the decline which followed the gold-decision rally the most severe losses occurred in those stocks which had advanced the most sharply.

The failure of the Supreme Court to compel payment of government bonds in the currency equivalent of old dollars was not followed by any weakening in the prices of these issues. On the contrary, a further advance in governments

took place following the announcement of the decision. Among the notable developments in the bond market during the week was the rise of Atchison general 4s to a new high record. Bank stocks have continued firm.

The failure of the market to hold its advance following the gold decision has been a great disappointment to many traders and investors. It was believed by many that the gold cases formed the chief unfavorable item in an otherwise promising situation and that the removal of this uncertainty would be followed by a substantial gain in the general level of common stock prices. The rise in bond prices during the week has by contrast emphasized the unfavorable movement of stocks. Disappointments of this sort occur not infrequently, however, when the general public has been waiting anxiously for some development believed to be of paramount importance. It not infrequently happens that the importance of the event is exaggerated and that the profit-taking selling following it is more than sufficient to offset any benefit to the market which may occur from the anticipated favorable news. There is also the possibility that some other, and less widely advertised, change in the situation may occur which is neglected by the general public but which nevertheless has its effect upon prices.

In the present instance, although the gold decision proved as favorable to the government as could reasonably have been expected, reports from Washington indicated that the probability of a further decline in the gold value of the dollar had been greatly reduced. The decision leaves unsettled an important fundamental question as to the government's obligation to holders of gold-clause government bonds in case a substantial rise in the general price level occurs later on, such as would cause real loss to such holders. So that the general effect has been to weaken the forces making for a further decline in the gold value of the currency rather than to encourage the inflationists.

So far as the decision has tended to promote confidence in the maintenance of the present level of the dollar, it is natural that it should have a favorable effect upon the prices of bonds. The dollar is rapidly becoming the safest currency in the world and it is reasonable to expect that a substantial movement of funds from Europe to this country will occur during the coming year. This is likely to drive yields on high-grade securities down to a still lower level.

Another element in the situation is the increasing concern of investors and business men over the possibility of the passage of unfavorable legislation by Congress. A number of radical proposals are certain to be brought up during the next several weeks and these may be expected to have an effect upon business and upon common stock levels. Were it not for political uncertainties the outlook for common stock prices would appear favorable. Business is at a much more satisfactory level than it was three months ago and even though some reaction may occur over the next several weeks earnings for the first quarter of 1935 should in many cases be fairly satisfactory. This, combined with the upward tendency of bond prices, should under normal circumstances result in a further appreciation in common stocks. As usual, however, the stock market is discounting the future and in this instance apparently regards the outlook as at least doubtful. A. MCB.

Some Unusual and Mystifying Aspects of the Supreme Court Gold Decisions



THE bewilderment which the government's current inflationary program has diffused throughout the economic area has been largely dissipated by the finality with which the Supreme Court of the United States has assembled and resolved the major issues as they were presented in what may here be generally designated the gold clause cases decided on Monday of this week. To that extent it is fitting that the element of gratitude be infused into the country's sighs of relief, however difficult it may be in so intimate a perspective to appraise all their implications.

The Five Cases

Altogether five cases were decided. Three of these are the subject of one opinion and concerned with the enforceability of a customary provision for the payment of gold embodied in corporate obligations.¹ These three cases unquestionably determined the rights of all corporations and individuals *inter se* in relation to such contractual provisions. A fourth case involves the same consideration in respect of the governmental obligation presented by a Liberty bond,² and a fifth concerns itself with the obligation of the government under the commitments embodied in Treasury (gold) certificates.³

Four justices joined with the Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Stone specially concurring in the Perry case) in the opinion of the court. The four dissenting justices contented themselves with one opinion for the purposes of all five cases, their views being expressed by Mr. Justice McReynolds.

Gold Payments Unenforceable

For all practical purposes the majority has held that no provision for the payment of gold, or its equivalent, whether embodied in a governmental or private obligation is enforceable at law.

It is true that the decision in the Perry case assigns the governmental obligation to a category differing from that accorded those of private corporations and individuals, and denies the authority of the Congress to repudiate a sovereign commitment. But their beneficiaries will derive scant consolation from this purely ethical pronouncement, since the court immediately thereupon denies to the plaintiff any recovery beyond the nominal amount designated in the bond. In other words the owner must accept, regardless of the tenor of the instrument, and any possible fluctuations in the value of the currency, the number of dollars named therein in full satisfaction of his claim.

The government had contended in this case that "earlier Congresses could not validly restrict the Seventy-third Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to regulate the value of money, borrow money, or regulate foreign and interstate commerce." The Chief Justice in commenting upon this rather amazing argument says that "from this premise, the government seems to deduce the proposition that when, with adequate authority, the government borrows money

¹ *Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company*; the *United States of America, Reconstruction Finance Corporation et al. v. Bankers Trust Company and William H. Bixby, trustees; the United States of America, &c., v. Bankers Trust Company and William H. Bixby, trustees*.

² *Perry v. the United States*.
³ *Nortz v. the United States*.

and pledges the credit of the United States, it is free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient."

The Chief Justice remarks that this contention raises a question of far greater importance than the particular claim of the plaintiff, and that "on that reasoning, if the terms of the government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the government at its discretion and that, when the government borrows

constitutional provision for the coinage of money and the regulation of its value.

The Question of Purchasing Power

In discussing the plaintiff's claim of an equivalent in currency the court has this to say:

But "equivalent" cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could be legally used.

It is exceedingly difficult to follow the court's reasoning in this connection. The court has introduced the criterion of "purchasing power" as essential to the determination of damages, and limits this power to its operation within the

Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice Sutherland, Mr. Justice Butler and I conclude that, if given effect, the enactments here challenged will bring about confiscation of property rights and repudiation of national obligations.

Just men regard repudiation and spoliation of citizens by their sovereign with abhorrence; but we are asked to affirm that the Constitution has granted power to accomplish both.

No definite delegation of such power exists.

—From the dissenting opinion filed by Justice McReynolds.

money, the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge."

The Question of Damages

The court then proceeds to the question of damages. The plaintiff being the owner of a \$10,000 Liberty bond by the terms of which payment was to be made in dollars of the same gold content as prevailed at the date of its emission, he demanding its redemption on May 24, 1934, by the payment of 10,000 gold dollars each containing 25.8 grains of gold .9 fine. This being refused he demanded the equivalent in bullion, or the sum of \$16,931.25 in legal tender currency. In other words, he had attempted to measure his damages by the difference between the gold content of the dollar before and after its devaluation.

This measurement stands rejected, and the court has said:

But the change in the weight of the gold dollar did not necessarily cause loss to the plaintiff of the amount claimed. The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the time the government offered to pay him the \$10,000, the face of his bond, in legal tender currency.

Earlier cases which enforced payments in specie where contracts so provided are distinguished upon the ground that at those times metal coins and paper money were alike in circulation, and, presumably, that a comparison of purchasing power could be made, for the court says:

Plaintiff's damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time the alleged breach occurred.

The court has anticipated the argument that the owner of such a bond may have contemplated the employment of its proceeds in commercial operations external to the United States by insisting that the Congress possessed and had exercised the power to prohibit such transactions through the use and export of gold. This power, it is asserted, is derived from the

United States. It is undoubtedly true that the Congress made the possession of gold, except under special license, a criminal act, and it would naturally follow that the government could not be a participant in the crime by exchanging the proscribed metal for the bond upon its delivery for redemption. The bond represents a valid obligation of the United States Government. The Chief Justice of the United States has so declared. If that is true it is valid in all its parts and the government has no right whatever to deny its obligation or any proportion of it. It would therefore follow that the owner is damaged *ipso facto* to the extent that the government violates its agreement. The owner was apparently willing to waive the actual delivery of gold, but insisted upon receiving the "purchasing power" which that gold would have. It was otherwise held, for the court says:

Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense but an unjustified enrichment.

If this is so, it would appear that the whole professed purpose of New Deal legislative and administrative policies has been defeated, and that, so far as price levels are affected, we are in exactly the same situation as we were before.

The Question of Repudiation

There is implicit in the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the Liberty bond case a recognition of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reconciling the court's conclusions in the case involving private obligations with

its insistence upon the integrity, if somewhat academic, of a governmental obligation. Unless the learned justice's reasoning is quite misapprehended he would appear to hold the view, much as he expressly deplores the refusal to fulfill the solemn promise of bonds of the United States, that under its powers to coin money and regulate its value the Congress has equal power to repudiate governmental obligations with that which it exercised on behalf of private debtors.

The case involving gold certificates is on a slightly different footing, but is generally governed by principles applicable in that involving government bonds. The Secretary of the Treasury in his annual reports had on several occasions declared that these certificates were of the nature of warehouse receipts, and they expressly provide that an equivalent in actual gold dollars for which they were exchangeable had been deposited in the Treasury of the United States. This theory the court held to be inadmissible and that the Secretary's description of the certificates as warehouse receipts could in no manner alter their true legal characteristics. The certificates made no reservation, as in the case of bonds, as to a prevailing standard of value.

Court Influenced by Practical Considerations

It would appear to be a reasonable inference that the court was influenced by practical, as well as purely legalistic, considerations in reaching its decision in the cases involving private obligations.

"It requires no acute analysis," observes the Chief Justice, "or profound economic inquiry to disclose the dislocation of the domestic economy which would be caused by such a disparity of conditions in which, it is insisted, those debtors under gold clauses should be required to pay \$1.69 in currency while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges and prices on the basis of \$1 of that currency."

Generally speaking, the distinction between previous cases before the court in which payment in specie had been enforced according to the tenor of the contract lies in the fact that two kinds of money were concurrently in circulation. Contracting parties were therefore at liberty to provide for payment in either. In the existing situation gold has been withdrawn from circulation, and leaving out the smaller denominations, the only available currency is in the form of paper invested with an arbitrary value for the purposes of domestic exchange.

Purpose of Gold Clauses Conceded

It appears to have been conceded that the gold clauses were for the express purpose of safeguarding the creditor from loss through an inflated currency. Likewise it protected the debtor against the rather imaginary contingency of an increase in the dollar's gold content and its consequent enhancement. There does not seem to be any serious contention but that, if the sovereign power denies to the contracting individual the ability to fulfill his engagements to the letter of his agreement, the remaining alternative is that he pay the equivalent of the gold which he promised in available currency. The question is whether the Congress has the constitutional authority arbitrarily to reduce the debtor's obligation and, in consequence, deprive the creditor of a part of his property without his consent and without compensation.

It may well be conceded that Congress has the power to invalidate the provisions of existing contracts which interfere with

the exercise of its constitutional authority. The difficulty arises in the application of this principle, and the discovery of the constitutional power. The court has found this in the power which the Constitution vests in the Congress over the monetary system. In order to demonstrate the right of Congress to invalidate contracts in the circumstances indicated the court has resorted to a wealth of analogy, which includes such widely divergent considerations as bankruptcy, interstate commerce, tariffs, embargoes and non-intercourse with foreign nations.

Interesting Analogy

One of the cases cited by the Court in support of the Congressional power to strike down contracts under the provisions for monetary control involved the

issuance of free passes. A settlement of a controversy with a railroad had been made upon the consideration that the claimant should thereafter be the beneficiary of a free pass on the road. Free passes were later declared illegal by the Congress and the claimant's consideration automatically failed. This decision was based upon the Congressional authority over interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.

The purpose of the amendment which authorized the repudiation of the gold clauses by individuals, as declared by the Senator who introduced it and quoted in the dissenting opinion, is as follows:

It will be my task to show that if the amendment shall prevail it has potentialities as follows: It may transfer from one class in these United States value to the extent of almost \$200,000,000,000.

This value will be transferred, first from those who own the bank deposits; secondly, this value will be transferred from those who own bonds and fixed investments.

Realities vs. Appearances

The Supreme Court in a number of cases has undertaken to look beyond the pretext to the real purpose of legislation, and to deny its validity when the realities are manifestly in conflict with the appearances. The minority has indicated this in the following paragraph:

The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes passed by Congress in respect of money and credits were designed to attain a legitimate end. Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligation, repudiate national debts and drive into

the Treasury all gold within the country in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value.

With what to this writer seems to be sure penetration the minority observes that "the real purpose was not to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States, but to destroy certain valuable contract rights."

It is with the utmost respect for both the high purpose and great ability of the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court that this writer is impelled to observe that careful perusal of its opinion leaves him with the impression of an unbridged gulf between what the Congress is under the Constitution empowered to do with respect to coinage, and what it has done, now with judicial sanction, in respect of private rights, and the property of individuals.

The Emergency Myth; Taxing Bigness

To the Editor of *The Annalist*:

Within a week of the time that this is written, two spokesmen of the administration have resorted to the emergency argument in defending certain phases of New Deal policy. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, according to a dispatch to *The New York Herald Tribune* of Jan. 12, 1935, in his final defense of the government in the gold-clause cases, placed his argument above the legal plane, maintaining that "supreme necessity" forced the government to abrogate the gold clause in public and private contracts on June 5, 1933. Only thus was a break-down of the entire economic system avoided.

In *The Herald Tribune* of Jan. 14 Secretary of Commerce Roper is reported as pleading with business for greater confidence in the government. True, some of the things the government has done have been far from heartening to business, but it must be remembered that it was the great national emergency which made experimentation necessary.

These particular examples are cited simply because they have recently come to the attention of the public through the newspapers, not because they are unique. In fact, much of the New Deal policy has been predicated on the assumption that the country has been tottering on the brink of ruin and is still not far removed therefrom. This assumption is even included in some of the legislation of the period. For example, the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, among other things, created a stabilization fund of \$2,000,000,000 and gave the President the right to revalue the gold dollar from time to time within certain limits. Both of these provisions were to be effective for a period of two years. Both were capable of being extended for another year in the event that a continuance of the emergency should make such action advisable. In an acute case, the patient is either dead or recovered within a few days or, at most, weeks. Yet this law envisages a critical condition extending for more than two years beyond the end of January, 1934.

This writer is frankly concerned by all this talk of emergencies. If the American people wish to sanction a huge spending program for public works, economic planning, a commodity dollar, or other vagaries, they, of course, have the right to do so. Clearly, however, they should not be given the impression that their approval of such extraordinary measures is essential to rescue the country from dire catastrophe unless there is ample proof that calamity is the only alternative to these unorthodox policies. Since many of the supporters of the New Deal have attempted to justify past poli-

cies or actions on the ground that an emergency existed, it will be worthwhile to examine the record briefly in order to ascertain the facts.

An emergency is defined by Webster's dictionary as "an unforeseen occurrence or condition calling for immediate action; exigency." If we accept this definition — a not unreasonable procedure — it is indeed difficult to justify the New Deal spokesmen and law-writers in their position.

It may be granted that the administration faced an emergency situation at the outset. The closure of all the country's banks is admittedly an exigency, a condition calling for immediate action. Such action was, in fact, taken in the passage and administration of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, properly so called.

Let us review the situation following the inauguration of the President on March 4, 1933. At 1 o'clock in the morning of March 6 the President proclaimed a four-day moratorium for all of the banks of the country, pending the passage of the emergency legislation already referred to. Congress convened on March 9, 1933, and passed the Emergency Banking Act in record time amid the plaudits of the multitude. The moratorium was extended for a few days to permit the authorities to execute the provisions of the law.

The Emergency Banking Act provided for the reopening of sound banks only. Emergency issues of Federal Reserve Bank notes were authorized under such conditions that it would be possible for any bank which was permitted to reopen to rediscount practically its entire earnings assets at the Federal Reserve Bank, obtain the proceeds in Federal Reserve Bank notes, and pay off its depositors in full in this type of money should they wish to withdraw their deposits.

On Monday, March 13, sound banks in the Federal Reserve cities were permitted to reopen. On Tuesday, March 14, the sound banks in about 250 clearing house cities resumed business. On Wednesday, March 15, the remaining sound banks of the country were allowed to open their doors to the public. Although approximately 3,000 banks were not licensed to reopen on the days mentioned, the institutions which were licensed controlled some 90 per cent of the banking resources of the country.

The reaction of the public to the measures taken to restore confidence in the banking system was all that could be hoped for. Deposits exceeded withdrawals in all parts of the country. The propensity to hoard cash was abated. The emergency was over.

Yet the Attorney General based his final plea, in defending the government's

abrogation of the gold clause, on the necessity of preventing an economic collapse. Was there a recurrence of emergency conditions between March 15 and June 5 that necessitated the drastic governmental action which breached billions of dollars of contracts to pay in dollars of 23.22 grains of gold? This question can best be answered by a further review of facts relating to the economic conditions of the period in question.

It will be recalled that, in connection with his closure of the banks, the President issued an order requiring all holders of monetary gold to deliver it to the banks, the Reserve Banks or the Treasury in exchange for other forms of money. The purpose of this was to strengthen the reserve position of the Federal Reserve Banks, which, in the existing circumstances, was desirable. This order continued in force after the banks were reopened, and was extended and reinforced by a subsequent proclamation on April 5. A couple of weeks later, on April 20, the President proclaimed a formal embargo on gold exports and the United States departed officially from the gold standard. The Thomas inflation amendment became law on May 12. On June 5, the President approved the Congressional resolution abrogating the gold clause.

In recalling the economic situation in this interval, it will be advisable to consider first the period from the reopening of the banks to the formal embargo on gold exports. During this period there was every expectation that the United States would shortly return to the gold standard with the traditional unit of 23.22 grains. No fear of inflation loomed on the horizon. The NRA and the AAA were as yet unborn. No suspicion prevailed that business was not to be allowed to follow a natural course without the interference of government. What happened in the course of these weeks?

A rapid revival in business activity set in immediately upon the reopening of the banks. The weekly index of business of *The New York Times* rose from 60 on March 18 to 69 on April 22, or 15 per cent. The *Annalist* weekly index of wholesale commodity prices rose 1.2 per cent between March 14 and April 18, the same journal's sensitive price index rising 6.6 per cent in the same interval. After April 5, necessary exports of gold were permitted under license by the Treasury, but only \$9,600,000 of gold was actually moved under this regulation. The exchange rate on Paris hovered about the gold par, an indication that a return to the gold standard was confidently expected by the market. No renewed outbreak of banking difficulties put in an appearance.

The foregoing portrayal scarcely sug-

gests economic collapse. On the contrary, the business outlook was brighter than than it had been in many months, with sound business recovery definitely under way.

In the latter weeks of the period in question—April 20 to June 5—the same statistical series give a distorted picture because prices and production were influenced by the fear of inflation engendered by the passage of the Thomas Inflation Amendment on May 12. Nevertheless, the data give no indication of emergency conditions.

The *New York Times* business index increased from 69 to 83.2, more than 20 per cent, between April 22 and June 3. Meanwhile, from April 18 to June 6, The *Annalist* index of wholesale prices rose 11 per cent. The index of sensitive commodity prices advanced by approximately 34 per cent. It must be admitted that an important part of the enlargement of business activity and the advance in commodity prices was speculative, anticipating inflation of the currency or of credit. Also, the dollar was depreciated by approximately 16 per cent in terms of the franc at the close of the period. This does not mean, however, that a resumption of the gold standard with a dollar of 23.22 grains could not have been undertaken by the government with good effect. Such action would presumably have precipitated a temporary speculative collapse, but there is not the least reason to think that the sound revival of business, which started after the settlement of the banking crisis, would not shortly have been resumed.

In short, an examination of the record leaves the impression that the "supreme necessity" of abrogating the gold clause was a figment of the Attorney General's imagination. No more credence can be given to the alleged emergencies referred to by the Secretary of Commerce. Space is lacking to follow the entire course of business through the months from June 5, 1933, to the beginning of the year 1935. On one who has kept posted on the situation, however, no impression of recurring crises or impending catastrophe will be made by the facts. It looked at one time as though an emergency might develop because of labor troubles which were due largely to Section 7-a of the NIRA and to the policies of the Recovery Administration. Actually, no real emergency developed, but, in any event, it would not be reasonable to defend governmental policies on the score of an emergency engendered by those policies.

The fact of the matter would seem to be that the real emergency is the vital necessity, in the minds of the New Deal

Continued on Page 340


Inflation Control Impossible Because of Two-Year Lag in Commodity Prices



MUCH of the uncertainty bedeviling contemporary business is caused by the inflationary policies of the administration. The devaluation of the dollar failed to lift the price level proportionately, but it has increased considerably the potential monetary base of the United States; it has thus prepared the ground for thoroughgoing monetary inflation. The administration has, accordingly, embarked on a program of large-scale borrowing, the brunt of which is borne by the banks and by the Federal Reserve System. It is well known that such monetary inflation eventually leads to the expansion of commercial credit, to an increase of money in general circulation and to a rise of the price level; but it is not known just when these effects of inflation will become manifest in a magnitude commensurate with the inflationary effort. It is the purpose of this analysis to give a tentative answer to this problem; and, incidentally, to throw some light on the feasibility of inflation control.

Analysis vs. Analogy

The only basis for judgment available is the basis of past monetary experience, and by this is meant American monetary experience. Analogies drawn from the past history of the currency developments of other nations are futile; the American system of commercial and re-



serve banking is unique. It must be remembered that banks are the true home of money; that the institutional banking set-up determines, ultimately, the character of the medium of exchange; and that the American banking organization is totally unlike that of France, Germany, Austria or any other country ever afflicted by the scourge of inflation. Even if one disregards the differences in methods of credit, invest-

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By KAREL FRANCIS FICEK*

ment and the use of checks, there remain two all-important characteristics setting the American system apart from all other systems: the United States is an immensely variegated economic continent rather than a mere economic region; and this continent is served by a wide mesh of independent, uncorrelated financial institutions. A European central banker may speak fittingly of the "ship of state" which he is guiding; the monetary authority of the United States, on the other hand, is in nominal command of a whole "fleet of state," and the captains of the individual vessels are likely to use their own judgment even when the

mutually inconsistent ways; for this reason, it will be necessary to introduce here definitions which will be not only clear and simple but also well adapted for the purpose in hand.

What Is Inflation?

Inflation will be defined as the issuance of money (including bank deposits) by a process of purchase as distinguished from the non-inflationary process of loan and discount. Banks may inflate the currency by buying bonds; the Federal Reserve Banks may inflate it by acquiring government securities on the open market, or by adding to their stocks of

surplus reserves), an expansion of credit follows on the heels of the inflationary impetus; if they invest (and, again, they can invest several times the amount of the reserves), a secondary wave of inflation follows in the wake of the primary wave.

Inflation tends to raise the price level; again this happens as a direct or as an indirect consequence of the inflationary impetus. Since inflation is the issuance of money by a process of purchase, it gives an upward push to the prices of the commodities, securities or services directly involved; and since it helps to generate an expansion of bank credit, it stimulates bank borrowers' demand for commodities and securities.

The sequence of events—inflation, bank credit expansion, increase of money in general circulation and rise of prices—is portrayed in the tables which follow. The secular trends of the time series used in these tables have been eliminated and fluctuations have been expressed as percentages of the corresponding trend ordinates multiplied by 100. This was done in order to make these data susceptible of correlation analysis. The secular trends were computed by the method of least squares; the function $y = ab^x$ was employed in preference to a straight-line trend, in order to express realistically the cumulative "geometric progression" character of economic change.

Monetary Changes, 1918-1932


The monetary base of the United States, the reservoir from which commercial and savings banks' reserves may be drawn, consists of the stock of monetary gold, the Treasury currency in circulation and the holdings of government

TABLE I. FLUCTUATIONS OF THE MONETARY BASE OF THE UNITED STATES

Adjusted for Secular Trend, 1918-1932 (Annual Averages, Millions of Dollars)				
Stock of Monetary Gold	Gov. Sec. Held by Monetary Treasury	Total: Index of Monetary Fluctua- tions	F. R. B. Base	1918-1932
1918 .3,158	1,477	134	4,769	100
1919 .3,129	1,251	254	4,634	93
1920 .2,869	1,401	324	4,594	90
1921 .3,291	1,501	264	5,056	96
1922 .3,802	1,604	455	5,861	108
1923 .4,061	1,736	186	5,983	106
1924 .4,439	1,757	402	6,568	113
1925 .4,381	1,755	359	6,495	108
1926 .4,452	1,743	350	6,545	105
1927 .4,564	1,774	417	6,755	106
1928 .4,206	1,783	297	6,286	95
1929 .4,283	1,785	208	6,276	92
1930 .4,460	1,781	564	6,805	96
1931 .4,704	1,774	669	7,147	97
1932 .4,239	1,820	1,461	7,520	99

Source: Report of the Federal Reserve Board for 1932, p. 43.

securities by the Federal Reserve Banks. These three items are "basic" in the sense that they are independent of the discretion of the individual banks. Table



admiralty's signals do not happen to get crossed.

On analyzing recent monetary experience of the United States, it appears that it takes from two to three years for an inflationary impetus to be translated into the reality of proportionately higher prices; and it follows from this that inflation, under American conditions, cannot be controlled, because corrective measures would have to be applied some two or three years before the emergency which they are designed to meet has occurred.

This conclusion is made possible by a detailed analysis of the four primary monetary factors which bear upon the price situation. These factors—changes in the monetary base, in the inflated portion of money, in bank credit and in money in general circulation—will be analyzed below individually; but the fact must be stressed here, at the outset, that these factors constitute a kind of parallelogram of forces, or vectors, each one tending now in one direction, now in another, and rarely in agreement with one another. The price level is a resultant of the clash or cooperation of these primary factors. It may happen, for example, that while inflation is going on, money in general circulation declines instead of rising; just as, for instance, the capital of a corporation may fall from \$1,000,000 to \$500,000 at the same time that "water" in the capital set-up increases from \$100,000 to \$200,000. The expression "watered stock" is analogous to the expression "inflated currency"; it will help the reader to bear this illustration in mind. Unfortunately, monetary theory has not yet evolved a clear conceptual language of its own; such phenomena as "monetary inflation" are defined in a hundred various and

gold; the Treasury may inflate the currency by purchasing, with fiat money, or with the proceeds of the so-called "gold devaluation profit," services, goods or relief from economic distress. The test of inflation is the character of the asset backing the issue of money; if the asset is self-liquidating, there is no inflation; at a pre-arranged time in the very near future the asset (promissory note, bank acceptance, &c.) will fall due and the money will be repaid by the lender and retired from circulation. On the other hand, long-term bonds, gold, goods and services bought by the banks or by the government are not self-liquidating; bonds and goods are "shiftable" in an emergency, but only at a loss; gold is negotiable at a more or less fixed price, but it can be got rid of altogether only if it is wanted in the arts or abroad; and services perish at the very instant of their performance.

Inflation tends to increase money in general circulation both directly and indirectly. Newly issued currency may circulate from hand to hand, or it may be used for the repayment of bank loans, or finally, it may go to swell bank deposits. In the first case, money in general circulation (that is, money owned by the public) will increase by the amount of the new issue; in the second case, money in circulation will remain unchanged but bank reserves will rise; in the third case, money in circulation will increase and, if the inflation was due to government action, bank reserves will rise also.

The indirect effect of inflation is produced through the medium of bank reserves. Excess bank reserves eventually prompt the banks either to lend or to buy bonds. If they lend (and they can lend several times the amount of their

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I shows that the monetary base grew in the period 1918-1932 at the average compound increment rate of 3.3 per cent per annum. The index of fluctuation shows that a curtailment of the base started in 1919 and reached its low point in 1920; that the period 1921-1927 was, on the whole, one of extension; that a curtailing movement began in 1928, culminated in 1929, and was followed by a period of extension during 1930-1932.

Table II indicates that money in general circulation, which increased at the average compound increment rate of 3.5 per cent per annum (or only slightly in excess of the rate of growth of the monetary base of the country) moved relatively upward through 1918-1920, declined in 1921, advanced briskly in 1922-1924, and came to a temporary rest on a remarkably high plateau during the prosperous and stable years of 1925-1928. Thereafter money in general circulation decreased steadily from 1929 down to 1932.

TABLE II. FLUCTUATIONS OF MONEY IN GENERAL CIRCULATION

Adjusted for Secular Trend, 1918-1932

(Midyear Figures, Millions of Dollars)

Year.	Currency in Gen. Circ.	Bank Deposits.	Total: Index of Money in Gen. Circ.	Inflated Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Expanded Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Circulation.	Monetary Wholesale Prices.
1918.	3,599	28,765	32,364	87	90	85	98
1919.	3,895	33,603	37,498	97	111	92	108
1920.	4,420	37,721	42,141	105	93	111	125
1921.	3,865	35,512	39,227	96	84	101	83
1922.	3,649	37,615	41,284	97	102	113	110
1923.	3,046	40,886	44,734	101	92	88	113
1924.	3,949	43,406	47,354	103	96	94	107
1925.	3,877	47,612	51,489	109	116	106	104
1926.	3,910	49,733	53,643	109	110	110	105
1927.	3,866	51,662	55,528	109	106	109	104
1928.	3,930	53,398	57,328	109	102	113	109
1929.	3,947	53,852	57,799	106	95	102	104
1930.	3,668	54,954	58,622	104	97	93	95
1931.	3,957	51,782	55,739	95	102	93	94
1932.	4,921	41,963	46,884	78	99	71	78

formly behind currency inflation. This is readily explained by the fact that investment is an easier method of employing surplus bank reserves than lending; bonds are traded on a continuous market, whereas acceptable bank borrowers are not often found standing in line and clamoring for accommodation.

The relationships between the four primary series may be visualized to some extent when their indexes are juxtaposed, as is done in Table IV. This table includes also an index of the fluctuations of wholesale prices (United States Department of Labor annual averages adjusted for their secular trend). While

TABLE IV. INDEXES OF FLUCTUATIONS

Adjusted for Secular Trends, 1918-1932

Year.	Monetary Base.	Inflated Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Expanded Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Circulation.	Wholesale Prices.	Change in: Money. Money. Gen. Circ. Price Level.
1928.	100	90	85	87	98	+ .22
1919.	93	111	92	97	108	+ .96
1920.	90	93	111	105	125	- .59
1921.	96	84	101	96	83	- .90
1922.	108	102	94	97	85	+ .22
1923.	106	113	100	101	92	+ .96
1924.	113	109	101	103	94	+ .96
1925.	108	116	106	109	104	+ .22
1926.	105	110	110	109	105	+ .22
1927.	106	109	110	109	104	+ .22
1928.	95	102	113	109	110	+ .77
1929.	92	88	115	106	113	+ .96
1930.	96	94	110	104	107	+ .96
1931.	97	102	93	95	94	+ .96
1932.	99	91	71	78	87	+ .96

* Of money in general circulation. i.e., uninflated.

Sources:

1. Report of the Controller of the Currency, 1932, p. 116. "Volume of money in general circulation, excl. banks, Fed. Res. Banks, and Treasury."

2. Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1932, p. 121. "All banks in the United States—Deposits of member and non-member banks, exclusive of interbank deposits."

Table III contains two indexes, the index of bank credit and the index of the inflated portion of the currency, i.e., money in general circulation derived from purchases as distinguished from loans. This was arrived at by subtracting the volume of loans and discounts from the total volume of money in general circulation. The size of the inflated portion is thus somewhat underestimated; for when a commercial note is discounted, the account of the borrower

TABLE III. FLUCTUATIONS OF THE INFLATED AND UNINFLATED PORTIONS OF MONEY IN GENERAL CIRCULATION

Adjusted for Secular Trend, 1918-1932

(Mid-year Figures, Millions of Dollars)

Year.	Bank Loans	Index of Balance: Index of Money in Gen. Circ.	Index of Fluc- tuations: Inflated Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Index of Fluc- tuations: Uninflated Portion of Money in Gen. Circ.	Total: Index of Money in Gen. Circ.
1918.	32,364	22,404	85	9,990	90
1919.	37,498	33,822	106	17,607	96
1920.	42,141	30,839	111	11,302	93
1921.	39,727	28,988	101	10,739	84
1922.	41,264	27,750	94	13,514	102
1923.	44,734	30,396	100	14,336	103
1924.	47,354	31,541	101	15,813	109
1925.	51,489	33,882	106	17,607	116
1926.	53,643	36,176	110	17,467	110
1927.	55,528	37,378	110	18,150	109
1928.	57,328	39,483	113	17,845	102
1929.	57,799	41,531	115	16,268	94
1930.	58,622	40,638	110	17,984	94
1931.	55,739	35,384	93	20,355	102
1932.	46,963	27,834	71	19,050	91

Sources:

1. Table II, "Money in general circulation."

2. Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1932, "All banks in the United States—Loans and discounts."

is credited with the amount of the note, less discount. But as the purpose of Table III is the construction of indexes of fluctuation around a trend line, such discrepancies do not vitiate the final result.

Why Credit Expansion Lagged

Incidentally, it is worth while to note that while the inflated portion of money during 1918-1932 grew at the average compound increment rate of 4.7 per cent per annum, the volume of bank credit grew at the rate of only 1.9 per cent per annum. Credit expansion lagged uni-

116 in 1925 in consequence of the unprecedented high, 113, registered by the index of the monetary base in 1924. The figures of Table V show how the Blunder of 1924 bore fruit in subsequent years. The prosperous period, 1925-1929, was one of pronounced currency deflation and credit expansion; wholesale prices which were abnormally low in 1924 became abnormally high all throughout 1925-1930.

The Time Factor

The data contained in Table V do not warrant refined correlation analysis, nor is such an analysis necessary; coeffi-

cients of linear correlation inferred from percentages of unlike signed pairs suffice to confirm some of the relationships. Table VI shows, as might be expected, that changes in credit go hand in hand with changes in money in general circulation and that both are linked with changes in the price level. These three factors form one unambiguous circle. But other factors appear, at first sight, to behave in a totally unexpected and contrary way, and it remains, therefore, to investigate, by means of more thorough analysis, the connections between them.

TABLE VI. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FIVE MONETARY FACTORS, AS INDICATED BY INFERRED COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION

Monetary base.	Inflated portion of money in gen. cir.	Expanded portion of money in gen. cir.	Money in gen. cir.	Wholesale prices.	Change in: Money. Money. Gen. Circ. Price Level.	Inferred Coefficients of Correlation
1928.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1919.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1920.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1921.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1922.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1923.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1924.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1925.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1926.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1927.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1928.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1929.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1930.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1931.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		
1932.	+ .22	- .96	- .59	- .90		

per annum in the course of the longer period, while during the course of its latter three-fifths the growth continued at the rate of only 4.7 per cent. In both cases, however, the speed of the growth of the inflated portion exceeded the rate of growth of the whole by about the same percentage, 1.3 per cent and 1.2 per cent.

Table X suggests that, under American conditions, it takes, on the average, one year for currency inflation to effect an increase of money in general circulation, or for currency deflation to result in a decrease of money in general circulation. The result is, of course, attained with the help of credit expansion or, per contra, with the help of credit contraction, as has already been demonstrated. The one-year lag must be added

TABLE IX. FLUCTUATIONS OF THE INFLATED PORTION OF MONEY IN GENERAL CIRCULATION ADJUSTED FOR SECULAR TREND, 1907-1932 (Mid-Year Figures, Millions of Dollars)

Lag.	Money in General Circulation.	Bank Loans and Discounts.	Balance in General Circulation.	Index of Inflated Portion.
				Coefficient of Correlation and Standard Error.
1907.	14,817	10,764	4,053	110
1908.	14,483	10,438	4,045	100
1909.	15,727	11,373	4,354	101
1910.	17,078	12,522	4,556	98
1911.	17,651	13,046	4,605	91
1912.	18,813	13,594	4,729	90
1913.	19,366	14,036	4,845	80
1914.	19,866	14,505	4,	

of 1933, 1934 and 1935 will not become commensurate with the efforts until some time in 1935, 1936 and, especially and most probably, in 1937 and subsequent years; and that, under American conditions, a system of managed or controlled inflation is impossible. Its impossibility does not arise from a defect in the machinery; the Federal Open

Market Committee, proposed in Senator Fletcher's S. 1715, may have the power to create inflation and deflation; but it cannot possibly have the required amount of foresight, in spite of the fact that, under the proposed bill, the appointive members of the Federal Reserve Board will be "persons well qualified by education and/or experience."

The apparatus of American banking is such that the full effect of a governmental monetary measure appears only years after such a measure has been brought to pass; and consequently, if inflation and deflation were to be controlled, the control would have to be performed years before the emergency which made it advisable arose—a contradiction

in terms, logic and grammar. Should Senator Fletcher's bill become an act, and should the Federal Open Market Committee attempt to enforce its provisions, the country would soon become accustomed to the spectacle of the closing of the Federal Reserve barns some two or three years after the Federal Reserve horses had been stolen.

The Chimera of Unemployment Reserves Under the American Money System



THE social value of reserves against the hazards of unemployment is not to be questioned. A greater measure of protection to wage earners against the shocks of the business cycle would do more to achieve a stability of the social structure than any item in the whole program of social security proposed by the President. Unfortunately, however, this protection cannot be achieved by any system of financial reserves that has so far been proposed. In fact, the statement may be made that financial reserves of this sort are impossible under our money system, and any attempt to create them will only serve to aggravate the very problem which they are designed to solve. Unemployment reserves—depression insurance—will, as we shall seek to show, increase both the peaks and the troughs of the business cycle. The bigger the barricade we build up by these means, the bigger the flood it will be called upon to stem.

Diverse Types of Unemployment

In discussing this problem of the futility of unemployment reserves we are dealing primarily with unemployment created by the business cycle. This, it is true, is but one of the forms of unemployment which face wage earners, but it is the most acute, the most baffling, and the most in need of solution. Unemployment may arise from factors connected with the individual, such as incompetence, sickness, accident or disinclination to work. Or it may arise from the nature of the work, which may be casual or seasonal in nature, as dock work, crop gathering, or employment in Christmas trade. It may arise from natural events, such as floods, fires and other catastrophes. It may also appear as the result of industrial shifts or technological improvements. Instances of industrial drifts appear in the decline of the starched collar industry and in the replacement of coal fuel by oil. Technological unemployment has appeared in almost every industrial activity, and has been accounted by some as the prime cause of the present depression.

The problem of meeting these various types of unemployment involves a variety of treatments. For unemployment arising from personal factors, education and vocational guidance must be the chief solution, while casual and seasonal unemployment must be met in the main by a greater development of and competence in labor exchanges and employment bureaus. To some extent, concerted management policy can iron out the seasonal curve of employment, as is now being attempted in the automobile industry by the method of staggering new models. In all these cases, as well as in cases arising from sickness or catastrophe, unemployment reserves created by the State or by industries can be of decided benefit, and no one will question their social and economic value.

But such unemployment reserves can be in their nature little more than a revolving fund in which current contribu-

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tions correspond to current benefit payments, or at most can consist of reserves to meet definitely predictable contingencies. When it is attempted to build up reserves beyond current withdrawals, or to create reserves to meet the shock of widespread cyclical unemployment the system will inevitably break down, and because of this fact, become a snare and delusion.

The Actuarial Problem

Because insurance has proved so successful in certain fields of human activity, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that it is possible to insure against depressions. Insurance is a system or a plan which distributes the losses of individuals ratably over a large number of participants in the plan. But insurance is based on the premise that losses do not occur simultaneously to all subscribers. Individual losses do not occur in any regular order, but there is some regularity of occurrence when taken collectively. This collective regularity is used as a basis for computing the deposit or premium required from each participant.

Insurance is based upon actuarial science, which is the study of the incidence of events and the determination of their course over a broad field of time and space. In life insurance, as is well known, it is possible to predict within certain limits how many persons of a given age will die in a given year, and reserves to meet this expectancy may be calculated and arranged accordingly. If the bases are taken broadly enough, life insurance can be set up in such a way that not even a war will materially upset the general scheme. Likewise, fire and marine insurance can be built up, and in this case the base is broadened by the system of reinsurance.

Inadequate Actuarial Data

The basis of actuarial science is adequate, comprehensive statistics, and the knowledge that the incidence of events will follow a regular course defined by previous history. In the case of casual, seasonal, incidental, and possibly technological unemployment, it might be possible to chart the incidences if adequate historical statistics were available. But this first requirement of a real unemployment insurance scheme is absent. Such statistics do not exist in this country. At the present time no complete national enumeration of the unemployed exists, excepting those made by the general census, and these are infrequent, irregular, and open to question as to their adequacy and reliability. Our principal information regarding the condition of unemployment consists of estimates drawn from unemployment surveys, which are chiefly made by sampling, and limited registrations of the unemployed, and such is the feebleness of this data that estimates vary by several million,

depending upon the bias or political complexion of the estimator.

It is obvious that proper unemployment reserves cannot be built up in the absence of comprehensive statistics, but what is not so obvious is that the presence of statistics would not solve the problem of unemployment reserves designed to meet cyclical unemployment. The reason that it is impossible to create any system of reserve against the contingencies of widespread unemployment is to be found in the nature of our money system and in the unpredictable character of depressions. Depressions are like earthquakes. Their coming may be sensed, but where the shock will be felt, the extent of the reverberations, or their duration, are things which so far have not been brought under the régime of predictive science. All the financial data collected by an army of Wall Street statisticians did not forestall the stock market collapse, and all the unemployment statistics the most avid collector

could desire would not keep men at work in times of depression.

Depressions cannot be predicted because, unlike death or fire or marine disaster, they are out of the natural order. Whether or not they are precipitated by natural events, they actually concern an artificial world with which man has surrounded himself and which is dominated by forces that lie within the individual. This artificial world is the world of money economy and the forces by which money economy is dominated are psychic in nature. If depressions are caused by sun spots, as some believe, it is nevertheless true that their course is determined largely by the subjective forces of fear and panic and uncertainty. These are forces which man has never learned to control. We may be able to integrate the ravages of bubonic plague without mortality tables but we cannot yet tell what a man will do under the influence of fear or excitement.

Incidence of Depressions Most Severe in the Money System

Furthermore, depressions, though they may arise from natural causes or mal-adjustments in the mechanism of physi-

72 Years in Business

John Hancock
MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A mutual dividend-paying company

**\$91,877,154.03 paid policyholders in 1934;
more than one billion dollars paid since
beginning business.**

Total insurance in force \$3,473,967,189.00.

**Total admitted assets \$684,065,767.43; policy
reserve \$569,442,629.00; other liabilities
\$52,806,893.73.**

**Total Surplus Resources, \$61,816,244.70,
comprised of Contingency Reserve held
for Asset Fluctuation \$16,500,000.00 and
General Surplus of \$45,316,244.70.**

cal production and distribution, develop their most catastrophic phases in the money system. Money, as it exists today, is the most tenuous element in the whole scheme of modern economy. It is the most susceptible to the psychic factors of depressions, and undergoes either the first or the most complete disintegration under the forces of weakening confidence. Money conforms nearer to the physicist's new theory of matter than anything we can conceive. It exists only so long as it is in motion, and like the enchanted elf of the fable, the moment it ceases to dance, that moment it disappears into thin air. Money, under our modern scheme, is merely the activity of credit. It exists only as a set of debits and credits on a book. The moment we try to congeal this ethereal substance, to bring it to rest and to lay it up in store, it ceases to be.

Money an Evidence Not of Value but of Debt

What men accept for their daily toil and for the product of the field or work bench is not a tangible substance endowed with intrinsic value but an evidence of debt. This evidence of debt consists of deposit credit, the obligation of a bank to pay out a certain sum of money on demand. The bank, as is well known, does not hold cash to meet these obligations, except to a meager extent, but holds in turn the obligations of its customers, the obligations of industry and government, and a small amount of physical property.

The nature of money becomes important when we consider that the essence of the theory of unemployment reserves is the storing up of purchasing power which may be used by wage earners during periods of unemployment. It is a modern attempt to practice the foresight of Joseph. But we cannot follow Joseph's example. We cannot lay aside money in a national granary against the seven lean years. The moment we set aside funds for a contingency, they are spent. The purchasing power of money is expended the moment it is deposited in a bank. Piling up of financial reserves against catastrophe is nothing more than the piling up of debt.

Problem of Investing Unemployment Reserves

The truth of this statement appears if we trace the practical application of a reserve fund. Reserve funds, as they are accumulated, can be kept in only two forms, either as deposits with banks or as trust funds invested in evidences of debt or ownership. The Wisconsin statute stipulates five different methods by which funds may be set aside, but in essence they all resolve into one of these two. The employer may (1) deposit his unemployment reserves with the State; (2) deposit them with a trust company or a bank with fiduciary powers under a trust agreement; (3) deposit them with a bank covered by Federal deposit insurance; (4) purchase income reserve contracts of the Fidelity Investment Association of Wheeling, W. Va.; or (5) by satisfying the commission of good financial standing, set up his fund on his own books in the form of a booking reserve account. The Wagner bill, as introduced in Congress, sets up in the Federal Treasury an "unemployment trust fund" in which is to be held all moneys received under the provisions of the act, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to invest these moneys, except such amount as is not required to meet current withdrawals, in a defined category of obligations of the United States or obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States.

We thus arrive at the paradox that

financial reserves cannot be created. Unemployment reserves, under both the Wisconsin act and the proposed Federal act, disappear the moment they are created. The purchasing power set aside to meet a crisis has been expended the moment it has been invested in a bond or held in a bank. If the money is left on deposit with a bank, it has gone into loans to bank customers, or loans to industry, States, municipalities or the Federal Government. The borrower of the money spends the proceeds in a thousand diverse channels, all tending to increase current purchasing power and to create demand for current production. If the bank buys industrial bonds on issuance, the issuer of the bonds has spent the money for the purposes designated in the prospectus—from meeting current payrolls to building new factories and productive equipment. If invested in government bonds on issuance, the money has gone into postmasters' salaries, battleships, roads, public buildings or other purposes for which the borrowing was undertaken. If the securities are purchased in the open market, the funds so used are reinvested in the capital market or used by the seller for the purchase of current consumables.

Effect Upon the Business Cycle

The effect of this process is not hard to trace, and presents a concrete example of the "over-saving" theory of depressions. While the fund is in course of accumulation, it will act as a stimulus to the investment market by creating a market demand for the obligations of government or industry. The influence of this flow of funds seeking employment will be toward lower interest rates and easy credit conditions. Government will find it easier to go into debt and corporations will be encouraged to expand their capital equipment with borrowed funds. If government should be following a program of debt retirement, the fund will become a factor in competition with private capital seeking investment, and the effect will be still lower money rates and premium prices for governments.

The extent of these influences will depend of course upon the amount of the yearly accretions to the fund but their presence cannot be denied. Conceivably they might result in over-stimulation of the investment market, and produce an orgy of speculative activity like that induced in the period 1924-29 by the large accretions to the gold stock, pyramided by the credit power of the banking system. Whether the effects would extend to this degree or not, the sum result would be to increase activity in the capital goods sector, stimulating increases in productive capacity or in government expenditure, which in turn would react in the form of an exhilarant to the whole commercial system. The curve of business would mount under this influence.

Unemployment Reserves a Form of Forced Savings

The point should here be made that the funds made available to the investment market from the unemployment reserve differ in marked degree from other investment capital. Normally, investment funds are drawn into the capital market by the demand for capital and by the opportunities offered for its profitable employment. If long-term prospects are not favorable, or if interest rates are not attractive, these funds flow elsewhere. They may flow into short-term obligations, or into equities, or they may remain in the hinterland from which they originally came, and invested in land or in equities or loans that never are traded in on the big exchanges. Or they may not accumulate, but be spent by their

possessors for current consumable goods.

But unemployment reserves constitute forced savings. They are investment funds created not by natural demand but by legislative fiat. Moreover, their application will not be in conformity with conditions in the investment market, but in channels defined and restricted by law and having no current relationship to the market.

The Problem of Liquidation

At some time or other, the business curve will turn downward, and payments from the fund will exceed the accretions. Now what will be the effect as the curve descends, and the reserve, instead of pending, begins to contract? It is the theory of advocates of reserves that as the fund is drawn down to meet benefits to the unemployed, the shock of the general decline in activity will be absorbed and broken by the force of the purchasing power poured into the market by means of unemployment benefits. This is a fallacy. The purchasing power, as we have seen, has already been spent. It cannot be spent twice. This purchasing power can come only from liquidating the investments held in the fund, by selling them to willing buyers who transfer their own purchasing power to the managers of the fund. No new purchasing power is created.

If the funds are held as current deposits, and are drawn down, it means that the banks will have to call loans to meet these withdrawals, or contract lending in other directions. It may be argued that the funds so drawn out of the bank will be replaced as the sellers of foodstuffs or clothing or shelter to the unemployed re-deposit the funds in the bank. This may be true, but the process does not create additional purchasing power; it merely transfers it.

Effect on the Investment Market

Moreover, to the extent that the reserves are held in investments, the effect will be doubled. Laying aside for the moment the very real problem faced by many banks that no purchasers may appear to take these investments off the hands of managers of the fund—the problem of liquidity—it will be seen that the mere fact of a contraction of the fund will double the stringency of the investment market. The investment market is something which constantly swallows, but never disgorges, money. In the first place, the stimulus created by the yearly increase of the fund will be removed, and the capital requirements usually financed from this source will be thrown upon the remaining investment sources, or be unsatisfied. In the second place, the remaining sources of capital funds will now be required not only to absorb the investments being thrown upon the market by the reserve, but, in addition, to take care of the capital requirements formerly financed by the reserve itself. If the reserve, instead of increasing by a hundred million dollars a year is contracted by that amount, the net effect is a drain of two hundred million dollars a year upon the investment market.

The truth of this statement is readily apparent to any one familiar with the mechanics of the investment market. The bond market of the New York Stock Exchange is normally thin and concerned with retail transactions. In 1929, with approximately 49 billion dollars of bonds listed, the average volume of monthly trading was only \$300,000,000 and never greater than .71 per cent of the total listed, while the total turnover for the year was only 6 per cent. The attempt to liquidate any considerable amount of bonds of an unemployment reserve would prove to be a catastrophic undertaking,

as many a hard pressed bank seeking to increase its own liquidity has discovered in recent years. Bond traders know that the sale of a dozen bonds of many issues may frequently depress the market by as many points.

Estimates of Reserves to Be Liquidated in Time of Depression

How catastrophic such an attempted liquidation would prove to be would depend of course upon the amount to be liquidated, and we can only guess at this. Based upon the experience of the past four years, and the amounts spent by the Federal Government, by States, municipalities and private agencies, certainly a five-billion-dollar fund would not seem enormous.

The Wagner bill, as introduced, says nothing about the maximum size of the fund, but we may take as a figure the very moderate reserves of \$75 per employee set as a maximum under the Wisconsin statute. Such a reserve for the twenty-five million wage earners who presumably will be covered by the Federal act would mean a total reserve of a little less than two billion dollars. The question might then be posed as to whether in time of depression a reserve could be liquidated without loss and without disturbing the financial machinery.

Probable Limits to Reserve Liquidation

This is of course a very theoretical question, and one which can be answered only in the most general terms. The fund could be liquidated without strain only if that amount of new money were brought into the investment market. On this question we have a figment of data. The Federal Government has increased its debt by 10 billion dollars since 1929, but an examination of the figures for holdings of governments by the banking system, including the Federal Reserve Banks, indicates that none of this increase has been absorbed by private investment sources, but that on the contrary the entire amount has been taken by the banks, chiefly in replacements of commercial and security loans and other investments that have been liquidated.

Since 1930 less than three billion dollars have been raised in the capital markets for purposes other than Federal financing, and of this three billion, fully two-thirds have been for State and municipal purposes. It is obvious that any attempt to realize on an unemployment reserve of only two billion dollars by selling its holdings in the open market—even though this liquidation extended over a period of several years—would result in incalculable havoc in the investment market. If further evidence were needed, it can be found in the surrogate's records, in the infinite patience and long period required to liquidate estates of only moderate size.

Summary

Summing up we may state: (1) Financial reserves can be effective only in cases where contingencies can be calculated and determined by actuarial methods, and where these contingencies arise in sufficient regularity to permit the arrangement of reserves in accordance therewith. (2) The incidence of depressions are irregular and unpredictable, and hence defy actuarial procedure. (3) Purchasing power cannot be stored up en masse under our money system, which is a system of debt, rather than metallic circulation. (4) The attempt to create unemployment reserve will intensify booms. (5) Unemployment reserves are incapable of mobilization when needed and any attempt to mobilize them will only result in further intensification of depressions.

Recent Books

Air Law, by Howard S. LeRoy (Randolph Leigh Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., \$3). The rapid and parallel growth of radio and aviation has given rise to new fields for the application of legal principles. The widespread adoption of these arts has produced a varying approach to fundamental regulatory problems. The legal literature which is growing up around these problems is increasing so rapidly in volume as to be entirely beyond the time requirements and library facilities of the busy practitioner, according to the publisher. Hence, this outline and guide to the law of radio and aeronautics.

Better Government Personnel, by the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel (McGraw-Hill). The commission finds that our governmental units do not generally offer the more capable men and women a fair chance, in any way comparable with that offered by private business, industry or the professions, for a lifetime of honorable work affording opportunity for advancement. The spoils system, the use of the public payroll for charity, undiscriminating criticism of public employees, and the failure to adjust our ideas, our governmental institutions and our public personnel policies to the social and economic changes since the Civil War are primarily responsible for this condition. The cure is not to be found in negative prohibitive legislation but in positive constructive action.

The commission recommends that the day-to-day administrative work of the government be definitely made a career service. To this end it presents two groups of recommendations which deal, first, with the broad aspects of the program, and, second, with a number of specific measures for immediate action.

The second group of recommendations is as follows:

1. The immediate repeal of all laws setting a definite term of office for appointive administrative officials.

2. The inclusion of all postmasterships in the civil service and their recruitment primarily by promotion.

3. The inclusion of Federal deputy collectors of internal revenue and marshals in the classified service.

4. The extension of the Federal civil service classification to include under the merit system such professional and skilled services of the regular departments as are now excepted.

5. The immediate extension of the Federal civil service system to include as far as may be practicable the personnel of the existing Federal emergency administrations, boards and agencies.

6. The extension of the merit system under the supervision of the United States Civil Service Commission, wherever practicable, to the personnel of State and local government agencies receiving or expending Federal funds, as a condition of the grant with the power to utilize existing local civil service agencies which are able and willing to meet standards set by the United States Civil Service Commission.

7. The extension of classification and salary standardization to the Federal services outside the District of Columbia.

8. The amendment of veteran preference laws so that they will adequately recognize the war service experience of veterans without conflicting with merit principles or the efficiency of the public service.

9. The immediate repeal of Section 213 of the Economy Act of 1932, which requires the discharge of one member of a married couple when both are employed in the Federal service.

10. The repeal or amendment of all general provisions prescribing residence requirements or geographic apportionment of appointments.

11. The immediate establishment or designation in every governmental department or agency of adequate size, whether Federal, State or local, of a personnel officer, who should in the larger departments, be freed of all other responsibilities.

12. The increase of the appropriations for personnel administration and the Civil Service Commission in the Federal government and in State and local governments where this is necessary for the adequate maintenance of the merit system, as a step toward the ultimate development of a career service.

Changing Asia, by Egon Erwin Kisch. (Knopf, \$3.) Contemporary history as issued by a well-known European journalist.

Chart of Plenty, by Harold Loeb and Associates (Viking, \$2.50). The result of a survey of potential product capacity in the United States made for the Federal Government by seventy engineers. The foreword is by Stuart Chase.

Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell (Columbia University Press, \$4.25). This book consists of seventeen studies of business cycles and economic theory. Those who contributed are: Asher Achinstein, Paul F. Brissenden, Arthur F. Burns, Paul H. Douglas, P. Sargent Florence, Abram L. Harris, Os-

THE TRAVELERS

L. EDMUND ZACHER, President

HARTFORD

CONNECTICUT

Annual Statements

December 31, 1934



THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY

(Seventy-first Annual Statement)

ASSETS	RESERVES AND ALL OTHER LIABILITIES
U. S. Government Bonds	\$181,661,098.00
U. S. Govt. Gtd. Bonds	4,596,200.00
Other Public Bonds	74,349,041.00
Railroad Bonds and Stocks	64,091,173.00
Public Utility Bonds and Stocks	60,357,596.00
Other Bonds and Stocks	36,881,629.00
First Mortgage Loans	78,234,156.72
Real Estate—Home Office	12,386,943.61
Real Estate—Other	40,007,429.64
Loans on Company's policies	122,282,347.37
Cash on hand and in Banks	13,649,696.14
Interest accrued	9,235,784.55
Premiums due and deferred	25,656,635.80
All Other Assets	609,543.40
TOTAL	\$723,999,274.23
	37,004,960.80
	TOTAL
	\$723,999,274.23

THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY

(Twenty-ninth Annual Statement)

ASSETS	RESERVES AND ALL OTHER LIABILITIES
U. S. Government Bonds	\$3,785,039.00
Other Public Bonds	2,063,358.00
Railroad Bonds and Stocks	2,149,592.00
Public Utility Bonds and Stocks	1,194,167.00
Other Bonds and Stocks	9,279,509.00
First Mortgage Loans	327,500.00
Cash on hand and in Banks	1,663,753.53
Premiums in Course of Collection	1,735,300.40
Interest accrued	97,541.43
TOTAL	\$22,295,760.36
	8,567,108.88
	TOTAL
	\$22,295,760.36

THE TRAVELERS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

(Eleventh Annual Statement)

ASSETS	RESERVES AND ALL OTHER LIABILITIES
U. S. Government Bonds	\$8,239,000.00
Other Public Bonds	482,000.00
Railroad Bonds and Stocks	1,483,400.00
Public Utility Bonds and Stocks	3,352,000.00
Other Bonds and Stocks	1,609,100.00
First Mortgage Loans	250,000.00
Cash on hand and in Banks	1,535,748.88
Premiums in Course of Collection	1,368,002.89
Interest accrued	139,696.13
All Other Assets	14,168.50
TOTAL	\$18,473,116.40
	4,558,842.87
	TOTAL
	\$18,473,116.40

Additional information about The Travelers Companies, including complete lists of securities, is set forth in The Travelers Year Book for 1935. Copies will be supplied upon request.

ALL FORMS OF LIFE, CASUALTY AND FIRE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES

A Comparison of Commercial Lighting Rates Charged By the Public Utilities

This is the second of a series of articles on electric utility rates in the United States. For detailed statistics on the number of cities and towns covered by this survey and the population density of the various regions see Tables I and II at page 271 of THE ANNALIST of Feb. 15, 1935.

SI M U L T A N E O U S L Y with the termination of the period in which the electric utility securities were considered "depression proof," there arose the hue and cry against the oppressive rates charged by the companies engaged in rendering this important public service. It is probably true that the inherently stable nature of the industry was, in itself, a cause of the developments which since have proved so harassing: the great clamor against exorbitant rates by the "out" politicians, Democratic or Republican, in an effort to "get in," or by the "ins" in order to "stay in"; the increased taxes with which to balance municipal budgets, already expanded to tremendous proportions for relief requirements. Unfortunately, the outmoded merchandising methods of some utilities made them vulnerable to attack; and naturally, for political reasons, the attacks centered largely on domestic rates. For this reason the attention of investment analysts has been concentrated on that field to the practical exclusion of all others. But the commercial field is important from the standpoint of the number of customers involved, and no survey of rates is adequate which does not cover the situation in respect to commercial lighting.

In comparing commercial lighting rates it is necessary to make certain assumptions, and in this study the requirements of a small store of the neighborhood type was chosen. The lighting load was assumed to be 3,000 watts, consisting of 20 bulbs of 100 watts each, 15 of 40 watts each and 16 show case bulbs of 25 watts each, all of which could be operated at one time.

Commercial Rates Lowest in East South Central States

Table I gives the arithmetic means of commercial rates by sections and for the country as a whole, and should be considered as indicative only of general

TABLE I. AVERAGE COMMERCIAL LIGHTING RATES					
	Net Monthly Bill For...				
Section.	Net Min. Charge.	200 Kwh.	600 Kwh.	1,000 Kwh.	
East So. Cent.	\$1.15	\$11.53	\$26.75	\$35.26	
East No. Cent.	1.04	11.64	25.98	37.73	
Pacific Coast	0.90	10.22	27.01	42.35	
West No. Cent.	1.52	12.13	28.15	43.04	
So. Atlantic	1.50	12.14	33.11	50.43	
Mid. Atlantic	2.42	14.12	35.64	52.44	
New England	1.24	14.76	35.83	53.03	
Rocky Mountain	1.53	14.96	36.68	51.92	
United States	1.50	12.93	31.35	46.90	
Deviation from extreme:					
From low	40.0%	20.9%	17.1%	24.8%	
From high	41.3%	15.7%	17.0%	11.8%	

trends. As in the case of the like tabulation for domestic rates, the above ranking was determined by giving a score of one to the section which had the lowest average cost for 200 kwh consumption for commercial lighting service, a score of two for the next to the lowest and a score of nine to the highest cost section. Similar rankings were given for 600 kwh and 1,000 kwh, with the sum of the three indicating the final order except in the case of two ties, in which cases the sum of the three actual averages dictated the decision.

On this basis, the East South Central section had a slight edge over the East



By FRANK D. CHUTTER
Assisted by ALBERT A. SMITH Jr. and DAVID C. ROULSTON

North Central division, followed by the Pacific Coast States. While the latter lost the premium position it held in the domestic rates, it is to be noted that its rate for 200 kwh was the lowest for the country. That the sparsely populated Rocky Mountain States has slipped down to the highest cost position is not surprising, nor the fact that the rates in New England and Middle Atlantic States are still higher than the average for the West South Central area. Again it is

to be found in the Northern and Northeastern portions of the country. The unweighted arithmetic mean of the low extreme deviations in these four sections is 44.5 per cent, as contrasted with only 19.4 per cent for the Southern, Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States. A similar average of the high extreme deviations is 59.1 per cent in the five Southern and Far Western sections against 33.7 per cent in the Northern and Northeastern portions of the country. This

North Central areas, the average costs for these sections being within 16 cents of each other. The West North Central States occupy fifth place, and the remaining places are unchanged from the general ranking.

The high, low and average commercial lighting rates for 600 kwh. consumption in each section of the country, with percentage deviations from average, are shown in Table III. Again it is to be observed that, on the whole, the low extreme deviations, expressed in percentages of average, are almost twice as large in the East North Central, Middle Atlantic and New England States than in the other sections of the country. Contrary to what was found in the case of 200 kwh. consumption, it cannot be said that the high extreme deviations are generally smaller in the three Northeastern portions of the country than in the other sections. It is still true, nevertheless, that in the former areas and in the South Atlantic States, the sums of the high and low percentage deviations from the sectional averages are larger than in the balance of the country.

In ranking the sections of the country on the basis of the cost of 600 kwh. of electricity, the East North Central District has forged into first or low-cost place, followed by the East South Central States, thereby forcing the Pacific Coast area into third position. Following at a modest distance is the West North Central District in fourth place and the South Atlantic States in the fifth. The last four positions continue to remain unchanged from the general ranking and from the order which obtains in the 200 kwh. category.

The high, low and average rates for 1,000 kwh. commercial lighting consumption in each of the nine sections of the country, with percentage deviations from average, are shown in Table IV. Table IV shows that the cost of 1,000 kwh. for commercial lighting is generally the lowest in the East South Central States, the relative standing of this area having been materially improved as consumption increased. As a result of this change, the East North Central States, in which is located the lowest commercial lighting rate for a monthly consumption of 600 kwh., was forced back into second place, with the Pacific Coast District continuing to maintain the third ranking position. Following closely behind is the West North Central area, which likewise was successful in holding its fourth position established at the 600 kwh. mark after making a poorer relative showing in the smaller category. At a considerable distance the South Atlantic District shows up, still occupying the fifth rank which was attained in the previous classification after running second only to the Pacific Coast Section in the comparison at 200 kwh. In all three comparisons, the West South Central Division consistently placed sixth in respect to the sectional averages, but whereas the sparsely populated Rocky Mountain Section had previously been ranked as the highest cost for both 200 and 600 kwh., it has bettered its relative standing by two degrees. Thus, the Middle Atlantic and New England Districts are relegated to the two least enviable stations which they have attained on two other occasions as pointed out last week, although in this instance New England is in the cellar position.

For the United States as a whole, the range of the sectional averages as ex-

Table II. Extreme Rates for 200 Kwh. Consumption

Section.	City.	Low Extreme		High Extreme	
		Rate.	% Deviation From Average.	Rate.	% Deviation From Average.
New England	Milo, Me.	\$9.00	39.0	\$14.76	54.4
Middle Atlantic	Washington	7.20	20.3	11.62	41.6
East North Central	Madison	5.75	50.5	11.62	29.9
South Atlantic	Atlanta	9.32	18.7	11.46	74.5
East South Central	Montgomery (c)	9.33	19.1	11.53	47.4
West South Central	Amarillo	11.00	21.3	13.97	39.6
West North Central	Lincoln	7.32	39.6	12.13	27.8
Rocky Mountain	Boise	12.36	17.4	14.96	82.2
Pacific Coast	Seattle (f)	8.10	20.7	10.22	46.7
U. S. sectional avg.		10.22	21.0	12.93	15.7
U. S. extreme		5.75	55.8	12.93	116.6

(a) Also Manchester, Conn., and Gloucester. (b) Also Tampa. (c) Also Chattanooga. (d) Also Vicksburg. (e) Also Lake Charles. (f) Also Bellingham. (g) Also Baker and Medford.

Table III. Extreme Rates for 600 Kwh. Consumption

Section.	City.	Low Extreme		High Extreme	
		Rate.	% Deviation From Average.	Rate.	% Deviation From Average.
New England	Milo, Me.	\$21.00	41.4	\$35.83	54.3
Middle Atlantic	Buffalo (a)	16.65	52.0	34.64	53.1
East North Central	Madison	13.25	49.0	25.98	58.2
South Atlantic	Clarksburg (b)	23.25	24.1	30.63	82.8
East South Central	Covington	19.44	27.3	26.75	44.3
West South Central	Tulsa	26.40	20.7	33.31	66.6
West North Central	Lincoln	20.14	28.5	28.15	40.3
Rocky Mountain	Boise	26.94	26.6	36.68	74.5
Pacific Coast	Seattle	17.55	35.0	27.01	48.1
U. S. sectional avg.		25.98	17.1	31.35	17.0
U. S. extreme		13.25	57.7	31.35	104.1

(a) Also Niagara Falls. (b) Also Fairmont and Parkersburg. (c) Also Vicksburg.

Table IV. Extreme Rates for 1,000 Kwh. Consumption

Section.	City.	Low Extreme		High Extreme	
		Rate.	% Deviation From Average.	Rate.	% Deviation From Average.
New England	Lewiston	\$31.70	40.2	\$53.03	76.67
Middle Atlantic	Buffalo (a)	22.65	56.8	52.44	60.6
East North Central	Springfield, Ill.	20.20	46.5	37.73	61.9
South Atlantic	Clarksburg (b)	35.25	26.3	47.83	84.0
East South Central	Johnson City	24.70	29.9	35.26	64.5
West South Central	Tulsa	38.40	22.4	50.13	91.50
West North Central	Lincoln	31.54	26.7	43.04	63.50
Rocky Mountain	Boise	41.34	20.4	51.92	96.00
Pacific Coast	Seattle	22.95	45.8	42.35	56.00
U. S. sectional avg.		35.26	24.8	46.90	83.2
U. S. extreme		20.20	56.9	46.90	91.50

(a) Also Niagara Falls. (b) Also Fairmont and Parkersburg. (c) Also Vicksburg.

Table V. Range of Sectional Averages

KWH Consumed.	Low Extreme		High Extreme	
	Amount.	% Deviation From U. S. Average.	Amount.	% Deviation From U. S. Average.
200	\$10.22	21.0	\$12.93	14.96
600	25.98	17.1	31.35	17.0
1,000	35.26	24.8	46.90	13.1

KWH Consumed.	Low Extreme		High Extreme	
	Amount.	% Deviation From U. S. Average.	Amount.	% Deviation From U. S. Average.
200	\$5.75	55.5	\$12.93	116.6
600	13.25	57.7	31.35	104.1
1,000	20.20	56.9	46.90	95.1

probably safe to say that the wide variation in sectional "tendencies" for commercial rates cannot be justified fully by such factors as customer density and varied economic conditions in the respective areas. Like Topsy, the rate structures "just growed."

Variations From Sectional Averages

The high, low and average commercial lighting rates for 200 kwh. in each section of the country, with percentage deviations from averages are shown in Table II. Although in each section there is a wide variation between the sectional average and the respective low and high extremes, the greatest difference seems

suggests that, although the sectional averages vary considerably among themselves, there is a tendency for the rates to be scattered widely to the low-cost side and more concentrated on the high-cost side of the sectional averages in the North Central and Northeastern portions of the country, a characteristic which might be called low-cost skewness, as contrasted with high-cost skewness in the remaining five sections of the country.

The above tabulations show that the Pacific Coast area is the lowest cost leader in the 200 kwh. class and is followed at a considerable distance by the South Atlantic, East South Central and East

The Week in the Commodities; Reaction Moderate To Gold Clause Decision



An advance of 0.6 points for the week carried the Annalist Weekly Index of Wholesale Commodity Prices up to a new high since 1930 of 124.7 on Feb. 19 from 124.1 (revised) on Feb. 11. The rise reflected both the continuation of the advance in hog prices that has been in progress since December and the moderate recovery of the speculative markets following the Supreme Court decision on the gold clause.

The effect of the Supreme Court decision on the speculative markets may be seen from Moody's Spot Price Index of fifteen speculative commodities in the accompanying table of Daily Spot Prices. The index had been rising steadily during the previous week partly on account of advancing hog prices but partly also because of increasing confidence that whatever the Supreme Court decision means would be found to prevent a break in commodity prices. When the decision was finally announced Monday Moody's index advanced 1.7 points, a large rise for a single day, which left it at 158.8 at the close of Monday (Dec. 31, 1931=100), compared with 157.1 on the preceding Saturday. Although prices reacted somewhat on Tuesday, partly on profit-taking, the index only declined 0.1 point.

DAILY SPOT PRICES

Moody's
Index—

	Cotton	Wheat	Corn	Hogs	U. S. Old
Feb. 11.	12.55	1.11%	1.01%	7.99	155.1 92.6
Feb. 12.	Holiday.			8.00	
Feb. 13.	12.55	1.12%	1.01%	8.12	156.0 92.8
Feb. 14.	12.55	1.12%	1.03%	8.26	156.7 93.2
Feb. 15.	12.65	1.13%	1.03%	8.27	157.4 93.7
Feb. 16.	12.65	1.12%	1.03%	8.27	157.1 93.5
Feb. 18.	12.80	1.14%	1.06%	8.45	158.8 93.9
Feb. 19.	12.65	1.14%	1.04%	8.69	158.7 94.1

Cotton—Middling upland, New York. Wheat—No. 2 red, new, c. i. f., domestic, New York. Corn—No. 2 yellow, New York. Hogs—Day's average, good and choice, Chicago. Moody's index—Daily index of fifteen staple commodities Dec. 31, 1931=100; March 1, 1933=80.

As discussed in a recent issue of THE ANNALIST,¹ an adverse decision would not have affected commodity prices directly, but only through the effect on general business, unless it had been such as make unavoidable a return to the old dollar parity. In the latter event, however, the whole price structure of export and import commodities would have collapsed with repercussions on those commodities that are on a purely domestic basis. While it was not expected that this would happen, the threat remained, and contributed to the downward drift of the speculative commodities in the second half of January. Now, however final the decision may or may not prove to be, it will undoubtedly be generally regarded as settling the issue, and the removal of the uncertainty should prove beneficial.

Hog prices continued their rise, the price of \$8.69 reaching a new high since November, 1930. The Department of Agriculture reported that the number of hogs and pigs on farms on Jan. 1 was only 37,007,000 head, a decrease of 20,170,000 head, or 35.3 per cent from a year ago, when they totaled 57,177,000. The number was estimated to be the smallest in fifty years. The number in the Corn Belt (North Central States) was placed at only 24,011,000 head, a decrease of 16,924,000 head, or 41.3 per cent from the previous year's 40,935,000, reflecting the acuteness of the drought in that district.

Wheat also advanced with corn and the

¹See "Commodities Under an 'Adverse' Supreme Court Gold Clause Decision," THE ANNALIST, Feb. 1, 1935, page 204.

other grains, and flour. Lard, sugar and cocoa were higher, as were cotton, silk, hides, cottonseed oil, lead and rubber. Steers, however, declined to \$13.14 from \$13.56; lambs were lower, together with butter and eggs, coffee, apples, lemons, oranges and tin.

Wholesale prices in the leading countries were generally somewhat higher in January, and The Annalist International Composite for nine countries advanced to 73.3 in terms of gold (1913=100.0) from 72.6 in December. The composite is now the highest since Septem-

ber, and except for that month the highest since January, 1934; most of the advance of the past year, however, is due to the rise in this country on account of the drought. The advance from December reflected to a considerable degree the pressure on foreign currencies caused by the fear that the Supreme Court decision would in some way lead to a return to the old dollar parity. In France, particularly, an advance of 2 points to 346 marked a halt to the drastic deflation of the past year, while the latest weekly index for that country shows a considerable recovery since the turn of the year. Not all of that is due to the pressure on the franc, however, with its devaluation implications, part being apparently due to a checking—for the time being, at least—of the decline in business.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES

(Measured in currency of country; index on gold basis shown for countries whose currency has depreciated; 1913=100.0)

	P. C. Ch'ge From Jan., Dec., Nov., Jan., Dec.
U. S. A.	.122.6 118.0 116.4 115.2 + 3.9
Gold	73.1 70.1 69.3 66.1 + 4.3
Canada	111.7 111.2 111.2 110.3 + 0.4
Gold	66.7 66.9 67.8 68.2 - 0.3
United Kingdom	104.5 104.4 104.1 104.6 + 0.1
Gold	62.6 63.0 63.6 68.5 - 0.6
France	346 344 356 405 + 0.6
Germany	101.0 101.0 101.2 96.3 0.0
Italy	280.2 279.2 277.2 277.6 + 0.4
Gold	270.6 269.1 267.4 276.4 + 0.6
Japan	137.1 136.8 136.8 132.6 + 0.2
Gold	47.0 47.0 47.4 50.5 0.0
Composite in gold	73.3 72.6 73.1 74.3 + 1.0

*Preliminary. ¹Revised. ²Based on exchange quotations for France, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium. Back figures: For weekly figures from April 26, 1927, to Feb. 11, 1935, see THE ANNALIST of June 22, 1934, page 963, and this issue, page 323.

Indices used: U. S. A., ANNALIST; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics; United Kingdom, Board of Trade; France, Statistique Generale; Germany, Statistische Reichsamt; Italy, Consiglio dell'Economia di Milano; Japan, Bank of Japan. For back data, see THE ANNALIST, Jan. 18, 1935, pages 95, 96, 99 and 163.


COTTON

The cotton market advanced 25-odd points Monday in heavy trading on the Supreme Court decision sustaining the administration on the gold-clause abrogation. Half of the gain, however, was lost Tuesday on profit-taking and re-selling, supplemented by March liquidation in anticipation of first notice day next Tuesday. Last week the market had been virtually stationary, awaiting the decision; indeed, on Saturday several of the contracts had a price range of but 1 point, probably the least in the history of the Exchange. May closed Tuesday at 12.53, against 12.38 on Monday of the week before, and spot middling at 12.65, against 12.55; May Liverpool closed at 6.85d, against 6.74.

Spot transactions were in somewhat larger volume, amounting to 48,000 bales at the ten designated markets, against about 35,000 the week before, but were 44 per cent under last year. Inquiries, both domestic and foreign, increased, but sales continued restricted by the scarcity of offerings at prevailing prices.

January cotton consumption was the highest since September, 1933, if allowance is made for the usual seasonal fluctuations. The adjusted daily average consumption rose to 20,700 bales, from 18,000 in December and 18,900 in January, 1934, reflecting the heavy business of recent months. Exports declined further, and on a seasonally adjusted basis were lower than any months since the war with the exception of August, 1920, and May, 1923. Domestic stocks were lower in warehouses and mills; in the latter

THE ANNALIST WEEKLY INDEX OF WHOLESALE COMMODITY PRICES (1913=100)
(Unadjusted for Seasonal Variation)



SPOT PRICES OF IMPORTANT COMMODITIES

(New York Prices Except as Noted)

	1. Farm Products	2. Food Products	3. Textile Products	4. Fuels	5. Building Materials	6. Metals	7. Chemicals	8. Miscellaneous Commodities	All Commodity Dollar.
Feb. 19, 1935	\$1.14%				111.9	98.7	80.2	124.7	73.9
Feb. 11, 1935	121.6	128.2	106.4	157.5	109.6	112.1	98.7	80.1	124.1
Feb. 5, 1935	120.6	127.1	106.3	160.1	109.6	112.1	98.7	80.0	123.7
Jan. 29, 1935	117.7	127.5	107.3	160.4	109.7	112.1	98.6	79.7	123.0
Feb. 20, 1935	91.9	106.4	122.9	155.5	104.9	113.6	99.5	86.9	108.2
Feb. 19, 1935	\$1.14%				18.50-19.50	18.50-19.50	9.00-10.50		
Feb. 11, 1935	1.04%				13	12%	0.98%		
Feb. 20, 1935	28.75				28.75	21.50			
Feb. 19, 1935	21				21	.20	.12		
Feb. 11, 1935	.0446				.0430		.0450		
Feb. 20, 1935	10-10%				.10	.10%	.11%-12		
Feb. 19, 1935	.08%				.08%	.08%	.11		
Feb. 11, 1935	8.20-8.35				8.05-8.20	8.05-8.20	8.05		
Feb. 20, 1935	11.90-12.00				11.50-11.60	11.50-11.60	6.70-6.80		
Feb. 19, 1935	11.60				11.15	bid	5.10		
Feb. 11, 1935	.06%				.06%	.06%	.07%-0.07%		
Feb. 20, 1935	.07%				.07%	.07%	.08%		
Feb. 19, 1935	.31				.30%		.33%		
Feb. 11, 1935	1.31%				1.31%		1.57%		
Feb. 20, 1935	1.47-1.52				1.44-1.49		1.59-1.64		
Feb. 19, 1935	.60				.60		.65		
Feb. 11, 1935	7.25				7.25		7.25		
Feb. 20, 1935	2.05				2.05		1.75		
Feb. 19, 1935	3.85				3.85		3.50		
Feb. 11, 1935	.0400				.0400		.046%		
Feb. 20, 1935	1.177				1.177		1.197		
Feb. 19, 1935	17.90				17.90		16.90		
Feb. 11, 1935	2.124				2.124		2.028		
Feb. 20, 1935	.0355				.0350-0.0355		.034		
Feb. 19, 1935	.50%				.51		.52		
Feb. 11, 1935	.0370				.0370		.0440		
Feb. 20, 1935	.1623				*16.23		*16.50		
Feb. 19, 1935	*14.74				*14.78		*13.20		
Feb. 11, 1935	*1.65				*1.65		*1.65		
Feb. 20, 1935	*2.20				*2.20		*2.26		
Feb. 19, 1935	.31				.31		.31		
Feb. 11, 1935	.11%				.11		.10		
Feb. 20, 1935	.40%				.40%		.40%		
Feb. 19, 1935	.13%				.13%		.13%		

Monthly prices as of Feb. 15, 1935, Jan. 15, 1934, and Feb. 15, 1934. ¹Prices for previous Friday. ²Includes processing tax. ³Closing price of nearest future contract.

⁴Blue Eagle. ⁵Revised basis.

on an adjusted basis they were the lowest since 1924.

DOMESTIC COTTON ACTIVITY

(Thousands of running bales, counting round as half, linters excluded; as reported by the Bureau of the Census)

	Jan., 1935.	Dec., 1934.	*Jan., 1934.	P.C.
Consumption:				
Month	547	414	508	+ 7.7
Adjusted	20.7	18.0	18.9	-
Aug.-Jan.	2,675	2,913	8.2	-
Month-End Stocks:				
In consuming establishments	1,194	1,300	1,606	-25.6
In public storage and wareh'ses	8,964	9,641	9,496	-5.6
Total	10,158	10,941	11,102	-8.5

Exports:	Month	466	504	739	-36.9
Adjusted	9.7	10.5	19.6	-	
Aug.-Jan.	2,905	4,921	41.0	-	

Spindles (Thousands):	Active	25,146	25,057	25,647	-2.0
Adjusted	25,021	25,057	25,519	-	

*Revised. †Daily average, adjusted for seasonal variation.

Domestic cloth business continued light last week, while waiting for the gold decision. A considerable volume of business was released by the decision, but the higher prices asked at once by the mills held the volume to somewhat disappointing levels. Production in the week ended Feb. 9 was reported at 131 million yards by the Cotton Textile Institute, against the same figure the week previous, and 126 a year ago.

MOVEMENT OF AMERICAN COTTON

(Thousands of running bales, counting round as half, linters excluded; as reported by the New York Cotton Exchange)

Week Ending Thursday, Yr.'s Feb. 14, 1935.	Feb. 7, 1935.	Feb. 15, 1934.	Ch'ge 1935.
Movement Into Sight:			
During week	75	114	155 -51.6
Since Aug. 1	6,702	9,882	-32.2

Deliveries During Week:	To domestic mills	101	145	-26.2
To foreign mills	120	105	195	-38.5

To all mills	227	206	340	-33.2
Deliveries Since Aug. 1:				
To domestic mills	2,821	3,425	17.6	
To foreign mills	3,049	4,801	-36.5	

To all mills	5,870	8,226	-28.6
Exports:			
During week	65	109	147 -55.8
Since Aug. 1	3,056	5,226	-41.5

World Visible Supply (Thursday):	World total	6,150	6,302	8,209 -25.1
Week's change	-152	-92	-185	

U. S. A. only	4,359	4,456	5,461 -20.2
Certified Stocks:			
Thursday	96	99	285 -66.3

THE GRAINS

The wheat market, after advancing moderately last week on a better cash demand and the poor crop prospects in the Southwest and Canada, rose sharply on the gold decision Monday, with gains of 2 cents up to the time that trading was suspended. On reopening Tuesday, the market was at first active but later turned dull and prices reacted somewhat with profit-taking, the gold decision proving to have less effect than had been expected. May closed at 98 1/4, against 96 (corrected) on Monday a week ago; trading volume for the week ended Feb. 15 was the lightest in over two years, reflecting the expectation of a gold decision. May Winnipeg closed at 83 1/2, against 82% (relatively unaffected by the decision, thanks partly to the "pegs"); and May Liverpool at 4s 11 1/2d, against 4s 10 1/2d, likewise not much excited by the Supreme Court decision.

Recent rains in the Southwest have failed to reach the driest areas of the Winter wheat belt, and this with very light marketing was a strengthening influence in the cash situation. Only 326 cars were received at the principal central and Southwestern markets, against 821 a year ago.

The Australian crop is now estimated at 135 millions of bushels, against 175 last year; the carryover is placed at about 35 millions by the trade, the largest for any period for which data are available, except during the war period. Allowing for normal domestic requirements, the Southern Hemisphere surplus for export or carryover is about 290 millions

COMMODITY FUTURE PRICES

(Grains at Chicago; Others at New York)

Daily Range

Cotton:	March		May		July		October		December		January	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Feb. 11	12.35	12.30	12.41	12.36	12.41	12.37	12.33	12.27	12.38	12.32	12.38	12.34
Feb. 12		Holiday										
Feb. 13	12.36	12.29	12.42	12.36	12.45	12.36	12.35	12.26	12.41	12.34	12.41	12.34
Feb. 14	12.37	12.32	12.44	12.39	12.46	12.42	12.36	12.43	12.43	12.38	12.44	12.38
Feb. 15	12.44	12.37	12.50	12.44	12.53	12.46	12.42	12.36	12.49	12.42	12.51	12.43
Feb. 16	12.42	12.40	12.48	12.47	12.52	12.50	12.41	12.40	12.47	12.45	12.51	12.49
Week's range	12.44	12.29	12.50	12.36	12.53	12.42	12.26	12.49	12.32	12.51	12.34	
Feb. 18	12.65	12.32	12.73	12.39	12.75	12.42	12.65	12.31	12.69	12.38	12.70	12.41
Feb. 19	12.58	12.43	12.66	12.52	12.70	12.58	12.59	12.47	12.67	12.55	12.67	12.57
Feb. 19 close	12.44t		12.53t		12.58t		12.49t		12.55t		12.57t	
Contract range	{ 14.15	11.13	14.23	11.79	14.21	12.03	12.71	11.74	12.76	12.22	12.70	12.25
	Aug. 9	My. 1	Ag. 9	My. 25	Ag. 9	Nv. 1	Ja. 2	Ja. 31	Fe. 1	Fe. 2	Fe. 18	Fe. 2
	May											
Wheat:		High.		Low.		High.		Low.		High.		Low.
Feb. 11	.96%		.95%		.89 1/2		.89		.87%		.87%	
Feb. 12	Holiday											
Feb. 13	.97%		.95%		.90		.88 1/2		.88 1/2		.87 1/2	
Feb. 14	.97%		.95%		.89 1/2		.88 1/2		.88 1/2		.87 1/2	
Feb. 15	.98%		.96%		.90%		.89 1/2		.89 1/2		.88 1/2	
Feb. 16	.98%		.97 1/2		.91 1/2		.90 1/2		.89 1/2		.88 1/2	
Week's range	.98		.95%		.91 1/2		.89 1/2		.89 1/2		.87 1/2	
Feb. 18	.99%		.96%		.92 1/2		.89 1/2		.90 1/2		.87 1/2	
Feb. 19	.99%		.98		.92 1/2		.91 1/2		.91		.90 1/2	
Feb. 19 close	.98 1/2t											
Contract range	{ 1.17		.93 1/2		.98 1/2		.86 1/2		.92 1/2		.84 1/2	
	Aug. 10		Oct. 31		Dec. 7		Jan. 15		Jan. 7		Jan. 15	
Traded week ended Friday, Feb. 15, 44,090,000 bushels; last year, 57,228,000.												

Weekly Range

Corn:	First Two Days, Week Ended Feb. 23, 1935.		Week Ended Feb. 16, 1935.		Week Ended Feb. 9, 1935.		Contract Range	
	High.	Low.	Close.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Date.
May	.89	.85%	.87 1/2 t	.87	.83%	.85%	.81 1/2	Dec. 5
July	.83 1/2	.79 1/2	.82 1/2 t	.81 1/2	.78 1/2	.80%	.77 1/2	Dec. 5
Sept.	.79 1/2	.76 1/2	.78 1/2 t	.77 1/2	.75 1/2	.77 1/2	.74 1/2	Jan. 9
Bushels traded*				33,328,000		37,219,000		
Oats:								
May	.53%	.50%	.52 1/2 t	.52 1/2	.49%	.50%	.47%	Aug. 10
July	.45%	.43%	.44 1/2 t	.44 1/2	.42%	.44 1/2	.41%	Dec. 5
Sept.	.42%	.40%	.41 1/2 t	.41 1/2	.40%	.41 1/2	.39%	Jan. 8
Bushels traded*				6,347,000		7,581,000		
Rye:								
May	.87 1/2	.65 1/2	.66 1/2 t	.66 1/2	.63 1/2	.65 1/2	.61 1/2	Aug. 9
July	.67 1/2	.64 1/2	.65 1/2 t	.66	.63 1/2	.65 1/2	.62	Feb. 5
Sept.	.67 1/2	.64 1/2	.65 1/2 t	.65 1/2	.64 1/2	.65 1/2	.62 1/2	Feb. 6
Dec.				2,513,000		4,60		

Financial News of the Week



EARNINGS of Loew's, Incorporated, showed a substantial improvement during 1934. Average weekly net income, adjusted for seasonal variation, for the twelve weeks ended Nov. 22, 1934, stood

at the highest level since 1931. It was necessary to reduce interim earnings to an average weekly basis, because the report for what is equivalent to the first quarter of the year covers sixteen weeks, while the other three reports cover twelve weeks. Table I gives important balance sheet and income account items, together with certain ratios. Table II gives interim earnings for 1933 and 1934. The company's fiscal year ends on Aug. 31.

Loew's, Incorporated, which is a holding company, was incorporated in 1919 under the laws of Delaware as a successor to Loew's Theatrical Enterprises. Its many subsidiaries are engaged in all branches of the motion picture industry and in the vaudeville field. The capital structure of the company consists of common and preferred stock and funded debt. As of Aug. 31, 1934, outstanding preferred stock amounted to 136,722 no-par shares, while common stock outstanding totaled 1,464,205 no-par shares. Subsidiary preferred stocks were listed at \$4,948,032. Funded debt of the parent organization amounted to \$8,715,000 on Aug. 31, 1934, while subsidiary bond and mortgage debt totaled \$22,383,456. The company was also contingently liable for \$1,697,000 as joint guarantor of mortgages of affiliated corporations.

TABLE II. LOEW'S, INC.

	Operating Income		Net Income		Common Share		Earned a Share	
16 weeks ended:								
Mar. 15, 1934 . . .	\$3,948,106		\$2,378,864		\$1.44			
Mar. 16, 1933 . . .	2,672,429		1,271,371		.68			
12 weeks ended:								
June 7, 1934 . . .	2,950,299		1,777,278		1.07			
June 8, 1933 . . .	1,266,565		322,746		.08			
12 weeks ended:								
*Aug. 31, 1934 . . .	1,578,738		1,729,147		1.05			
*Aug. 31, 1933 . . .	1,571,568		1,688,263		1.03			
12 weeks ended:								
Nov. 22, 1934 . . .	3,167,903		2,001,308		1.23			
Nov. 23, 1933 . . .	2,732,607		1,594,608		.95			

*Obtained by deducting prior results from full-year total. *Based on 1,464,205 common shares and on 136,722 preferred shares in November, 1934; 138,349 shares through November, 1933, and 140,497 shares prior to that.

INDUSTRIALS

American Type Founders Company—The merger of the company's plants in Elizabeth and in Jersey City, N. J., will be completed by April 1 and all manufacturing operations will be conducted in the Kelly Press division of the company in Elizabeth. The merger is part of the reorganization of the company under trusteeship recently approved by the courts.

Armour & Co. of Illinois—The directors have extended from March 10 to April 1 the time in which holders of the 7 per cent preferred stock of the company may exchange their holdings for the new prior preferred and common stocks. They also declared the regular quarterly dividend of \$1.50 a share on the prior preferred stock.

Algoma Steel Corporation, Ltd.—Justice J. A. McEvoy, at Osgoode Hall, Toronto, Ont., approved on Feb. 12 a proposed sale of the assets of the Algoma Steel Corporation, Ltd., founded in 1907, to a new company known as the Algoma Steel Corporation, Ltd., having a capital structure consisting of \$2,700,000 of 5 per cent preference stock and 130,000 shares of no-par value common stock. The new company was incorporated last year.

By the order, completion of the transaction is conditional upon enactment by the Ontario Legislative Assembly of certain necessary validating legislation.

Application for the order was made by E. Ward Wright, K. C., representing the Toronto General Trusts Corporation, trustee for the holders of first and refunding mortgage bonds of the old Algoma Steel Corporation, of which \$14,945,454 are outstanding, with interest unpaid from April 1, 1932. Mr. Wright said there was also outstanding \$5,278,000 of "purchase-money bonds" of the corporation, with interest unpaid from Dec. 1, 1931. The corporation, he said, had total liabilities of approximately \$26,000,000.

General Motors Corporation—General Mo-

tors plans a program of expansion in a comparatively new industry, the manufacture of Diesel-electric railway equipment. It has taken an option on property near Chicago, where it expects to proceed immediately, through its subsidiary, the Electro-Motive Corporation, with the construction of a new Diesel locomotive manufacturing plant. This was announced on Feb. 13 by Alfred P. Sloan Jr., president of General Motors Corporation.

For thirteen years the Electro-Motive Corporation has been supplying railroad equipment. During the recent expansion in the demand, particularly for Diesel electric locomotives, it has been necessary to

lease. With any increase in traffic there will be need for replacements.

"Any resumption in operations by the producers of capital goods, such as here is contemplated, will help remove a fundamental barrier to recovery and stimulate greater industrial activity."

The construction of the first unit will begin immediately, and it is expected that the plant will be operating by August of this year.

Hamilton Woolen Company—The properties of the company, the stockholders of which recently voted to liquidate, have been sold to interests connected with J. P. Stevens & Co. of New York City, according to an

plan of reorganization. Mr. Pitt states he is authorized to negotiate and asks whether the trustee and inspectors are prepared to consider a firm offer. It is proposed to make payment in full, in cash, of the claims of unsecured creditors.

The plan provides for recognition of and continuance in force of all secured claims against the company.

The first mortgage bonds would be continued and arrears of interest paid, subject to certain changes to be approved by the bondholders.

An issue of 5 per cent second mortgage debentures is proposed. The total would not exceed \$3,000,000, of which \$1,000,000 would be issued to the new interests for cash; \$500,000 in part settlement of the claim of Price Realty Company, Ltd., and the balance under certain conditions.

Holders of preference shares would receive in exchange six new common shares for each preference share. Holders of common would receive one new share for each two held.

The scheme, as outlined, would be effected as follows:

The present share capital would be replaced by 2,000,000 common shares of no-par value. The new interests would undertake to subscribe and pay for 1,000,000 at \$5 a share; 377,058 would be issued to holders of present preference shares, and 213,416 to holders of present common.

The letter concludes that in the event the scheme is consummated the company could be taken out of bankruptcy.

Spreckels Sugar Corporation—Morris L. Rosenwasser, First Assistant Corporation Counsel of Yonkers, N. Y., obtained permission last week from Federal Judge John C. Knox to intervene in behalf of the city in foreclosure proceedings against properties of the Spreckels Sugar Corporation and the Syrup Products Company, Inc.

Yonkers, the attorney explained, had a lien of \$592,000 for taxes and water rates against the companies, which takes precedence, he said, over all other liens.

The United States District Court, Mr. Rosenwasser contended, erred in failing to provide that the portion of property subject to the city's lien should be sold separately and at not less than the levy. The case will be taken to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company—The company has mailed stock certificates to its common and preferred stockholders representing the dividend consisting of one-fourth of a common share of the Radio Corporation of America for each preferred or common share of Westinghouse, declared on Jan. 8 by the board of directors.

In the letter accompanying the dividend A. W. Robertson, chairman of the board, said Westinghouse would hold 74,799 common shares of R. C. A. after the distribution of the dividend, which amounted to 665,533 shares, and that it expected to sell its holdings on the open market before Nov. 21.

Under the consent decree of Nov. 21, 1932, Westinghouse and the General Electric Company were ordered to dispose of at least one-half of their R. C. A. holdings within six months and of the remainder by Nov. 21, 1935. Westinghouse distributed 1,334,000 of its 2,842,950 common shares by a stock dividend in February, 1933, and has sold 643,500 shares in the open market since that time.

Holders of preferred shares of Westinghouse received a form to permit them to obtain the optional dividend of \$3.50 in cash in exchange for the dividend one-fourth share of R. C. A. common stock. The right to elect the cash option may be exercised only by preferred stockholders of record of Jan. 21. It is not transferable and will expire on Nov. 1.

The General Electric Company in February, 1933, distributed 4,807,321 of its 5,188,755 shares of R. C. A. common stock to its stockholders, leaving it with 381,434 shares. More than two-thirds of this number has been sold in the last two years.

In December, 1934, General Electric sold privately at 99 1/4 the approximately \$1,600,000 debentures of Radio Corporation of America maturing in 1942, which it received in satisfaction of certain inter-company debt. The bonds bear 2 per cent fixed interest and 3 per cent additional interest if earned until Nov. 1, 1937, and thereafter fixed interest of 5 per cent.

General Electric holds 27,080 shares and Westinghouse 50,000 shares of Class A preferred stock of the Radio Corporation, on which dividends in arrears were cleared up recently and regular dividends resumed in the first quarter this year.

MINES

Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Company—Ore mined and trammed to mill amounted to 352,850 tons in January, against 352,460 tons in December and 355,360 tons in January, 1934. Gold recovery in January is estimated at 9,612 fine ounces, compared with 10,571 in December and 11,079 in January of last year.

Base Metals Mining Corporation, Ltd.—




Table I. Loew's, Incorporated
(Thousands)

Years ended Aug. 31:	Gross Income.	Operating Profit.	Federal Taxes.	Minority Interest.	Net Income.	Dividends Declared.	Total Common Share.	Surplus for Year.
1925	\$56,295	\$6,996	\$674	\$1,034	\$4,978	\$2,022	\$4,69	\$2,856
1926	62,210	9,235	1,125	1,253	6,548	1,591	6,17	4,957
1927	79,597	9,919	1,237	1,611	6,737	3,713	6,35	3,024
1928	99,260	11,186	1,152	1,115	8,568	13,381	5,98	5,187
1929	116,202	15,682	1,608	1,968	11,757	5,004	7,91	6,753
1930	129,521	18,930	1,893	2,095	14,600	5,771	9,65	8,829
1931	120,401	15,039	1,554	1,321	11,830	6,657	7,43	5,173
1932	†107,416	10,275	987	1,002	†7,961	6,784	4,80	1,177
1933	†84,939	7,267	517	94	†4,034	4,184	2,15	1,150
1934	†96,878	†11,210	696	201	†7,480	4,987	4,50	5,492

*Includes \$422,663 in 1932, \$350,615 in 1933 and \$142,757 in 1934 profit on company securities retired. *Interest not deducted as was the case in prior years. In addition a stock dividend of 25% was paid to common shareholders on June 18, 1928. d Deficit.

sublet portions of this construction work to plants not operated by General Motors. It has not been possible through this method to handle the increased business satisfactorily, it was said. Accordingly, it has been decided to centre the manufacture of Diesel-electric locomotives in a new and modern plant near Chicago.

"In making this move," said Mr. Sloan, "we are prompted by the belief that perhaps the most important need looking to recovery in this country is the entrance of private initiative and capital into new fields of development. General Motors is demonstrating its faith in the possibilities of the future.

"We are firmly convinced that the railroads are entering a period of important development in which new and economical equipment will enable them to improve their service to the public. We believe that the present trend of applying Diesel power to railroad requirements in the form of locomotives and switch engines for handling standard railroad equipment is only in its infancy, with wonderful possibilities for growth.

"It is important from the standpoint of revenue for the railroads to find means of reducing the cost of operating their present passenger and freight equipment. The use of Diesel-electric power units offers important practical possibilities in this field, including greater flexibility of service and fuel costs approximately one-fourth the cost of fuel for a comparable steam locomotive.

"The decline in railroad traffic with the accompanying curtailment in the purchase of new equipment has been one of the most serious problems of the depression years. During the past few years the railroads have not replaced their equipment and much of it is now obso-

le—announced by Richard Lennihan, president of the Hamilton company.

The new owners will keep the mill open, employing the 1,000 or more workers employed by the Hamilton company, with the prospect of additions later.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation—The company has announced plans for the construction of a new \$4,000,000 blooming plant on the South Side, Pittsburgh, Pa., as part of modernization program to replace a plant now in operation.

Phelps Dodge Corporation—The company has sold a subsidiary, the National Electric Products Corporation, to a group headed by W. C. Robinson of Pittsburgh. This subsidiary, which has been managed by Mr. Robinson, is the largest steel conduit company in the world. Its business and plants once constituted the National Metal Molding Company. The consideration was not stated.

In October, 1930, the Phelps Dodge acquired National Electric Products, and in 1932 it formed the Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation out of the American Copper Products Corporation and the Habirshaw Cable and Wire Corporation, subsidiaries of National Electric Products.

The National Molding division was then operated as National Electric Products. Although National Electric Products does some copper wire business, its activities are confined largely to steel conduits. The fact that the steel conduit business did not fit in with the copper business was said to be a factor in Phelps Dodge's disposal of National Electric Products.

Price Brothers & Co., Ltd.—P. W. Pitt, representing British financial interests, has sent to Gordon W. Scott, trustee in bankruptcy of the company, details of a

Profit before depreciation, depletion, taxes and deferred development is estimated for 1934 at \$128,888. Production value was \$396,204; with freight to be deducted. Cost of production was \$267,316. New ore was developed in the final quarter east of the West Monarch ore body and a stope opened for sixty feet. Diamond drilling in the vicinity of both the East and West Monarch ore bodies was unproductive.

Dome Mines—Value of January bullion production amounted to \$545,789, a decline of \$57,508 from the total in December and comparing with \$641,637 in January, 1934. The January total this year represents production after the deduction of the Dominion Government's bullion tax, which was not in effect a year before. The decline from the previous month's total was due to the treatment of lower-grade ore.

United Verde Copper Company—At the annual meeting of the company, four directors of the Phelps Dodge Corporation were elected directors of United Verde. At the organization meeting Louis S. Cates, president of Phelps Dodge, was made president of United Verde. Recently the Phelps Dodge Corporation purchased a substantial stock interest in United Verde from heirs of the late Senator W. A. Clark.

Wingold Mines, Ltd.—The annual meeting has been called for Feb. 27 at Winnipeg. Development progress of the property will be brought up to date at the meeting. One by-law to be presented provides for issuance of certain shares in payment for the purchase of gold reserve No. 5 mineral claim.

RAILROADS.

Canadian National Railways—Authority to refund Canadian National securities aggregating \$200,000,000 was sought in a bill introduced in the House of Commons on Feb. 14 by E. N. Rhodes, Minister of Finance. If the full amount of refunding contemplated in the next year were possible, a saving of about \$500,000 a year in interest rates would be effected, Mr. Rhodes said.

Canadian National issues which are callable this year at from par to 103 are as follows:

4 per cent perpetual stock.....	\$60,833,333
7 per cent debenture bonds.....	23,989,000
7 per cent debenture bonds.....	23,779,000
4½ per cent gold bonds.....	26,000,000
4½ per cent gold bonds.....	35,000,000

In addition, these issues mature this year: \$17,000,000 at 4½ per cent; \$532,800 at 6 per cent and \$12,355,000 at 7 per cent. These make a grand total of \$199,489,133, which if it could be converted at 3½ per cent would effect a saving of more than \$3,000,000.

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company—Federal Judge James H. Wilkerson in Chicago on Feb. 13 granted the protective committee for holders of 7 per cent and 6 per cent preferred stock the right to intervene in the pending reorganization of the company.

At a hearing relative to the reorganization under Section 77B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, lawyers stated that the committee now represented holders of more than 160,000 shares of the stock, aggregating in excess of \$16,000,000, or about 30 per cent of the total.

Hudson & Manhattan Railway Company—Directors have declared a semi-annual instalment of interest at 2 per cent out of surplus income for 1934 on the 5 per cent adjustment income bonds, payable on April 1, 1935. Interest at the rate of 2½ per cent was paid on Oct. 1, 1934, making a total disbursement of 4½ per cent out of 1934 earnings.

No dividends have been paid on the non-cumulative preferred stock of the company since disbursement of \$2.50 a share on Aug. 15, 1933, and the last payment on the common was \$1.25 a share on Dec. 1, 1932. The company failed to earn adjustment bond interest requirements by \$86,000 in 1933 and by \$151,000 in 1934.

Interest on the adjustment income bonds was paid at the semi-annual rate of 2½ per cent from Oct. 1, 1923, to Oct. 1, 1934, inclusive. The interest is cumulative, but is not due and payable except when and as declared by the directors out of available surplus income as determined by the board.

Missouri Pacific Railroad—John W. Stedman, chairman of the committee for holders of first and refunding mortgage 5 per cent bonds last week announced that the committee had rejected a plan of reorganization for "Mop" proposed by O. P. Van Sweringen, which would have salvaged a large measure of the Alleghany Corporation's control of the line.

The committee rejected also a proposal of Mr. Van Sweringen that the Missouri Pacific carry out a contract under which it was to pay the Alleghany Corporation \$20,000,000 for certain terminal properties and real estate at and near Kansas City. A decision by a special master in Federal court in St. Louis on Feb. 13 held that the contract should be disaffirmed as "unduly burdensome" to the railway.

The Missouri Pacific paid about \$3,000,000 to the Alleghany Corporation on account of the contract between March 1, 1931, and Dec. 30, 1932. Mr. Stedman's committee and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation demanded an investigation of the transaction after the railway entered bankruptcy in June, 1933.

Mr. Stedman is a vice president of the Prudential Insurance Company, which has proposed a plan of reorganization for the Chicago & Eastern Illinois, another Van Sweringen line in bankruptcy. Mr. Van Sweringen opposes the plan.

Mr. Stedman's committee is the only one of several formed to protect Missouri Pacific bondholders that Mr. Van Sweringen has approached with his reorganization plan. In respect to the \$224,040,000 of bonds that Mr. Stedman's committee represents, Mr. Van Sweringen would substitute a new bond bearing 1 per cent fixed interest and 3 per cent interest conditioned on earnings.

By the substitution of income bonds for the present junior Missouri Pacific bond issues and of new common for the present preferred and common stocks, Mr. Van Sweringen would retain for the Alleghany Corporation a substantial portion of its approximately 50 per cent control in the line. This in turn would improve the status of a \$48,260,000 bank loan secured by about 50 per cent of Alleghany Corporation stock.

Mr. Stedman's statement follows:

"In view of the publicity recently given in the newspapers to a plan for the reorganization of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, which is being prepared by O. P. Van Sweringen, John W. Stedman, chairman of the committee for Missouri Pacific Railroad Company first and refunding 5 per cent mortgage bonds, which is the largest bond issue of the Missouri Pacific system, made this statement in behalf of the committee:

"He said that the committee had not been given a copy of the plan, but that Mr. Van Sweringen had appeared before the committee and had described the plan in some detail. Mr. Stedman understands that it is proposed to make certain changes in the plan before it is filed, but, unless the changes are radical, the plan will not be acceptable to the committee.

"The fundamental principle upon which the plan is based seems to the committee to be unfair to all bondholders and particularly to the first and refunding mortgage bondholders. Mr. Stedman stated that he could not go into details of the plan until it is filed, but that, unless it is substantially changed, the committee will not be able to recommend its adoption by the bondholders."

Mr. Stedman's statement was considered significant because his committee includes S. Parker Gilbert, a partner in J. P. Morgan & Co., who hold a large amount of the \$48,260,000 bank loan secured by Alleghany Corporation common stock.

New York Central Railroad Company—Permission to apply to the Public Works Administration for a loan of \$1,500,000 to buy and lay 20,000 tons of new rails was asked on Feb. 14 of the Interstate Commerce Commission by the New York Central. Of the total \$1,206,000 would be for purchasing rails and \$294,000 for appurtenances and labor.

New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio Company—Holders of \$8,000,000 of prior lien bonds maturing on March 1 have received an offer of an extension to March 1, 1950, at an interest rate of 4½ per cent. The offer is made by the Nypano Railroad Company, a line leased by the Erie Railroad Company. Holders accepting the offer are expected to deposit their bonds on or before Feb. 28 with J. P. Morgan & Co.

Edward B. Smith & Co. and Brown Hariman Co., Inc., are offering, up to March 1, 1935, to purchase, at the principal amount thereof and accrued interest, bonds from holders who do not wish to accept the extension offer.

UTILITIES

American and Foreign Power Company, Inc.—The bank loans of the company, which originally stood at \$50,000,000 and which now amount to \$39,833,800, have been extended from Oct. 26, 1935, to Oct. 26, 1938. C. E. Calder, president of the company, has announced.

At the same time, the \$35,000,000 note of the American and Foreign Power Company held by the Electric Bond and Share Company has been extended from Nov. 15, 1935, to Nov. 15, 1938.

As a result of these extensions, all funded debt maturities, sinking-fund and contractual requirements of the American and Foreign Power Company and subsidiaries to the public have been reduced to \$1,914,000 for the balance of 1935, to \$1,842,000 for 1936, and to \$1,507,000 for 1937.

Mr. Calder also announced that after reducing the bank loans by \$1,232,520 at the time of making the extension of the loans, and after providing for semi-annual debenture interest due on March 1, 1935, the company and its subsidiaries had \$11,015,600 cash in banks in New York.

Of the bank loans, which amounted to \$42,388,200 on Sept. 30, 1934, including \$8,477,000 held by the Electric Bond and Share Company, the balance being held by banks, the Electric Bond and Share Company holds \$7,976,762 and the banks hold the remainder.

Insull Utility Investments, Inc.—Tentative plans for reorganization of the company under Section 77B of the amended Bankruptcy Law were submitted on Feb. 15 to James H. Wilkerson, Federal judge, by

Sims, Stransky & Brewer, counsel for three petitioning creditors.

The plans provided that New York and Chicago banks, which hold most of the assets as collateral for loans, receive 60 per cent of the stock in a new company, which would have a million shares of no par value. Debenture holders would get 25 per cent and other creditors the balance of 15 per cent.

Samuel A. Ettelson, attorney for the debenture holders, objected to circulation of the plan on the ground that Judge Wilkerson has not approved a reorganization petition. Consideration of a reorganization plan is premature, he contended.

Harry A. Bigelow, trustee in bankruptcy for the defunct concern, called the court's attention to "inaccuracies" in the letter to creditors advising them of the plan. The letter asserted that the assets total \$30,000,000 to \$35,000,000, while Mr. Bigelow said assets were less than \$13,000,000.

The letter also stated that the trustee had \$3,000,000 in assets, of which \$1,044,506 consisted of cash and the balance securities. Mr. Bigelow told the court that about \$315,000 had been paid in counsel fees and administrative expenses.

Sixteen suits are pending against New York and Chicago banks to recover about \$15,000,000 alleged to have been improperly placed as collateral for loans before the receivership in 1932.

Judge Wilkerson, acting on motion of attorneys for the petitioning creditors, continued the hearing of the reorganization petition to May 15 on condition that nothing be done to interfere with the trustee's administration of the estate under regular bankruptcy proceedings.

Kansas City Power and Light Company—Because of uncertainty about the gold-clause decisions, the company rescinded last week its call for redemption on March 1 of \$3,000,000 of its outstanding \$6,000,000 first-mortgage thirty-year 4½ per cent series bonds, due in 1957. It has offered, however, to purchase at 104½ and accrued interest any or all of the bonds that had been called.

The price named in the offer is the same as that announced for the redemption, and the other has been extended a month beyond the original redemption date, or to April 1, subject to withdrawal.

Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated, Ltd.—At a special general meeting of the company authority was given for a bond issue of \$150,000,000 if and when the directors deemed it expedient and practicable to retire outstanding bonds.

Senate Approves Investigation of Telephone Companies—Investigation of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and all other telephone companies was approved on Feb. 12 by the Senate, which passed the Wheeler resolution directing such an inquiry by the Federal Communications Commission and authorizing \$750,000 for the purpose.

The resolution, which now goes to the House, instructs the commission to make a "prompt, vigorous and effective" inquiry to "develop the facts for the information and protection of the public and for the basis of rate investigations." The House Interstate Commerce Committee has reported to the House a similar resolution sponsored by Representative Rayburn.

Senator King objected to the appropriation, saying that taxpayers were already too heavily burdened.

INSURANCE COMPANIES

Aetna Life Insurance Company—Premium income of the company and affiliated companies amounted to \$126,553,553 in 1934, as compared with \$117,725,741 in 1933, an increase of \$8,827,812.

Aetna Life alone has a premium income \$4,927,987 higher at \$79,009,081, and a gain in surplus of \$2,438,772. New business totaled \$272,838,666, exclusive of additions of \$479,561,479 under group policies. Total insurance in force at the year end was \$40,400,504,967, a rise of \$78,114,315 in 1934. Total assets rose from \$446,773,067 to \$465,572,083.

The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company had underwriting profit of \$844,684, net interest and rents of \$940,602, assets of \$32,018,063, a rise from \$30,465,583, and a surplus gain from \$7,606,046 to \$9,463,862.

The Automobile Insurance Company had an income from interest and rents of \$534,014 and an underwriting profit of \$576,418. Assets rose from \$18,248,791 to \$18,368,291, and surplus from \$3,366,337 to \$4,667,679.

The Standard Fire Insurance Company's assets increased from \$4,454,067 to \$4,475,536, and surplus from \$1,225,164 to \$1,468,070. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company of Illinois—Statement for 1934 shows premium income for the year of \$18,307,575, compared with \$16,004,197 in 1933. Assets increased from \$17,222,827 on Dec. 31, 1933, to \$19,545,750 at the end of last year. Earnings for the year amounted to \$3,014,293, of which \$2,876,778 was paid to policy holders in dividends after provision had been made for all known and contingent reserves. The balance was added to the policy holders' surplus account.

National Life and Accident Insurance Company, Inc.—Statement for 1934 shows an increase of \$32,135,459 in life insurance in force, exclusive of reinsurance, with

\$397,162,475 insurance in force at the end of the year. Total claims paid amounted to \$5,614,764. The total increase in life insurance in force in 1934 was \$56,771,166. Total assets on Dec. 31 amounted to \$38,564,519 and capital and surplus was \$6,280,659.

Prudential Insurance Company of America

Production of new business in 1934 exceeded \$2,000,000,000, more than 10 per cent above 1933 production, according to a report by Edward D. Duffield, president. Insurance in force was more than \$15,000,000 covering 22,000,000 policy holders. Assets increased \$130,000,000 to \$2,965,245,000 in 1934. Further substantial additions were made to contingency reserve, resulting in a margin of \$183,295,000 for protection of policy holders over and above all liabilities. Payments to policy holders and beneficiaries, including matured endowments, cash surrenders, dividends, disability payments and annuity payments, amounted to nearly \$420,000.

Sun Life Assurance Company—Annual report for 1934 shows an increase in assets of \$41,232,681 to a total of \$665,378,716, new paid-for business of \$236,215,901, an increase of approximately \$20,000,000 over 1933; cash in banks amounting to about \$20,000,000 and an excess of income over all disbursements of \$43,589,726.

The total income for the year from all sources amounted to \$159,251,028, an increase of \$7,015,206 over that of 1933. The total disbursements were \$115,661,302, a decrease of \$11,844,499. The report points out that the surplus earned during the year amounted to \$21,281,235, of which \$13,219,504 has been paid or allotted in dividends of participating policies.

The financial report presented by Arthur B. Wood, president, stated that no payment of dividends to shareholders or allotment of surplus to shareholders' account has been made, conforming to the decision to defer consideration of these matters until business recovery is more fully established.

INVESTMENT TRUSTS

Equity Corporation—The corporation has mailed a notice of a meeting of stockholders to be held on March 11 to vote on a proposed merger with two controlled companies, the Interstate Equities Corporation and Chain and General Equities, Inc.

Stockholders of the latter two companies have approved the merger. The consolidation will result in simplification of the structure of the Equity group of companies.

Net assets of the Equity Corporation on Dec. 31, 1934, were \$6,525,781, compared with \$4,384,457 on Dec. 31, 1933. Net assets of the Equity Corporation and controlled companies were equivalent to \$58,38 a share of preferred stock on Dec. 31, leaving a balance of 14 cents a share in asset value for each common share. This compared with \$56.09 a share for the preferred stock and 9 cents a share for the common on Sept. 30, 1934, and \$56.93 a share for the preferred and 15 cents a share for the common on Dec. 31, 1933.

MISCELLANEOUS

"Baby Bonds" to Be Issued March 1—The government will begin its experiment with "baby bonds" on March 1, the Treasury announced on Feb. 17, offering them in denominations from \$25 to \$1,000 at 14,000 postoffices on a basis to yield an interest rate of 2.9 per cent compounded semi-annually if held for ten years.

The first series probably will be dated April 1. No definite limit was fixed on the amount of the offering, but the Secretary of the Treasury will have authority to terminate it whenever it seems desirable.

The fears expressed in some banking quarters that the sale of the bonds would place the government in active competition with savings banks were somewhat allayed when details of the procedure were made known. Under the plan the 2.9 per cent yield would be realized only if the bonds were held to maturity, and those who turn them in at earlier dates—the Treasury will redeem them at any time after sixty days from the date of issue—would receive a lower return.

This is accomplished by selling the bonds on a discount basis and arbitrarily fixing the sum which the purchaser would receive at the end of the first year and at intervals of six months thereafter.

Purchasers who turn in bonds for redemption prior to the close of the first year, if the bond is redeemed, will pay a premium equal to 1 1/3 per cent over that period, and the redemption value of the bond will thereafter continue gradually to increase and will be stepped up more rapidly after the end of the seventh year, the final payment on maturity representing the yield of 2.9 per cent on the investment.

Under the "discount plan" and the rate fixed by the Treasury, purchasers will pay \$18.75 for a bond of \$25 maturity value, \$37.50 for a \$50 bond, \$75 for a \$100 bond, \$375 for a \$500 bond and \$750 for a \$1,000 bond. The difference between the price paid at issue and the maturity value represents a premium or interest.

The process by which the redemption

value of the bond is gradually increased was illustrated by the Treasury. At the end of the first year the redemption value of a \$100 bond will be \$1 more than the amount paid for the bond on the discount basis and thereafter it will be increased by another \$1 every six months until the end of the seventh year. From that time until maturity at the end of ten years the redemption value will be increased by \$2 every six months. The other denominations will increase proportionately at the same rate.

In the case of the \$100 bond, for which the purchaser will pay \$75, the plan gradually to step up redemption value will work out as follows:

At the end of the first year, \$76; 1½ years, \$77; 2 years, \$78; 2½ years, \$79; 3 years, \$80; 3½ years, \$81; 4 years, \$82; 4½ years, \$83; 5 years, \$84; 5½ years, \$85; 6 years, \$86; 6½ years, \$87; 7 years, \$88; 7½ years, \$89; 8 years, \$92; 8½ years, \$94; 9 years, \$96; 9½ years, \$98; 10 years, \$100.

In the case of the \$1,000 bond the procedure would be the same except that the increases in redemption value would be ten times the amount as specified for the \$100 bond. The plan works out on the same proportionate basis for all of the denominations.

Chicago Joint Stock Land Banks—The protective committee for bondholders, headed by Robert Stevenson, has announced the approval of a plan for liquidation of the bank's assets. It is proposed that the assets be offered for sale by the receiver and a bid of \$10,681,024 was made by the committee. This sum is equal to 25 per cent of the principal amount of the bonds, which would be reduced by the amount of dividends paid to bondholders by the receiver in addition to the first dividend of 30 per cent and the book value of all assets withheld from sale.

If the committee is the successful bidder, a corporation would be organized to issue five-year income debentures to present bondholders to a total equal to 24 per cent of the principal amount of the outstanding bonds, or, making an allowance for a 10 per cent dividend which may be paid by the receiver, to 14 per cent. In addition, no-par common stock would be issued to present bondholders at ten shares for each \$1,000 bond, such new stock to be placed in a voting trust.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—A survey by the corporation shows that on Oct. 1, 1934, 98.53 per cent of the number of accounts in banks which are members of the corporation was fully insured under the present maximum of \$5,000 of insurance on an individual account.

Of the total deposits of \$35,975,239,000 in all insured banks, \$15,647,231,000, or 43.49 per cent, had insurance.

In the case of banks with deposits of more than \$50,000,000, those accounts which had full insurance represented 97.16 per cent of the total. The corporation said, however, that the dollar total of deposits insured in this group of the largest banks amounted to only about 26 per cent of the total of all the deposits in this group.

This was largely accounted for, the corporation said, by the fact that these large banks held the deposits of institutions and corporations and served as correspondents for smaller banks.

Mitten Bank Securities Corporation—Announcement that a downward readjustment of the capitalization of the company was under consideration by the directors was made by W. K. Meyers, the president, at a disorderly meeting of stockholders on Feb. 15.

National Department Stores, Inc.—A plan of reorganization of the company and its subsidiary, the Tech Corporation, was filed in United States District Court in Wilmington, Del., on Feb. 15. Judge John P. Niels was asked to set a date for a hearing.

National Department Stores had filed a petition of bankruptcy under Section 77b in the Federal court in Wilmington on June 12, 1934. Joseph Bancroft, Samuel C. Lamport and Harry H. Schwartz were appointed trustees. Robert H. Richards, representing the company, informed the court that the directors had approved the plan.

Under the plan, creditors having claims of \$150 or more would receive 25 per cent in cash and 75 per cent in preferred stock to be issued by the new company. The plan provides also for the following new securities: 6 per cent money notes of subsidiaries guaranteed by the new company to the extent of \$2,500,000; 5 per cent secured notes, issued to bank creditors, about \$500,000; 6 per cent preferred stock to general creditors, 2,000,000 shares; common stock for stockholders as follows: for each first preferred share, three and one-half new common shares; for each second preferred share, one and one-half common shares; for each common share, one-fourth common share.

Paramount Publics Corporation—Federal Judge Coxe, New York, has signed an order approving modifications of the plan of reorganization of the company and indicated that as soon as attorneys had agreed on phraseology he would sign orders holding three deposit agreements to be fair.

In approving the reorganization plan, which was submitted by Alfred A. Cook,

counsel for Paramount and the stockholders' protective committee, Judge Coxe held the plan to be "fair and equitable." He said it did not "discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders" and that it was "feasible."

Further hearings were adjourned until April 4 at 2:15 P. M., when it is expected the plan will be submitted for final confirmation.

Prudence Company—Federal Judge Grover M. Moscovitz in Brooklyn Monday appointed Adolph C. Kiendl special commissioner to preside in an inquiry into an attempted reorganization of the \$13,800,000 collateral bond issue of the Prudence Company, Inc., in the Supreme Court in Manhattan.

The projected reorganization was about to be consummated when the Federal court in Brooklyn assumed jurisdiction over the company under Section 77b of the National Bankruptcy Act and enjoined further action on the plan. A group of bondholders represented by Archibald Palmer objected to the plan on the ground that the reorganization committee was not representative of the bondholders.

Securities and Exchange Commission—Numerous rules and regulations have been issued by the commission during the past week. On Feb. 13 rules governing the filing of applications for the permanent registration of securities on national securities Exchanges were announced. Amendments to the Instruction Book for Form 10 for corporations, promulgated in December, and several new regulations under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were included.

On Feb. 14 the commission made public

Continued on Page 338

CORPORATE NET EARNINGS INDUSTRIALS

Company.	Net Income 1935.	Net Income 1934.	Com. Share Earnings. 1935.	Com. Share Earnings. 1934.
Best & Co.	\$953,449	\$711,972	\$3.14	\$2.33
mYr. Jan. 31.				
Caterpillar Tractor Co.				
For January.	277,958	223,019		
Loblaw Groceries, Ltd.				
4 wk. Jan. 12.	88,274	90,923		
32 wk. Jan. 12.	470,274	468,439		
	1934.	1933.	1934.	1933.

Company.	Net Income 1935.	Net Income 1934.	Com. Share Earnings. 1935.	Com. Share Earnings. 1934.
Leath & Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	23,355	*102,378	p.94	...
Leland Electric Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*59,679	*91,380		
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. and Subs.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,590,806	826,118	.82	.43
Lima Locomotive Works, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*490,826	*646,893		
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*190,891	25,692		.10
Manufacturers Finance Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	203,618	305,913		
McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*27,509	24,757		a.90
McKee (Arthur G.) & Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*86,390	*152,478		
McKeesport Tin Plate Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,859,339	1,888,416	6.19	6.29
Meiville Shoe Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,692,913	1,355,516	4.16	3.22
Midvale Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	632,591	28,349	3.16	.14
Modine Manufacturing Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	228,525	60,959	2.26	.61
Mohawk Carpet Mills, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*73,568	348,371		.63
Motor Wheel Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	409,673	122,168	.48	.14
Munsingwear, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*20,876	287,269		1.91
Murray Corp. of America				
11 mo. Nov. 30.	*363,229			
National Candy Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	432,312	713,939	1.53	2.99
National Sash Weight Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*74,194	*78,622		
National Transit Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	517,025		1.01	...
Neisner Brothers, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	831,994	461,320	3.35	1.48
New York Air Brake Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	54,556	*333,378	.21	...
Northern Pipe Line Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	83,687	60,827	.69	.50
Novadel-Agenc Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,012,907	922,777	2.12	1.93
Owens-Illinois Glass Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	6,496,359	6,032,312	5.41	4.86
Parker Rust Proof Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	691,067	403,958	5.78	4.11
Park Utah Cons. Mines				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*83,262	*88,725		
Pitney-Bowes Postage Meter				
Yr. Dec. 31..	301,835	216,708	.35	.25
Pittsburgh Screw & Bolt Corp.				
mYr. Dec. 31..	203,147	*143,700	.14	...

Company.	Net Income 1934.	Net Income 1933.	Com. Share Earnings. 1934.	Com. Share Earnings. 1933.
Purity Bakeries Corp.				
12 wk. Dec. 29..	107,756	181,126	.14	.23
Yr. Dec. 29..	209,217	723,679	.27	.94
Prentice-Hall, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	268,447	194,290	2.59	1.38
Ross Gear & Tool Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	248,476	139,091	1.72	.96
Rubberoid Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	415,807	146,968	3.13	1.10
St. Croix Paper Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*108,887	*138,187		
Sharp & Dohme, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	941,555	975,379	.18	.22
Square D Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	428,769	93,026	b.24	a.93
Standard Fruit & Steamship Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,708,587	2,121,372		
Stutz Motor Car Co.				
Yr. Oct. 31..	*246,545	*457,822		
Thatcher Mfg. Co.				
Dec. 31 or..	120,673	138,940	.07	.19
Yr. Dec. 31..	635,614	488,028	1.32	.28
Truett Pork Stores, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	17,133	111,477	.19	.18
Union Oil of California:				
Yr. Dec. 31..	2,902,733	1,954,279	.66	.45
Union Twist Drill Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	161,973	*71,266	.58	...
United Carbon Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	1,452,939	1,636,217	3.55	...
United Piece Dye Works:				
Yr. Dec. 31..	*1,870,516	*2,324,125		
United States Envelope Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	343,105	462,308	2.40	6.94
U. S. Hoffman Machinery Corp.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	44,376	*299,353	.20	...
U. S. Tobacco Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	3,411,116	3,396,482	7.09	7.03
United Verde Extension Mining Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	312,769	712,736	.29	.68
Wahl Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	23,207	65,389	p.2.12	p.5.98
Westmoreland Coal Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	42,771	*435,269	.21	...
Westmoreland, Inc.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	78,533	49,429	.39	.25

PUBLIC UTILITIES

1935.	1934.	1935.	1934.
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Detroit Edison Co.				
12 mos. Jan. 31.	5,474,670	6,358,560	4.30	5.00
			1934.	1933.
			1933.	1933.
Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	571,971	641,914	1.22	1.54
Bell Telephone Co. of Pa.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	7,877,853	5,910,380	p.39.39	p.29.55
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp.				
mDec. 31 qr.	2,126,687	3,813,578	.03	.18
mYr. Dec. 31.	9,681,748	12,496,759	.24	.51
Kansas City Power & Lgt. Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	3,322,832	3,212,725	p.83.07	p.80.32
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	4,539,948	2,018,877	4.13	1.83
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	2,003,400	1,924,635		
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	14,548,216	14,049,010	5.33	5.06
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31..	2,138,217	2,105,419	4.93	4.85

The Accepted Record of Financial Information

More investors, bankers, brokers, and business executives turn every day to The New York Times for the facts and figures and news of the business world than to any other publication.

More financial announcements appear in The New York Times than in any other publications, although thousands of lines of advertisements failing to

Company	—Net Income— 1934.	Com. Share Earnings. 1933.	1934.	1933.
Quebec Power Co.				
Yr. Dec. 31. 1727,181 1750,882				

Western Union Telegraph Co.: mYr. Dec. 31. 2,243,084 4,364,882 2.14 4.17

RAILROADS

Alabama Great Southern R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. 547,695 484,466 2.20 1.80

Ann Arbor R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. *52,288 *226,032 ...

Atch., Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Sys.: mYr. Dec. 31. 7,001,314 3,698,671 .32 p.2.98

Central R. R. of N. J.: mYr. Dec. 31. *1,536,070 *2,309,738 ...

Chi., Indianapolis & Louisville Ry.: Yr. Dec. 31. *1,416,314 1,514,467 ...

Delaware, Lack. & Western R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31*. 972,613 *2,993,862 ...

Florida East Coast Ry.: mYr. Dec. 31. *2,806,591 *3,185,635 ...

Erie Railroad System: mYr. Dec. 31. 601,034 531,528 r1.11

Gulf, Mobile & Northern R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. *170,740 *55,712 ...

Mobile & Ohio R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. *1,704,221 *1,549,892 ...

Nash., Chatt. & St. Louis Ry.: mYr. Dec. 31. *351,939 *292,326 ...

New York Central R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. 7,682,334 *5,412,514 ...

Northern Pacific Ry.: mYr. Dec. 31. 899,407 303,981 .36 .12

Pennsylvania Railroad: mYr. Dec. 31. 31,18,15,693 19,281,169 1.43 1.46

Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R.: mYr. Dec. 31. 2,921,162 2,565,250 3.38 2.97

Reading Co.: mYr. Dec. 31. 5,682,054 6,715,523 2.06 2.80

Rutland Railroad: mYr. Dec. 31. *375,102 *70,328 ...

Wabash Ry.: mYr. Dec. 31. *3,107,621 *4,823,058 ...

Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry.: mYr. Dec. 31. 1,197,549 1,065,050 a3.58 a2.28

*Net loss. tProfit before Federal taxes.

hOn shares outstanding at close of respective periods. jOn average shares. mPreliminary report. pOn preferred stock.

nOn second preferred stock. iiIndicated earnings as compiled from company's quarterly reports. aOn Class A shares. bOn Class B shares. uYear ended Dec. 31, 1933.

gOn combined preferred stocks. rOn first preferred stock.

RAILROAD EARNINGS AND STATEMENTS

Alabama Great Southern (Southern)

1934.	1933.
December net income... \$263,481	\$331,168
12 months' net income... 547,695	484,466

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe	
December net income... 911,774	193,408
12 months' net income... 7,001,314	3,698,671

Atlantic Coast Line	
December net loss... 386,347	392,781
12 months' net loss... 495,478	2,385,788

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy	
Current assets Dec. 31. 28,582,862	25,344,359
Current liabilities... 9,923,167	8,688,243
tInv stocks, bonds, &c. 4,321,509	4,412,307

Chicago & Eastern Illinois	
December net income... 114,069	*82,462
12 months' net loss... 1,494,200	2,020,504

Current assets	2,206,356
Current liabilities... 13,437,438	15,584,160

tInv stocks, bonds, &c. 12,996	31,847
Fund debt due 6 months	2,845,400

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific	
December net loss... 1,662,838	1,543,702
12 months' net loss... 16,247,621	14,412,141

Current assets	24,754,930
Current liabilities... 20,536,441	17,119,988

tInv stocks, bonds, &c. 20,351	31,050
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Fund debt due 6 months	6,269,710
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Includes \$7,189,000 Milwaukee & Northern Railroad first and consolidated mortgage bonds which matured June 1, 1934, and which were extended to June 1, 1939.	110,162,176
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Chicago & North Western	
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Gross assets... 75,893,418	73,334,501
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Expenses, taxes, &c. 67,917,875	59,500,072
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Operating income... 7,975,543	8,804,429
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Eq rents, &c. 773,439	2,772,715
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Net operating income... 5,202,104	6,031,714
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Other income... 3,301,285	3,386,994
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Total income... 8,503,389	9,418,708
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Interest, rents, &c. 8,276,194	7,875,419
--------------------------------	-----------

Current assets Dec. 31. 29,219,533	25,041,575
------------------------------------	------------

Current liabilities... 45,584,749	34,327,981
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tInv stocks, bonds, &c. 4,120,655	4,280,456
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Fund debt due 6 months	6,550,800
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Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha	
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Gross assets... 14,848,618	14,527,600
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Expenses, taxes, &c. 13,386,652	12,143,359
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Operating income... 1,461,966	2,384,241
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Eq rents, &c. 859,981	846,697
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Net operating income... 601,985	1,537,544
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Other income... 80,709	84,804
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Total income... 682,694	1,622,348
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Interest, rents, &c. 2,605,904	2,682,573
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Net loss... 1,923,210	1,060,225
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Clinchfield	
-------------	--

December net income... 474,789	651,853
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12 months' net income... *	*
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*Taxes and charges entirely absorbed by earnings, leaving no balance to be carried to surplus.

Delaware & Hudson	
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December net income... 474,353	*268,783
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12 months' net loss... 2,601,063	3,699,772
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*Loss. tAfter taxes and charges.

Industrial \$130,624,000

Public utility 9,372,000

State and municipal 9,774,000

Foreign 14,857,000

Miscellaneous 1,007,000

Total \$165,634,000

Aberdeen, Wash., various of local improvement bonds called for payment at par between Feb. 2 and Feb. 28, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer.

American Chain Co., Inc., \$1,325,000 of first and collateral trust 6s, due April 1, 1938, called for payment at par on March 20, 1935, at the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., New York. Lowest and highest numbers called: \$125 denomination, B6

B196; \$250 denomination, A9, A944; D1, D575; M2, M3847.

Britton, S. D., all warrants to and including registered number 530 of Independent School District 1 called for payment at par immediately at the First National Bank, Britton.

Chicago (City of), various of tax-anticipation warrants called for payment at par on Feb. 19 and Feb. 21, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer, Halsey, Stuart & Co., Chicago, the Guaranty Trust Co., New York, and the Board of Education, 228 North La Salle Street, Chicago.

Embassy Realty Co., \$13,000 of first 6% due to March 1, 1940, called for payment at 100% (1936 maturity) and 101 (1937 maturity) on March 1, 1935, at the First Trust Co. of Appleton, Appleton, Wis.

Klots Throwing Co., entire issue of first refunding 6s, due March 1, 1939, called for payment at par on March 1, 1935, at the Irving Trust Co., New York.

Liberty Bank and Trust Co., entire series CB, CD, GA, GB and GC of first real estate bonds due March 1, 1936; Series AAA, CF and GF, due Sept. 1, 1936; Series CG, CH, CI and CJ, due March 1, 1937; Series GG and GH, due Sept. 1, 1937, and Series GN and GO, due March 1, 1938, called for payment at par on March 1, 1935, at the Liberty Bank and Trust Co., Louisville.

Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of Los Angeles (now Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of San Francisco), \$302,000 of 6s, due March 1, 1954, called for payment at par on March 1, 1954, at office of the bank, Federal Reserve Bank Building, 400 Sansome Street, San Francisco. Numbers called: M250145 lowest, M251474 highest; XM250001 and XM250002.

Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of Salt Lake City, \$414,000 of 6s, due March 1, 1954, called for payment at par on March 1, 1954, at office of the bank, 206 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Lowest and highest numbers called: Coupon bonds, M250004, M251638; coupon bonds, XM250046, SM250049; registered bonds, M250051, M250056; registered bond, VM250004, registered bonds, XM250006, XM250006.

Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of San Francisco, \$332,000 of 6s, due March 1, 1954, called for payment at par on

1,000 Natl Surety 25 25 .25 -.01

*Stocks fully listed; others are dealt in as unlisted issues.

DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN

1934. 1933.

Current assets	6,240,839	7,147,239
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Current liabilities	14,507,021	10,649,167
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tInv stocks, bonds, &c.	34	34
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Fund debt due 6 months	2,907,420	991,420
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Erie

Current assets Dec. 31. 18,191,473	18,113,899
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Current liabilities	23,439,258
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tInv stocks, bonds, &c.	8,682,490
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Fund debt due 6 months	6,355,124
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International-Great Northern

December net loss.... 1,195,907	1,113,983
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12 months' net loss.... 1,417,368	1,285,393
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Kansas City Southern

December net loss.... 89,625	162,404
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12 months' net loss.... 1,009,127	1,244,546
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Long Island

December net income.... 205,975	335,035
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12 months' net income.... 392,052	2,243,258
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Minneapolis & St. Louis

December net loss.... 274,500	197,527
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12 months' net loss.... 2,943,072	2,745,626
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Florida Public Service Co.—It has been announced that there is available for distribution an amount sufficient to pay \$3.33 per \$32.50 coupon due Aug. 1, 1934, and \$6.67 per \$32.50 coupon due Feb. 1, 1935, attached to the first A 6% due 1949. There is also available for distribution an amount sufficient to pay \$10 per \$30 coupon due Oct. 1, 1934, attached to first B 6%, due 1955. Coupons should be presented with names and addresses of owners to Transfer and Coupon Paying Agency, Room 2,016, 61 Broadway, New York, where payment will be made and coupons appropriately stamped.

Glenly Real Estate, Ltd., in default on Feb. 1, 1935, interest payment on issue of collateral trust 6 per cent notes, due 1937.

Medico-Dental Building Company of San Diego—Under adjustment plan, maturity date of all bonds was extended to November, 1949, and interest rate reduced to 4 per cent May 1, 1935; 5 per cent to 1936, and 6 per cent thereafter, on issue of first 6% due to 1941. Interest at reduced rate was paid Nov. 1, 1934.

Northeast Corner Fifteenth and Spruce Streets (Philadelphia)—All outstanding bonds have been extended to June 15, 1938, and interest reduced to 3 per cent per annum. Interest at reduced rate was paid to Dec. 15, 1934.

St. Louis Chain Store Properties, Inc.—New securities issued under plan of reorganization recently consummated are available for delivery at the Mercantile Trust Co., Baltimore, to holders of certificates of deposit, issue of first 6s, due 1943. For each \$1,000 of old bonds depositors will receive a like principal amount of new collateral trust bonds and two shares of Class B common stock of St. Louis Properties Corp., the new company. New securities will be accompanied with a cash payment for interest for six months ended Oct. 1, 1934, payable April 1, 1935, to holders of record March 25, 1935.

Sheldan Construction Co.—The Detroit Trust Co. has announced that offer made to holders of first 6s, dated Dec. 1, 1927, to pay June 1, 1933, and subsequent coupons at 50 per cent of face value is still open.

6,700 Crandon Avenue Apartments (Chicago), in default on Oct. 1, 1931, principal payment, and April 1, 1932, interest payment, on issue of first 6s, due to 1940.

Willoughby Building (Brooklyn, N. Y.), in default on Sept. 1, 1934, principal and interest payment on issue of first 6% due to 1941.

Westmoreland Apartments (St. Louis)—Interest due Feb. 1, 1935, has been paid to depositors at the rate of 5 per cent per annum in accordance with plan for extension of all maturities to 1938 on first 6%.

Current Security Offerings

BONDS

Boston Metropolitan District, Mass., \$8,500,000 rfdg coupon 3s, M&S, due March 1, 1936-1980, 1960 maturity at 100% to yield 2.98% and 1936-1950 maturities to yield 0.50% to 2.95%, offered Feb. 18. Chase National Bank, Bankers Trust Co., Estabrook & Co., L. F. Rothschild & Co., R. H. Moulton & Co. Inc., First of Michigan Corp., Roosevelt & Weigold, Inc., Kelley, Richardson & Co. Inc., N. Y.; Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago; Whiting, Weeks & Knowles, Inc., Lee Higgins Corp., Paine, Webber & Co., Boston.

Connecticut, State of, \$2,000,000 0.29% temporary loan notes, due Aug. 20, 1935, placed privately Feb. 18. Lincoln R. Young & Co., Hartford.

Corinth, N. Y., Town of, \$225,000 Union Free School District 7 3.70s, due March 1,

1936-1965, yield 1.50% to 3.60%, offered Feb. 15. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., Buffalo.

Pineellas Water Co., \$1,000,000 1st s f 5% Series A, due Sept. 1, 1958, price 87 1/2, offered Feb. 18. Swarz, Brent & Co., Inc., Burr & Co., Inc., N. Y.; Chandler & Co., Inc., and Boenning & Co., Philadelphia.

Rochester, N. Y., City of, \$1,200,000 water 2 1/2s, F&A, due Feb. 1, 1936-1944, yield 0.50% to 2.40%, offered Feb. 14. Barr Brothers & Co., Inc., N. Y.; Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., St. Louis.

Syracuse, N. Y., City of, \$4,779,000 2 1/2s and 2.20s, \$2,779,000 rfdg 2 1/2s, M&S, due March 1, 1936-1955, yield 0.40% to 2.50%, and \$2,000,000 welfare 2.20s, due March 1, 1936-1945, yield 0.40% to 2.25%, offered Feb. 18. Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., Bancamerica-Blair Corp., Darby & Co., Adams, McEntee & Co., Inc., M. F. Schlater & Co., Inc., Edward Lowber Stokes & Co., Schwabacher & Co., N. Y.; Lee Higgins Corp., Boston; Graham, Parsons & Co., Philadelphia.

Teaneck, N. J., Township of, \$196,000 genl funding 5s, due Aug. 1, 1936-1955, yield 4% to 4.60%, offered Feb. 16. Graham, Parsons & Co., Philadelphia; Ewing & Co., N. Y.

United States Treasury, \$75,024,000 182-day Treasury bills, due Aug. 21, 1935, average price 99.941, average rate on bank discount basis 0.117%, offered Feb. 18. United States Treasury.

News of Foreign Securities



THE outstanding feature on European stock markets last week was the activity on the London Stock Exchange, where prices fluctuated widely. During the early part of the week under review prices dropped sharply as a result of the uneasiness caused by the heavy failures in the commodity markets, but a rally during the closing days more than offset these earlier losses. The Annalist index of twenty London stocks is 19.54 for Feb. 19, as against 19.14 for Feb. 12. Investigations of the failures in the commodity markets are now under way.

The possibility of a corner in the tin market was brought up in Parliament but so far no action has been taken to investigate the matter. The United States Supreme Court's decision on the gold cases caused an increase in buying, but the resulting gains were offset by profit taking on Tuesday.

Prices on the Paris market declined slightly during the week and activity was restricted. The decision of the United States Supreme Court had little effect on the market. The index of fifteen stocks is 34.20 for Feb. 19, as against 34.24 for Feb. 12. Continued declines in business activity are primarily responsible for the weakness in the security markets.

Prices also declined on the Berlin market, the index of fifteen stocks being 26.15 for Feb. 19, as against 26.51 for Feb. 12. The market for stocks and bonds has been dull.

Courtaulds, Ltd (England)—Preliminary report for 1934: Profit, after expenses, depreciation and taxes, £2,217,790, against £2,552,050 in 1933.

French Line (Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (France)—For 1934: Net loss, after expenses, depreciation, write-offs and other deductions, 45,777,000 francs, compared with net loss of 194,074,000 francs in 1933.

Harrods, Ltd. (England)—Year ended Jan. 31: Net income, £708,900, equal, after preference stock dividends, to 18.46 per cent on £2,215,194 ordinary stock, against £681,602, or 17.23 per cent, in previous year.

Kreuger & Toll Company (Sweden)—The trustees of the bankrupt concern advanced a step on Feb. 16 in preparing a composition with the company's creditors. The annual report showed that credits available to general creditors at the end of 1934 totaled 47,430,000 kroner (\$11,923,902 at current exchange).

Many credits of considerable size remain with firms with which the Kreuger & Toll concern formerly was allied. It was impossible to estimate the dividend that will finally be declared.

Standstill Credit Renewed—The fifth annual conference between creditor bank delegations of eight countries and the German debtor banks that met in Berlin to consider terms for renewing some

2,000,000,000 marks (the mark was quoted Tuesday at 40.15 cents) of short-term credits covered by the standstill agreement came to an end on Feb. 16 with a new agreement which provides:

First—The credits are continued with certain modifications for another year ending Feb. 29, 1936.

Second—All global and maximum interest rates are reduced one-half of 1 per cent except for cash advances to the banks, for which reduction is limited to one-quarter of 1 per cent.

Third—The credit lines not used by Germany for two years may be canceled up to 50 per cent, and German debtors agree "to use unavailed acceptance credit lines only by bills drawn for financing international trade, not for financing business which could be more appropriately financed by inland credits."

In addition, the Reichsbank receives the right "to postpone the provision of foreign exchange in a certain limited category of cases; namely, in certain commitment credits and direct credits where bills have been renewed continuously for at least one year." Also the interest reduction is not to apply to Swiss banks "in view of the special conditions prevailing in Switzerland."

A separate statement issued by the

United States delegation says the bills used for financing foreign trade will comply with the Federal Reserve Bank's eligibility requirements, and registered marks now sold at a discount of more than 30 per cent will be made available for travel purposes or benevolent remittances.

During last year, the creditors' report stated, the total of standstill credits have been reduced from 2,538,000,000 marks to 2,07,000,000, of which 1,734,000,000 have been used. The original amount was 6,300,000,000 in 1931.

The American share of these credits has been reduced during the year from some 900,000,000 to 430,000,000, or the equivalent of \$172,000,000, according to the United States delegation's statement. In other words, of the total reduction of some 530,000,000 marks, approximately 470,000,000 were liquidated by American banks, mostly by the sale of registered marks.

This has been a sore point with other creditor banks, which charged that the Americans were depressing the price of registered marks. But it may account for the fact that the American delegation's statement is decidedly more optimistic than the entire creditor committee's report.

The American statement stressed the "considerable improvement in Germany's

internal economy," passed rather lightly over the foreign trade deficit and concluded that the domestic improvement "and excellent handling of the difficult foreign exchange situation by the Reichsbank encouraged the feeling that the time may not be far distant when further yearly credit agreements will no longer be necessary, thereby enabling trade and finance again to be conducted on a more normal basis."

The whole creditor committee's report, on the other hand, while taking cognizance of the domestic improvement which assured debtors liquidity, nevertheless emphasized as more important "the deterioration of Germany's external trade and exchange situation," adding as if by way of comment on the trade figures issued:

"The obstacles to free international trade have grown greater, and clearing and compensation schemes—the organization of international trade on a strictly bilateral rather than a multilateral basis—have become common. Such developments can but hamper rather than restore the health of international trade. They are destructive to the use of international credits and appear also to lead to the disappearance of any hitherto existing trade surplus in Germany's favor, thus reducing the free exchange at the Reichsbank's disposal."

This in turn would naturally reduce the chance of other banks to get their money back.



LISTED FOREIGN BONDS

The par value of listed foreign bonds sold in the New York market:

N. Y. Stock Exchange, N. Y. Curb

Week ended Feb. 16, '35. \$5,120,000 \$556,000
Week ended Feb. 9, '35. 8,562,500 1,040,000
Week ended Feb. 17, '35. 16,492,000 1,547,000
1935 to date..... 55,965,000 5,466,000

1934 to date..... 14,945,500 14,911,000

FOREIGN BOND AVERAGES

(10 Foreign Issues)

High. Low. Last. Week ended Feb. 16, '35. 110.75 110.01 110.75

THE ANNALIST WEEKLY INDICES OF FOREIGN STOCK PRICES

1934. London. Paris. Berlin.

Dec. 31..... 19.49 \$32.91 \$24.73

1935.

Jan. 8.....	20.03	35.11	25.46
Jan. 15.....	20.12	37.06	25.87
Jan. 22.....	20.39	37.53	26.06
Jan. 29.....	20.06	36.48	26.61
Feb. 5.....	19.98	35.30	26.70
Feb. 12.....	19.14	34.24	26.51
Feb. 19.....	19.54	34.20	26.15

!Dec. 29.

For figures back to the beginning of 1929, see THE ANNALIST of Sept. 14, 1934, page 390.

Foreign Government Securities

	IN LONDON	IN PARIS	IN NEW YORK
	British 3 1/2% War Loan. Consols. 1960-1990.	French 3% Rentes. 1920 Amort.	German Govt. 5 1/2%. Rep. 7%.
Feb. 11.....	£106%	£89%	£119%
Feb. 12.....	105%	88%	118%
Feb. 13.....	106%	88%	118%
Feb. 14.....	107%	90%	119%
Feb. 15.....	107%	89%	119%
Feb. 16.....	Ex. closed		

	IN LONDON	IN PARIS	IN NEW YORK
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Feb. 16.....	Ex. closed		

80 Years of Economic Fluctuations on One Chart

The Annalist has prepared a chart showing business activity, wholesale commodity prices and industrial stock prices from 1854; bond yields from 1857 and commercial paper rates from 1882.

This finely printed chart, 25 1/2 x 11 in size, is suitable as a wall or desk chart. It can be kept up to date with figures published currently in The Annalist.

50 Cents Postpaid
(Plus 1¢ Sales Tax with New York City orders.)

THE ANNALIST
TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK

Business Statistics

THE ANNALIST INDEX OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

	1934.											
	Jan.	Dec.	Nov.	Oct.	Sept.	Aug.	July	June	May	Apr.	Jan.	
Freight car loadings	166.2	63.1	58.9	57.6	59.1	59.6	61.9	64.9	63.9	64.7	65.2	
Steel ingot production	69.1	57.3	42.8	36.1	34.3	40.8	77.4	77.7	69.8	48.1		
Pig iron production	52.3	37.2	33.3	31.8	31.2	34.8	40.6	64.6	63.1	54.5	42.7	
Electric power production	*100.3	97.6	93.6	92.5	92.4	94.1	96.7	95.8	95.3	96.1	89.5	
Cotton consumption	97.0	84.3	86.0	92.2	58.5	82.4	77.6	68.8	90.8	88.8		
Wool consumption	*123.1	102.2	76.0	41.2	62.8	69.0	63.0	66.8	72.6	73.9		
Silk consumption	67.1	74.6	60.8	75.5	54.4	57.1	62.1	71.8	71.6	60.6		
Boot and shoe production	97.9	88.4	91.8	107.9	108.2	107.5	130.2	130.2	104.2			
Automobile production	*107.0	95.6	43.5	51.6	52.7	62.4	70.9	71.2	70.1	78.5	57.2	
Lumber production	46.3	42.5	46.7	50.2	55.5	44.8	47.6	51.9	53.3	54.5		
Cement production	37.9	43.9	42.3	40.8	46.8	43.8	49.6	52.8	52.6	54.4	46.2	
Zinc production	65.3	66.7	68.0	66.2	53.7	52.5	51.0	52.3	59.5	59.4	62.3	
Combined index	*83.8	*78.5	71.2	70.5	66.5	71.1	73.2	77.3	80.2	80.0	73.1	

For monthly figures on the combined index back to January, 1919, see THE ANNALIST OF Jan. 19, 1934, page 177.

2 TRANSPORTATION (27)

	(Thousands)		
	P. C. Depart- ture Avge. (1930-34) Aver.		
Week ended Feb. 9:			
Total car loadings	593	650	- 8.8
Grain & gr. prod.	25	34	- 26.2
Coal and coke	160	154	+ 4.0
Forest products	25	29	- 13.8
Manuf. products	366	408	- 10.4
Year to Feb. 9:			
Total car loadings	3,361	3,835	- 12.4
Grain & gr. prod.	147	203	- 27.5
Coal and coke	907	903	+ 0.5
Forest products	124	163	- 23.6
Manuf. products	2,080	2,413	- 13.8
Freight car surplus, Jan. 14,	377	600	- 37.2
P. C. of freight cars serviceable Jan. 1	84.5	90.6	- 6.7
P. C. of locomotives serviceable Jan. 1	77.9	86.2	- 9.6
Gross revenue, year 1934	\$32,741,446	\$4,394,279	- 25.6
Expenses, year 1934	2,569,241	3,390,205	- 24.2
Taxes, year 1934	239,498	314,695	- 23.9
Rate of return on property investm't, "Fair Return"			
Year 1934:	2.26	5.75	- 60.7
Easter Dist.	1.69	5.75	- 70.6
Southern Dist.	1.25	5.75	- 78.3
Western Dist.	1.77	5.75	- 69.2

3 SUMMARY OF IDLE CARS (19)

Period Ended Dec. 31, Dec. 14, Nov. 30, Nov. 14, Idle cars.

236,110 241,110 221,645 189,610

4 AVERAGE DAILY CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (18)

(Barrels) (These figures do not include "hot" or illegally produced oil)

Code	Feb. 9, Feb. 17, 1935	1935
Texas Quota.	61,850	59,100
Panhandle.	57,000	56,800
North.	25,650	25,050
W. Cent.	150,200	150,250
E. Cent.	51,450	52,250
East.	43,650	43,750
Conroe.	47,600	47,600
S. W.	58,750	58,700
*Coastal.	128,300	128,000
Total.	1,031,700	1,014,450
Oklahoma.	497,100	507,100
Kansas.	138,600	139,000
Coast. La.	94,300	91,350
No. La.	109,500	100,450
Akansas.	32,000	31,600
Eastern.	100,700	106,850
Michigan.	30,000	38,550
Wyoming.	35,500	33,350
Montana.	9,500	11,200
Colorado.	3,500	4,200
New Mex.	49,400	47,300
California.	488,600	517,300
Total.	2,526,100	2,567,500
Excluding Conroe. \$Excluding Michigan.		
Effective Feb. 1, 1935.		

5 FAILURES (11)

Week Ended Feb. 14, 1935.

264 202 197, Feb. 15, 1935.

Trade Groups: Retail 145 146 142

Wholesale 16 23 13

Manufacturing 46 67 63

Other commercial 26 27 21

Total United States 233 263 239

Geographical Divisions: New England 39 28 24

Middle Atlantic 70 116 67

South Atlantic 20 16 12

South Central 14 10 11

Central East 37 46 54

Central West 21 16 31

Western 5 3 9

Pacific 27 28 31

Total United States 233 263 239

6 COAL AND COKE PRODUCTION (5)

(Thousands of net tons)

Week Ended Feb. 9, 1935. Feb. 2, 1935.

1,418 1,415 1,287

Bituminous coal: Total 8,510 8,490 7,720

Daily average 1,418 1,415 1,287

Anthracite (Penn.): Total 1,388 1,503 1,222

Daily average 231 250 204

Beehive coke: Total 16 16 26

Daily average 3 3 4

*Subject to revision. +Revised.

Business Statistics

THE ANNALIST INDEX OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

	1934.											
	Jan.	Dec.	Nov.	Oct.	Sept.	Aug.	July	June	May	Apr.	Jan.	
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Cotton consumption	97.0	84.3	86.0	92.2	58.5	82.4	77.6	68.8	90.8	88.8		
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Silk consumption	67.1	74.6	60.8	75.5	54.4	57.1	62.1	71.8	71.6	60.6		
Boot and shoe production	97.9	88.4	91.8	107.9	108.2	107.5	130.2	130.2	104.2			
Automobile production	*107.0	95.6	43.5	51.6	52.7	62.4	70.9	71.2	70.1	78.5	57.2	
Lumber production	46.3	42.5	46.7	50.2	55.5	44.8	47.6	51.9	53.3	54.5		
Cement production	37.9	43.9	42.3	40.8	46.8	43.8	49.6	52.8	52.6	54.4	46.2	
Zinc production	65.3	66.7	68.0	66.2	53.7	52.5	51.0	52.3	59.5	59.4	62.3	
Combined index	*83.8	*78.5	71.2	70.5	66.5	71.1	73.2	77.3	80.2	80.0	73.1	

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Manuf. products	2,080	2,413	- 13.8
Freight car surplus, Jan. 14,	377	600	- 37.2
P. C. of freight cars serviceable Jan. 1	84.5	90.6	

17
ENGINEERING CONTRACT AWARDS (14)
 (Average per week, thousands of dollars)

	Federal.	Munic.	Public.	Private.	Total.	
June '33	362	9,402	9,964	21,225	20,836	
July '33	632	5,704	6,336	6,261	12,598	
Aug.	600	7,300	7,900	6,913	14,813	
Sept.	6,020	12,413	18,433	8,238	26,669	
Oct.	33	12,163	14,502	29,670	5,736	35,406
Nov.	10,577	14,257	24,814	4,675	29,489	
Dec.	33	4,773	12,601	17,374	8,267	25,641
Jan.	34	15,532	20,262	29,854	3,542	33,395
June	34	5,624	17,343	22,967	4,531	27,498
July	34	10,224	14,516	25,040	4,460	29,500
Aug.	34	6,382	11,400	18,787	3,747	22,625
Sept.	34	4,256	15,021	19,977	4,333	23,610
Oct.	34	3,034	15,844	18,878	3,747	22,625
Nov.	34	6,332	16,725	23,057	5,826	26,883
Dec.	34	3,979	15,399	19,378	3,971	25,354
Jan. '35	5,347	15,210	20,357	4,696	25,253	

(Total per week, thousands of dollars)

	1934	1935
Oct.	3,424	15,979
Oct.	2,516	9,965
Nov.	4,966	28,141
Nov.	5,711	11,074
Nov.	1,340	16,257
Nov.	22	17,189
Nov.	2,456	10,158
Dec.	6,350	17,094
Dec.	1,979	22,080
Dec.	4,831	10,358
Dec.	271	12,065

	Week ended:	1934	1935
Jan. 31	3,616	14,589	18,205
Jan. 10	7,413	19,979	27,397
Jan. 17	5,139	16,757	21,896
Jan. 24	7,344	12,132	27,734
Jan. 31	3,219	12,592	18,111
Feb.	7	2,515	9,620
Feb. 14	2,952	5,931	8,883
Feb. 21	1,530	7,057	8,587

Four-day week.

18
AVERAGE DAILY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AWARDED (3)

137 States East of the Rocky Mountains)

	Public	Residential	Work and Utility	All Other	No. Days.
Jan.	4,374,500	2,216,000	7,171,615	26	150
Feb.	4,217,315	1,318,864	4,396,182	22	144
Mar.	1,039,852	3,442,259	12,236,605	407	27
Apr.	965,400	2,796,260	1,544,500	5,246,240	25
May	955,423	2,686,654	5,167,846	26	147
June	1,021,731	2,208,398	1,655,182	4,884,961	26
July	793,800	2,052,682	2,040,040	4,786,520	26
Aug.	690,407	1,872,481	3,890,630	4,453,518	27
Sept.	744,667	2,082,833	1,769,900	4,585,500	24
Oct.	1,011,538	2,509,192	1,691,769	5,212,499	26
Nov.	797,000	2,093,680	1,578,960	4,469,640	25
Dec.	582,040	2,002,680	1,124,240	3,705,960	25

1935.

	RESERVE BANK CREDIT	Monthly Averages of Weekly Data Adjusted for Seasonal Variation (Millions of Dollars)		
Bills	Total			
Bills	Bought	U.S. and		
Dis-	Open	Secu-		
1932.	counted.	rities.		
January	900	163	698	1,765
February	920	132	746	1,849
March	737	100	825	1,708
April	610	51	1,095	1,774
May	492	45	1,498	2,087
June	495	67	1,761	2,378
July	495	90	1,941	2,545
August	443	57	1,915	2,462
September	371	42	1,812	2,235
October	310	31	1,820	2,103
November	312	27	1,818	2,038
December	242	24	1,657	1,816

1933.

	1933	1934	1935
Bills	Totals		
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26 NEW YORK TIMES WEEKLY BUSINESS INDEX							
	Car Loadings	Steel Mill Activity	Electric Power Production	Automobile Production	Lumber Production	Cotton Cloth Production	Combined Production Index
Effective weights	25	25	20	10	10	10	100
Adjusted weights22	.11	.51	.04	.05	.07	1.0
Week Ended:							
1934.							
Feb. 17.....	60.1	56.7	93.3	71.3	71.1	89.6	81.7
July 14.....	61.5	41.6	97.3	72.7	53.7	85.6	79.3
July 21.....	62.5	40.7	97.7	71.2	51.5	88.2	79.7
July 28.....	61.0	41.0	98.6	66.3	55.9	88.1	79.8
Aug. 4.....	61.3	40.1	97.2	71.2	61.0	83.3	79.2
Aug. 11.....	60.8	39.7	97.2	71.0	66.8	80.5	79.1
Aug. 18.....	59.5	34.6	97.8	67.1	67.4	82.9	78.6
Aug. 25.....	58.9	32.2	95.6	66.0	62.8	77.7	76.5
Sep. 1.....	60.9	29.0	94.0	41.1	54.8	91.4	75.3
Sep. 8.....	60.2	27.1	93.5	58.4	64.0	57.2	73.4
Sep. 15.....	60.2	31.0	92.1	53.4	61.7	42.7	71.8
Sep. 22.....	60.2	32.3	92.8	48.5	60.0	45.8	72.3
Sep. 29.....	58.6	33.9	93.7	51.7	58.1	71.4	74.4
Oct. 6.....	57.9	35.2	93.6	30.7	64.4	86.7	74.1
Oct. 13.....	58.1	35.5	92.9	42.6	60.4	88.3	75.0
Oct. 20.....	58.6	34.6	93.7	58.4	57.8	90.2	76.0
Oct. 27.....	57.5	32.7	93.8	45.8	52.9	91.1	75.3
Nov. 3.....	59.2	37.4	93.6	35.1	53.3	92.7	75.6
Nov. 10.....	57.6	40.4	94.8	37.1	54.6	92.2	76.1
Nov. 17.....	58.9	42.0	95.4	34.5	53.4	88.2	76.5
Nov. 24.....	57.9	44.1	95.3	31.7	57.4	94.4	76.9
Dec. 1.....	58.2	46.7	98.1	34.4	55.3	92.0	78.6
Dec. 8.....	58.9	50.7	95.7	48.7	55.4	94.9	78.7
Dec. 15.....	63.2	59.3	97.3	51.8	58.1	100.9	82.1
Dec. 22.....	64.0	65.5	97.9	76.0	51.8	98.9	83.8
Dec. 29.....	63.7	64.5	98.3	96.9	55.3	76.8	83.3
1935.							
Jan. 5.....	65.0	72.3	99.2	98.5	55.0	103.0	86.7
Jan. 12.....	63.3	73.5	99.3	100.4	58.8	93.0	86.1
Jan. 19.....	63.9	75.2	100.4	100.3	56.4	93.2	86.9
Jan. 26.....	63.4	77.4	101.4	93.8	49.1	90.6	86.7
Feb. 2.....	67.1	75.8	101.2	96.1	53.3	192.9	88.2
Feb. 9.....	66.3	73.8	101.3	95.2	66.6	92.0	87.9
Feb. 16.....	64.8	69.0	101.6	96.0	62.7	...	87.1

For figures from Jan. 5, 1929, to June 30, 1934, see THE ANNALIST of June 2, 1933, page 773; May 11, 1934, page 756.

RATE OF OPERATIONS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY							
As Estimated by				Amer. Iron & Steel Inst.			
Week Ended:	U. S. Steel.	Indep.	Total.	Week Beginning:	Amer. Iron.	Steel Inst.	N. Y. Times.
1934.							
Feb. 26.....	42	46%	45	Feb. 19.....	43.6	Feb. 24.....	47
Aug. 13.....	25	26%	26	Aug. 6.....	25.8	Aug. 11.....	27%
Aug. 20.....	22	22%	22	Aug. 13.....	22.3	Aug. 18.....	21%
Aug. 27.....	19	20%	20	Aug. 20.....	21.3	Aug. 25.....	20%
Sep. 3.....	19	19	19	Aug. 27.....	19.1	Sep. 1.....	18.4
Sep. 10.....	19	21%	20	Sep. 3.....	18.4	Sep. 8.....	18
Sep. 17.....	20	22	21	Sep. 10.....	20.9	Sep. 15.....	20%
Sep. 24.....	21	24	23	Sep. 17.....	22.3	Sep. 22.....	22%
Oct. 1.....	22	24	24	Sep. 24.....	29	Sep. 29.....	24
Oct. 8.....	21%	24%	24	Oct. 1.....	23	Oct. 6.....	25
Oct. 15.....	21%	25%	24	Oct. 8.....	23.6	Oct. 13.....	25
Oct. 22.....	22	26	24	Oct. 15.....	22.8	Oct. 20.....	26%
Oct. 29.....	22%	27%	25%	Oct. 22.....	23.9	Oct. 27.....	25%
Nov. 5.....	23%	29%	27	Oct. 29.....	25.0	Nov. 3.....	27
Nov. 12.....	23%	30%	27%	Nov. 5.....	26.3	Nov. 10.....	27%
Nov. 19.....	24	31	28	Nov. 12.....	27.3	Nov. 17.....	28
Nov. 26.....	25	32	28	Nov. 19.....	27.6	Nov. 24.....	29
Dec. 3.....	25%	31%	29	Nov. 26.....	28	Nov. 29.....	28
Dec. 10.....	27	35%	31%	Dec. 3.....	28.8	Dec. 8.....	30
Dec. 17.....	28	38	34	Dec. 10.....	32.7	Dec. 15.....	33
Dec. 24.....	30	42	37	Dec. 17.....	34.6	Dec. 22.....	37
Dec. 31.....	33	44%	39	Dec. 24.....	35.2	Dec. 29.....	39
1935.				Feb. 19.....	49.1	Feb. 23.....	...


COTTON CLOTH PRODUCTION (31)							
(Thousands of Yards)							
Week Ended:	Total Prod.	Week Ended: 1934	Total Prod.	Feb. 9, 1935	Feb. 2, 1935	Feb. 10, 1935	
Oct. 6.....	117,496	Dec. 15.....	125,598	Jan. 5.....	42%	40	Dec. 31.....
Oct. 13.....	120,543	Dec. 22.....	126,175	Jan. 12.....	45%	45	Jan. 8.....
Oct. 20.....	124,127	Dec. 29.....	83,694	Jan. 19.....	51	49	Jan. 15.....
Oct. 27.....	124,909	1935.....		Jan. 25.....	47	49	Jan. 21.....
Nov. 3.....	126,663	Jan. 5.....	114,949	Jan. 19.....	54	50	Jan. 21.....
Nov. 10.....	125,348	Jan. 12.....	127,214	Jan. 25.....	54	54	Feb. 4.....
Nov. 17.....	119,282	Jan. 19.....	129,973	Feb. 4.....	52	58	Feb. 11.....
Nov. 24.....	125,093	Jan. 26.....	127,233	Feb. 11.....	50.8	51	Feb. 18.....
Dec. 1.....	111,426	Feb. 2.....	131,294	Feb. 16.....	53	51	Feb. 25.....
Dec. 8.....	120,727	Feb. 9.....	*131,000	Feb. 23.....	...	50	50

FREIGHT CAR LOADINGS (19)							
Feb. 9, 1935	Feb. 2, 1935	Feb. 10, 1935					
Grain and grain prod.	25,212	25,959	31,271				
Livestock	12,569	14,147	13,734				
Coal	150,804	155,434	139,484				
Coke	9,309	9,733	10,183				
Forest products	25,414	24,361	21,266				
Ore	3,133	3,446	2,596				
Merchandise, l. c. 1.	155,535	154,366	160,348				
Miscellaneous freight	210,584	210,718	194,886				
Car loadings (total)	592,560	598,164	573,898				

Week ended Feb. 16, 1935—Actual total, \$581,981; corresponding week in 1934, \$598,896.

30 MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY											
Call Loans			Time Loans			Prime Com'l Paper			Bankers' Acceptances, 190 Days.		
60-90 Days	4-6 Mos.	4-6 Mos.	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days	60 Days
High	Low	Ave.	High	Low	Ave.	High	Low	Ave.	High	Low</	

Stock and Bond Market Averages and Volume of Trading



AVERAGE NET YIELD ON TEN HIGH GRADE RAILROAD BONDS

	1935.	1934.	1933.	1932.	1931.	1930.
Jan. 10	3.82	4.72	4.66	5.04	4.21	4.44
Jan. 12	3.81	4.56	4.60	5.03	4.20	4.45
Jan. 19	3.79	4.44	4.62	5.05	4.18	4.42
Jan. 26	3.78	4.42	4.57	5.16	4.24	4.46
Feb. 2	3.79	4.37	4.58	5.20	4.22	4.41
Feb. 9	3.77	4.31	4.57	5.22	4.19	4.45
Feb. 16	3.73	4.23	4.77	5.11	4.19	4.43

For monthly data from January, 1857, to January, 1934, see THE ANNALIST of Feb. 9, 1934, page 274, and Feb. 23, 1934, page 349. For chart governing this period see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 19, 1934, pages 96 and 97.

AVERAGE PRICE OF 10 HIGH-GRADE RAILROAD BONDS

	1935.	1934.	1933.	1932.	1931.	1930.
Jan. 10	104.44	102.21	101.31	98.58	99.05	
13.107.24	104.24	104.62	103.32	97.96	98.84	
14.107.58	106.24	104.62	102.51	101.51	97.89	100.34
15.107.86	105.96	104.73	102.51	101.69	97.71	100.76
16.108.02	106.06		102.62	101.80		100.54
17.	106.25	104.29	102.64	101.69	97.71	100.76
18.107.89	106.58	105.24		101.65	97.74	100.82
19.108.24	106.85	105.34	102.60	101.62	98.14	
20.108.65		105.45	102.56	101.68	98.95	100.88

For complete daily figures from Nov. 2, 1931, to April 4, 1934, see THE ANNALIST issues of May 6, 1932, page 777; Dec. 2, 1932, page 745; June 23, 1933, page 864; Dec. 29, 1933, page 840; April 6, 1934, page 565.

BONDS SOLD ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Par Value)

	Week Ended	Same Week
Monday	\$6,151,800	Holiday
Tuesday	Holiday	\$13,529,000
Wednesday	7,863,100	16,473,000
Thursday	8,707,000	22,689,700
Friday	10,584,200	20,516,200
Saturday	5,594,100	10,174,500
Total week	\$38,900,200	\$83,382,400
Year to date	\$43,392,700	\$716,437,400
Feb. 19	18,198,500	17,077,000
Feb. 20	16,035,600	13,166,500
Feb. 21	12,555,800	15,646,500

BONDS SOLD ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Par Value)

	Week Ended	Same Week
Feb. 16, 1935.	1934.	
Corporation	\$28,131,500	\$62,075,000
U. S. Government	5,648,700	4,815,400
Foreign	5,120,000	16,492,000
Total	\$38,900,200	\$83,382,400

NEW BOND ISSUES (Thousands)

	Week Ended	Same Week
Feb. 15	Feb. 8, Feb. 16, 1935.	1934.
State and municipal	\$5,537	\$14,379
Fed. Int. Cr. Bks.	12,500
Total	\$5,537	\$26,879
Year to date	\$132,124	\$126,587
Feb. 19	17,077,000	
Feb. 20	16,035,600	
Feb. 21	12,555,800	

NEW BOND ISSUES (Thousands)

	Week Ended	Same Week
Feb. 16, 1935.	1934.	
Corporation	\$28,131,500	\$62,075,000
U. S. Government	5,648,700	4,815,400
Foreign	5,120,000	16,492,000
Total	\$38,900,200	\$83,382,400

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	Week Ended	Same Week
Feb. 15	Feb. 8, Feb. 16, 1935.	1934.
State and municipal	\$5,537	\$14,379
Fed. Int. Cr. Bks.	12,500
Total	\$5,537	\$11,948
Year to date	\$132,124	\$126,587
Feb. 19	17,077,000	
Feb. 20	16,035,600	
Feb. 21	12,555,800	

NEW BOND ISSUES (Thousands)

	Week Ended	Same Week
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Feb. 19	17,077,000	
Feb. 20	16,035,600	
Feb. 21	12,555,800	

DOW-JONES BOND AVERAGES (Based on closing quotations)

	10	30	
High	Second	Public	
Grade	Rails.	Util.	
Public	Indus.	Com.	
Rails.	Util.	Net.	
Feb. 11	76.42	93.27	85.20
Feb. 13	76.45	93.35	82.91
Feb. 14	76.76	93.40	83.01
Feb. 15	76.63	93.52	83.09
Feb. 16	76.66	93.37	83.00
Wk's rge.	40 bonds—High 83.09, low 82.83.		
Feb. 18	76.94	93.57	85.74
Feb. 19	76.95	93.71	85.62
Feb. 20	76.96	93.71	85.34
Feb. 21	76.76	93.78	85.34


TEN MOST ACTIVE STOCKS

Week ended Feb. 16, 1935.

Net Volume. Close. Chge.

Studebaker Corp.	110,000	%	-1%
General Electric	40,184	24	+1%
Columbia Gas & Elec.	39,900	51/4	-1%
Nat. Dept. Stores	32,900	25/4	-1%
Chrysler Corp.	30,300	391/4	+1%
United Corp.	30,300	2	-2%
Do pf.	28,300	241/2	-2%
General Motors	27,000	311/2	+1%
Pierce-Arrow	22,900	271/2	+1%
Nat. Distillers Prod.	22,400	271/2	+1%

For monthly data on the Axe-Houghton Weighted Average of Industrial Stocks from 1883 to 1929, see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 16, 1931, page 177. For corresponding figures on the Axe-Houghton Adjusted Index of Industrial Stocks, see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 16, 1931, page 163.



THE ANNALIST WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF GROUP LEADERS

43 Stocks Combined

Feb.	High.	Low.	Last.
14.	32.9	32.5	32.8
15.	33.4	32.7	33.1
16.	33.2	32.8	33.0
17.	35.3	32.7	34.5
18.	34.7	33.4	33.6
19.	35.8	33.1	35.5
20.	33.8	32.8	33.1

33 Industrial Stocks

Feb.	High.	Low.	Last.
14.	124.3	123.5	124.0
15.	125.4	123.7	124.9
16.	125.1	124.6	124.9
17.	129.9	124.0	128.

The Business Outlook

Continued from Page 306.

of many competent economists, based on purely *a priori* reasoning and the observation of general economic tendencies, that the inflationary process, once begun, is extremely difficult to control. Mr. Ficek's study affords weighty reasons why, in this country in particular, control of inflation is impossible.

All of which brings us, curiously enough, back to the Supreme Court decision in the gold-clause case, for the majority opinion stated:

Plaintiff's damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time the alleged breach occurred.

If this means anything, does it not mean that if the cost of living increases in the next few years, as and to the extent forecast in the foregoing references, people who have Liberty bonds falling due will then be able to assess damages, unless, peradventure, they can be induced to exchange them for new government obligations in the meantime? It is an interesting question.

As to immediate business prospects, current figures throw little light on the problem. The business index for the week ended Feb. 16 shows a further decrease, but this may have been the result of the well-known uncertainty over the gold cases, which only in recent weeks has begun to be reflected in the actual production and movement of goods. The outstanding feature of that aspect of the situation is the continued decline in steel ingot production, contrary to the usual seasonal movement. That the recent decline in steel output is not, however, the result of monetary uncertainty is suggested by The American Metal Market, which states:

Suspicious entertained in some quarters that the decline in buying of steel was due to uncertainty in connection with gold cases *** were not confirmed and by the same token it is now held that the decisions fully sustaining the government will not have any strong favorable influence on the steel market.

What the really strong influences in the steel market are, aside from a prospective sustained demand from the automobile industry, apparently as obscure to the trade authorities as every one else. The Iron Age lists a rather forbidding collection of items to which the recent setback may be attributed, without, however, attempting to appraise the relative influence of each item. It concludes, however, that despite a further decline in steel scrap prices, market sentiment is strengthening and confidence returning.

The most favorable item in the week's grist of statistics is on new passenger car registrations. In January, despite the fact that dealers were not completely supplied with new models, returns from eighteen States indicate that the figures for the entire country will show the highest daily average, seasonally adjusted, since December, 1930.

D. W. ELLSWORTH.

The Gold Case Decision

To the Editor of The Annalist:

Apropos of the recent gold case decision of the Supreme Court, it seems to me that the following quotation from Sir Thomas More's "Utopia," which was written about the year 1500, should make interesting reading.

THE ANNALIST cannot afford to let this decision pass without comment, and it

may be that you can do no better than Sir Thomas More did in his day.

Suppose that some king and his council were together, whetting their wits and devising what subtle craft they might invent to enrich the king with great treasures of money. First one counsellor to raise and enhance the valuation of money when the king must pay any, and again to call down the value of coin to less than it is worth when he must receive or gather any; for thus great sums shall be paid with a little money, and where little is due much shall be received. Another counsellor to feign war, that when under this color and pretense the king hath gathered great abundance of money, he may, when it shall please him, make peace with great solemnity and holy ceremonies, to blind the eyes of the poor commonalty, as taking pity and compassion, God wot, upon man's blood, like a loving and merciful prince. Another putteth the king in remembrance of certain old and moth-eaten laws that of long time have not been put in execution; which, because no man can remember that they were made, every man hath transgressed. The fines of these laws he counsellor to the king to require; for there is no way so profitable nor more honorable, as the which hath a show and color of justice. Another adviseth him to forbid many things under great penalties and fines, specially such things as is for the

people's profit not to be used; and afterward to dispense for money with them, which by this prohibition sustain loss and damage. For by this means the favor of the people is won and profit riseth two ways; first by taking forfeits of them whom covetousness of gains hath brought in danger of this statute; and also by selling privileges and licenses, which the better that the prince is, forsooth, the dearer he selleth them, as one that is loath to grant to any private person anything that is against the profit of his people, and therefore may sell none but at an exceeding dear price. Another giveth the king counsel to endanger unto his Grace the judges of the realm, that he may have them ever on his side; which must in every matter dispute and reason for the king's right. And they must be called into the king's palace, and be desired to argue and discuss his matters in his own presence. So there shall be no matter of his so openly wrong and unjust wherein one or other of them, either because he will have something to allege and object, or that he is ashamed to say that which is said already, or else to pick a thank with his prince, will not find some hole open to set a snare in, wherewith to take the contrary part in a trip. Thus while the judges cannot agree among themselves, reasoning and arguing of that which is plain enough and bringing the manifest truth in doubt, in the mean season the king may take a fit occasion to understand the law as shall most make for his advantage; whereunto all either for shame or for fear will

agree. Then the judges may be bold to pronounce of the king's side. For he that giveth sentence for the king cannot be without a good excuse. For it shall be sufficient for him to have equity of his part, or the bare words of the law, or a written and wrested understanding of the same, or else, which with good and just judges is of greater force than all laws be, the king's indisputable prerogative. To conclude, all the counsellors agree and consent together with the rich Crassus, that no abundance of gold can be sufficient for a prince, which must keep and maintain an army; furthermore, that a king, though he would, can do nothing unjustly; for all that men have, yea, also the men themselves, be all his; and that every man hath so much of his own as the king's gentleness hath not taken from him; and that it shall be most for the king's advantage that his subjects have very little or nothing in their possession, as whose safeguard doth herein consist, that his people do not wax wanton and wealthy through riches and liberty; because where these things be, there men be not wont patiently to obey hard, unjust and unlawful commandments; whereas, on the other part, need and poverty doth hold down and keep under stout courages, taking from them bold and rebelling stomachs.

STANLEY STOKES.
University City, Mo., Feb. 19.

A Distress Signal

To the Editor of The Annalist:

The gold-clause decisions bring up a very interesting question to attempt to solve.

By putting the clause in ninety-nine-year leases, corporation bonds, &c., the obvious intent was to guard against the thing that has just happened, i. e., the payment in depreciated dollars. The plan of mentioning payment in gold is obviously a failure.

My thought is this: The dollar is now legally fixed at 59.06, but for how long no one knows. That it will be revalued upward is highly improbable; that it will remain at 59.06 at least for the present, is probable; but that it will be lowered to 50 or less in the near or more distant future is a factor by no means to be overlooked.

In short, is there a clause that can be so worded as to protect against future devaluations?

The majority opinion says, "We are of the opinion that the gold clauses now before us were not contracts for payment in gold coin as a commodity, or in bullion, but were contracts for the payment of money." (Italics ours.) Might one protect himself by specifying payment in, say, a group of commodities, for example, Moody's Index?

Again quoting from the majority opinion, *** Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever." Professor Kemmerer of Princeton, writing in The New York Sun of Feb. 3, 1934, said: "*** our commodity price level, when once the adjustment to the new 59.06 cents dollar has been completely effected, would be as follows: All prices would be about 69 per cent higher than in 1926. Wholesale prices would be 139 per cent higher than for last November; general prices would be 118 per cent higher, and the cost of living would be 126 per cent higher." Perhaps the plaintiff was not damaged in current buying power, but potentially it would seem that holders of gold-clause contracts have been damaged. What about the holders of gold bonds who are to be paid in 1940 or 1945? This, however, is water over the dam; the point is to prepare for the future.

Perhaps some of your readers may have ideas to offer that might solve the problem.

GAYLORD A. WOOD.

Indianapolis, Feb. 19.

The Electric Light and Power Industry

THE following tables show important data on the electric light and power industry for 1933 and 1934. The 1934 figures are final official totals, preliminary estimates of which were

given in a table on page 102 in THE ANNALIST of Jan. 18, 1935. This issue also contained a discussion of the preliminary data. The tables were prepared by the Edison Electric Institute.

The Supply and Distribution of Electricity
(Thousands of kilowatt-hours)

	1934	1933	P. C. Ch'ge.
Generated (net)*:			
By fuel	53,291,098	47,476,277	+12.2
By water power.....	31,241,055	31,782,810	-1.7
Total	84,532,153	79,259,087	+ 6.7
Additional supply:			
Energy purchased from other sources.....	2,162,226	2,046,985	+ 5.6
Net international imports.....	882,877	605,852	+45.7
Total	3,045,103	2,652,837	+14.8
Less energy used in electric railway and other departments.....	2,013,132	1,902,423	+ 5.8
Net additional supply.....	1,031,971	750,414	+37.5
Total energy for distribution.....	85,564,124	80,009,501	+ 6.9
Lost in transmission, distribution, &c.....	14,782,344	14,255,893	+ 3.7
Sold to customers.....	70,731,780	65,753,608	+ 7.6
Large commercial (wholesale).....	36,918,569	33,722,373	+ 9.5
Small commercial (retail).....	13,150,738	12,474,822	+ 5.4
Domestic	12,797,635	11,960,256	+ 7.0
Street and interurban railways.....	4,352,119	4,003,876	+ 8.7
Municipal street lighting.....	2,203,484	2,213,007	- 0.4
Electrified steam railroads.....	702,664	661,387	+ 6.2
Municipal and miscellaneous.....	656,571	717,887	- 8.5
Total	70,781,780	65,753,608	+ 7.6

*By courtesy of the U. S. Geological Survey, with deductions for certain plants not considered electric light and power enterprises.

Number of Customers
(Average for year)

	1934	1933	P. C. Ch'ge.
Domestic	20,265,890	19,800,172	+ 2.4
Small commercial	3,705,712	3,671,102	+ 0.9
Large commercial	526,550	528,570	- 0.4
Municipal street lighting.....	38,377	37,166	..
Street and interurban railways.....	637	637	..
Electrified steam railroads.....	27	27	..
Municipal and miscellaneous.....	28,752	29,379	..
Total	24,565,945	24,067,053	+ 2.1
(As of Dec. 31)			
Farms in Eastern area (included with domestic).....	534,203	507,522	+ 5.3
Farms in Western area (included with large commercial)	209,751	206,036	+ 1.8
Domestic	20,484,232	20,004,988	+ 2.4
Small commercial	3,727,478	3,697,324	+ 0.8
Large commercial	526,853	527,656	- 0.2
All other	69,974	66,437	..
Total	24,808,537	24,295,515	+ 2.1

Revenue From Consumers

	1934	1933	P. C. Ch'ge.
Domestic service.....	\$677,697,300	\$656,570,100	+ 3.2
Small commercial (retail).....	511,681,700	499,684,400	+ 2.4
Large commercial (wholesale).....	495,657,100	465,190,800	+ 6.5
Municipal street lighting.....	92,384,400	94,269,500	- 1.4
Street and interurban railways.....	37,538,400	36,358,900	+ 3.1
Electrified steam railroads.....	6,725,500	6,549,900	+ 2.7
Municipal and miscellaneous.....	14,461,300	14,792,000	- 2.2
Total	\$1,837,046,000	\$1,773,415,600	+ 3.6

Dividends Declared

Since Previous Issue
of The Annalist

and Awaiting Payment

Regular.	Pe.	Pay-	Hldr's of	Company.	Pe.	Pay-	Hldr's of	Company.	Pe.	Pay-	Hldr's of	Company.	Pe.	Pay-	Hldr's of					
Company.	Rate.	riod.	able.	Record.	Company.	Rate.	riod.	able.	Record.	Company.	Rate.	riod.	able.	Record.	Company.	Rate.	riod.	able.	Record.	
Abbott Dairies, Inc.	.25c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Co.	7% pf	\$1.75	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	20	N Y & Hanseatic	\$.100	Q	Feb.	15	11
Do 7% 1st pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Do 6% pf	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	20	North RR of NJ 4% gtd.	\$.100	Q	Mar.	1	19	
Do 7% 2d pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Electric Stor Bat	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	9	North Penna R. R.	.51	Q	Feb.	25	Feb.	
Adams Exp 5% pf.	.125	Q	Mar.	30	Mar.	15	Do pf	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	9	Nineteen Hundred Corp.	.50c	Q	May	15	30	
Allied Laboratories	.10c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	25	Emp & Bay St Tel 4%	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	18	Do A	.50c	Q	Aug.	15	July 31	
Do \$3.50 cv pf.	.875c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	25	Empire Pow Corp	.56	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Oceanic Oil	.2c	Q	Nov.	15	Oct. 31	
Am Laundry Machine	.10c	Q	Apr.	1	Feb.	21	Eric & Pitts RR 7% gtd.	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	28	Oil Gas & Propane	.14c	Q	Feb.	15	Feb. 28	
Am Eng Svc pf.	.75c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	1	Frost N W (St. Louis, Mo.)	.50c	Q	Feb.	28	Frost N W	.50c	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28			
Amer Invstn Svc	.15c	Q	Mar.	15	Feb.	15	Gilders Co.	.25c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	18	Ogilvie F M Lt 7%	.175	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 28	
Am Inv Co of Illinois	B 10c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	12	Do pf	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	18	One-Thirty-Three Geary C	.50c	Q	Feb.	25	Feb. 15	
Do 7% pf.	.433c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	20	Gold & Stock Tel	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	30	Parke Davis & Co.	.25c	Q	Mar.	30	Mar. 20	
Am Rad & Std Sanit pf.	.15c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Goodyear T R 57 pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	1	Peoples Dr St, Inc.	.75c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar. 1	
Amer Sunattr Tob	.25c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	1	Great W Elec-Cr 6% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	30	People's Tel Co.	.25c	Q	Feb.	15	Feb. 28	
Armour & Co (Del) pf.	.175	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	10	Green Mt Pow pf	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	19	Philadelphia Co	.55	Q	Apr.	1	Mar. 1	
Do pr pf	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	10	Haloic Co	.25c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	19	Do 55 pf	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar. 1	
Do 7% pf.	.31	Q	Mar.	30	Mar.	20	Hooven & Allison 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	18	Phila, Germantown & Nor-		Q	Mar.	4	Feb. 20	
Alt & Moto Tel	.125	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	16	Holiday Inn Water 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	18	Pioneer Mill Co, Ltd.	.10c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 21	
Banjo Hyd-Elec 7% pf.	.175	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	11	Kauf Dept Str pf.	.175	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Pitts & A. Ry. pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 20	
Do 6% pf.	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	11	Kauf Dept Str pf.	.175	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Plymouth Fd, Inc.	C 1.1c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Bank of Nova Scotia	.33	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	16	Krege (S S) Co	.25c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Procter & G pf.	.15c	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Bayuk Cigar 1st pf.	.175	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	1	Libbey-O-Pd Gl	.50c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	28	Pub Co of New Hampshire		Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Birming'm W Wk 6% pf.	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Rice-Stix Dry Gds 1st pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Black-Clawson pf.	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	25	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Ritton Mfg	.6% pf	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 20	
Bristol Brass	.375	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Rite-Dry Oil & D.	.50c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 14	
Brill Mfg	.15c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Neiman Bros, Inc.	.50c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 1	
Buck Erie 7% pf.	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Parke Davis & Co.	.20c	Q	Mar.	30	Mar. 20	
Budd Realty Corp	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Seaboard Oil Co, Del.	.10c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar. 1	
But W Co 7% pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	1	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Standard Oil of Ky	.25c	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Canadian Cotton	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Accumulated		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Do pf	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Amer Hair & Feit 1st pf.	.32	Q	Apr.	1	Mar. 15	
Can Industries	.75c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	20	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Green Mt Pwr pf.	.75c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 19	
Can Vinegars, Ltd	.40c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Kemp Thomas 7% pf.	.37	Q	Feb.	15	Feb. 19	
Can Western Nat Gas	L H & P.Ltd 6% pf.	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	18	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Do 7% spl pf.	.37	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 19
Case (J 1) pf	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Nat Autonol Fibres	.57	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Cen Arkans Pb S pf	.75	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Do 7% pf.	.37	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Cen Ill Lt 6% pf	.150	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	North Am Elevators, Ltd.		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Do 7% pf.	.31	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	1	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	1st pf.	.37	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 15	
Cen Vernon Pb S \$6 pf.	.51	Q	Feb.	15	Jan.	31	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Schne Ch Thea pf.	.75c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 20	
Chestnut Hill RR	.75c	Q	Mar.	4	Feb.	20	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Whitman (Wm) Co 7% pf.	.175	Q	Mar.	15	Mar. 1	
Chi Dist Elec Gen 6% pf.	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Wisconsin Pr & Ld 6% pf.	.50c	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Chickasha Cot Oil	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	5	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Do 7% pf.	.58	Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
City Ice & Fuel	.50c	Q	Mar.	30	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Special		Q	Mar.	4	Feb. 21	
Do pf	.162%	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	22	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Reduced		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 18	
City of New Castle Water	.50c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	20	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Bklyn & Q Tr pf.	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar. 15	
Do 6% pf.	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	28	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Irregular		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 10	
Clark Equipment	.20c	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	28	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Belden Mfg	.51	Q	Feb.	15	Feb. 18	
Do pf	.150	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	28	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Stock		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 28	
Co G&E 6% pf.	.50c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	25	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Liquidating		Q	Mar.	15	Feb. 28	
Congoleum Nairn	.40c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar.	1	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Holland Land	.51	Q	Feb.	26	Feb. 16	
Cons Bak of Can	.20c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Stand Collateral		Q	Mar.	1	Feb. 14	
Cons Invest Tr	.50c	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	15	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Trusted Shares	.55	Q	Mar.	20		
Confed Life Assn (Toronto)	\$1	Q	Mar.	31	June 25	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Final		Q	Mar.	15			
Do	.51	Q	Jun.	30	Dec.	25	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Courtaulds, Ltd.	.6	Q	Mar.	15		
Do	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Resumed		Q	Mar.	15		
Do	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Central Surety & Ins	.50c	Q	Feb.	15	Feb. 9	
Do	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	(Kansas City)	.50c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar. 1	
Do	.51	Q	Mar.	1	Feb.	21	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.	1	Mar.	12	Neiman Bros, Inc.	.25c	Q	Mar.	15	Mar. 1	
Du Pont (E 1) De Nem	.65	Q	Mar.	15	Feb.	27	Long Isl Lit 7% pf.	.51	Q	Apr.										

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange

Bid and Asked Quotations of Feb 16 for Issues not traded in

Earnings per share as reported by Standard Statistics Company of New York: Light face—A—Calendar year 1933 or corresponding fiscal year. Full face—B—Calendar year 1934 or corresponding fiscal year.
 Blank means figures not available.

b—Parent company only.	c—On common and preferred combined.
d—Deficit.	e—Class A and B stocks combined.
f—Plus 2% semi-annually in stock.	g—Plus 2%.
a—On all classes of preferred.	

^h—Uncommon and preferred combined.
ⁱ—Before depletion. j—Preliminary.
^k—One-quarter share of Radio.
^l—Payable in scrip. m—Adjusted.

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

For Calendar Week Ended—

Earnings per share as reported by Standard Statistics Company of New York: Light face—A—Calendar year 1933 or corresponding fiscal year. Full face—B—Calendar year 1934 or corresponding fiscal year.
 Blank means figures not available.
 a—Parent company only.
 b—On common and preferred combined.
 c—On common and Class B combined.
 d—Deficit.
 e—Class A and B stocks combined.
 f—Plus 2% semi-annually in stock.
 g—One-quarter share of Radia
 u—Payable in scrip.
 m—Adjusted.

have par values of \$100 except otherwise indicated.
Partly extra. 1/—Plus stock.
On out-of-town market.
Stock in stock.
Payable in cash or stock.

cumulative. o-Special, and new stock combined. Mission Corp. for 75 Standard & Poor's stocks. —
Y-1.3 shares Nevada Cons.
Z-100 share New Trans. & West.
—Figures under high and low column represent asked and bid prices of Feb. 16.
** Stocks of no par value are indicated by (np); all other stocks

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

For Calendar Week Ended—

For Calendar Week Ended—

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

Saturday, Feb. 16

High Low Last

1933 1934 High Low

High Low Last

Low High

Stocks and

Shares

Listed

Rate

Paid

Per

Share

Stocks and

Shares

Listed

Rate

Paid

Per

Share

Stocks and

Shares

Listed

Rate

Paid

Per

Share

Stocks and

Shares

Listed

Rate

Paid

Per

Share

Rate

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

Saturday, Feb. 16

ADVERTISEMENTS.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

GOVT. AND MUNICIPAL BONDS (Cont.)	Bid.	Offer.
Key.		
TENNESSEE (Cont.):		
53 Morristown, any issue.....OW ..		
124 Nashville (City of), all issues.....OW ..		
131 Overton Co. Hwy. Rfdg. 5s, 2/1/49-39 (20M)	4.50-1	
53 Sevier County 6s, 1941..93 ..		
71 Sevier County, any issue.....OW ..		
71 Sullivan County, any issue.....OW ..		
71 Sweetwater, any issue.....OW ..		
33 Washington County 5s.....92 ..		
131 Washington Co. Fdg. 5s, 1/1/54 (51M)	4.75-1	
TEXAS:		
76 Abilene (City of).....72 ..		
115 Abilene73 ..		
115 Amarillo I. S. D. 5s.....95 ..		
115 Amarillo (City of).....OW ..		
76 Amarillo (City of) 5s.....95 ..		
76 Angelina County 5s.....96 ..		
69 Austin (City of).....3.75-1 ..		
117 Austin (City of) 4s, 1955-57	3.75% ..	
76 Austin Co. Road Dist. 5s.....4.75% ..		
76 Beaumont (City of) 5s.....5.25% ..		
115 Beaumont5.25% ..		
117 Beaumont Navig. Dist. ser. 5s.....4.85-1 ..		
117 Beaumont Navig. Dist. Term. 5s.....99 ..		
112 Brown County W. I. D. No. 1 5s/8s, 45	45 ..	
112 Cameron Co. Rd. rfdg. 3s & 5s-A 60	60 ..	
112 Cameron County Rd. 3s, A-G, orig. 72	72 ..	
16 Canadian City Waterworks	95 ..	
76 Corpus Christi Seawall 5s.....83 ..		
112 Corpus Christi G. O. 5s, any.....66 ..		
117 Corpus Christi Schools	77 ..	
117 Edinburgh new rfdg. 4/1/62	22% ..	
115 Edinburg Cons. I. S. D. 6s.....OW ..		
115 Fort WorthOW ..		
76 Galveston (City of) 5s.....4.80% ..		
115 GalvestonOW ..		
117 Galveston Co.4.50% ..		
60 Grimes Co. Rd. 5s/8s, 1964	101 ..	
69 Harris Co.3.75-1 ..		
112 Hidalgo Co. Road Dist. 45	45 ..	
112 Hidalgo Co. Spec. Road 5s/8s, 10/22-24	85 ..	
112 Houston (City of) 5s, any Imptv. 6s/15/24	3.50-1 ..	
111 Hunt County Road 5s, 1955-59	97 ..	
117 Jasper Co. R. D. No. 2 5s/8s	97 ..	
76 Jefferson County Road 5s.....100 ..		
115 Lamess 5s	59 ..	
69 Liberty Co. Rd. & Br. 5s/8s, 1964	99% ..	
76 Liberty County Road 5s/8s	98 ..	
117 Liberty Co. Cour. House 6s	98 ..	
60 McAllen Co. 5s	4.00-1 ..	
60 Montgomery Co. 5s/8s	5.30-1 ..	
16 Nacogdoches Co. Special Road	95 ..	
117 Newton Co. R. D. No. 4 5s/8s	97 ..	
115 Perryton75 ..		
117 Port Arthur Seawall 5s, 1937	99 ..	
115 Snider W. W. 5s	78 ..	
115 Tarrant Co. W. C. I. D. No. 1	OW ..	
122 Tarrant Co. W. C. I. D. No. 1 4s/8s	104 ..	
117 Victoria County Roads	4.35-1 ..	
69 Wharton Co.1.50-1 ..		
76 Wharton County Road 5s	4.75% ..	
112 Willacy County Road Dist.all. OW ..		

WATER COMPANY BONDS

15 Alabama Water Serv. Co. 5s, 1957	87 ..
12 Baton Rouge Water Works Co. 5s/8s, 1940	BW
142 Birmingham Waterworks 5s/8s, 1940-1934	104% ..
77 Community Wat. Ser. Co. deb. 6s, 1946	42% ..
96 Dallas 5s, any 1946	20 ..
22 Davenport Wat. Co. 1st 5s, 61(M)	103% ..
22 Peoria W. W. pr. in. 5s, 48(10M)	104 ..
15 Scranton Springbrook Wat. Serv. Co. 5s, 1967	85 ..

PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS

15 Alabama Water Serv. Co. 5s, 1957	87 ..
12 Baton Rouge Water Works Co. 5s/8s, 1940	BW
142 Birmingham Waterworks 5s/8s, 1940-1934	104% ..
77 Community Wat. Ser. Co. deb. 6s, 1946	42% ..
96 Dallas 5s, any 1946	20 ..
22 Davenport Wat. Co. 1st 5s, 61(M)	103% ..
22 Peoria W. W. pr. in. 5s, 48(10M)	104 ..
15 Scranton Springbrook Wat. Serv. Co. 5s, 1967	85 ..

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS BONDS

15 Alabama Water Serv. Co. 5s, 1957	87 ..
12 Ark.-Missouri Power 6s, 1952	60% ..
12 Associated Public Utilities 5s, 1947	51 ..
12 Barstow (W. S.) 6s, 1942	50 ..
12 Birmingham Gas 6s, 1935	42 ..
12 Central Gas & Electric 5s/8s, 1946	51 ..
12 Central Gas & Electric 6s, 1956	54 ..
9 Central Ind. Pr. Co. 1947	56% ..
12 Central Ind. Pr. Co. 1947	57% ..
12 Central Ind. Pr. Co. 1947	58% ..
12 Central States Utility 6s, 1938	13 ..
12 Central West Pub. Serv. 5s, 33/c/d 26%	14 ..
12 Chattanooga Railway 5s	74 ..
125 Columbus Elec. & Pr. 5s	101 ..
125 Conestoga Traction 4s, 1950	28 ..
125 Consol. Elec. & Gas 5s-6s, 1962 A	20 ..
125 Consol. Elec. & Gas 5s, 1937	21 ..
125 Derby Gas & Elec. 5s, 1946	66% ..
125 El Paso St. Ry. 5s/8s, 1948	42% ..
125 Federated Utilities 5s/8s, 1951	42% ..
125 Houston Elec. 6s, 1925	40% ..
125 Illinois Commercial Tel. 5s, 1948	55% ..
125 Interstate Power 5s, 1937	71 ..
125 Interstate Power 6s, 1952	48 ..
125 Interstate Tel. & Tel. 5s/8s, 33 (3M)	81 ..
152 Iowa Southern Util. 5s/8s, 1950	74 ..
9 Iowa Southern Util. 5s/8s, 1950	78 ..
125 Kansas City Pub. Serv. Ser. 5s, 1951	31% ..
125 Kansas Fr. & Lt. 6s, 1947	102% ..
125 Laclede Gas Light 5s/8s, 1953	67% ..
125 Laclede Gas Light 5s/8s, 1960	68 ..
125 Laclede Gas Light 5s/8s, 1962	62 ..
125 Laclede Gas Light 5s/8s, 1964	59 ..
125 Lehigh Valley Trans. 5s, 1960	37% ..
125 Macon Ry. & Lt. 5s	98 ..
9 Manlius Gas Co. 1st 5s, 1954	69 ..
125 Nashville Elec. & Pr. 5s, 1953	103 ..
125 New Or. City & Lake R. R. 5s, 1943	95% ..
119 N.W. Cr. R. R. gen. mfg. 5s, 1943	84 ..
9 North Shore Gas 5s, 1937	71 ..
125 Northern Utilities 6s, 1943	39% ..
125 Northern Utilities 6s, 1943	40% ..
9 Ohio Central Tel. 6s, 1947	15% ..
125 Ohio Central Tel. 6s, 1947	16% ..
125 Ohio Central Tel. 6s, 1947	17% ..
125 Old Dominion Power 5s, 1951	47% ..
125 Pac. Northwest Pub. Ser. 5s, 1950	11 ..
9 Penna. Elec. 5s, 1962	95% ..
9 Pub. Serv. Colo. 5s/8s, 1954	98% ..
9 Pub. Serv. Colo. 6s, 1961	100% ..
125 Public Utilities Consol. 5s/8s	44 ..
125 Rome Ry. & Lt. 5s	98 ..
125 Southern Cal. Elec. & Pr. 5s, 1953	104% ..
125 Tennessee Elec. & Pr. 5s, 1953	95% ..
125 Texas Elec. & Pr. 5s, 1953	95% ..
125 Tele. Bond & Share 5s, 1958	55% ..
22 Tele. Ser. Co. of Ohio 5s, 53 (2M)	60 ..
122 Texas Gas Utilities 6s, 1948, actual 14F	32 ..
122 Utility Elec. Horn Coal 6s, 1948	34 ..
122 Utility Elec. Horn Coal 6s, 1948	35% ..
122 Utility Elec. & Lt. Realty Tr. 6s, 58	30 ..
122 Utility Elec. & Lt. Realty Tr. 6s, 58	32 ..
125 Washington Gas & Elec. 6s, 1960	30 ..
125 Weatchester Service Corp. 6s	25 ..
125 Western United Corp. 6s/8s, 1955	70 ..
9 Wisc. Elec. Pr. 5s, 1954	104% ..
9 Wisc. Gas & El. 5s, 1952	105% ..
9 Wisc. Hydro-El. 5s, 1947	106% ..
9 Wisc. Mich. Pr. 4%s, 1961	100% ..
9 Wisc. Minn. Lt. & Pr. 5s, 1947	103% ..
9 Wisc. Minn. Lt. & Pr. 7s, 1947	96% ..
9 Wisc. Pr. & Lt. 5s, 1961	85% ..
9 Wisc. Pr. & Lt. 5s, 1952	94% ..
9 Wisc. Pub. Serv. 5s, 1958	96% ..
9 Wisc. Pub. Serv. 5s/8s, 1958	96% ..
9 Wisc. River Pr. 5s, 1942	90% ..
9 Wisc. Valley Elec. 5s, 1942	101% ..
9 Wisc. Valley Elec. 5s, 1942	104% ..
9 Wisc. Valley Pr. 5s, 1950	98% ..
143 Wolverine Power 4%s, 1959	59 ..

RAILROAD BONDS

Key.	Bid.	Offer.
63 Am. Refrigerator Trans. Eq. 5s	OW ..	
7 Bangor & Aroos. (Medford) 5s, 37.105%	
7 Bangor & Aroos. (St. Johns) 5s, 39.108%	
7 Bangor & Aroos. (Tiverton) 5s, 43.106%	
7 Bangor & Aroos. (Van Buren) 5s, 47.106%	107% ..	
45 Macom, Dublin & Savannah 5s, 63	65 ..	
7 Old Colony R. R. 4s, 1938	89 ..	
7 Old Colony R. R. 5s, 1945	90 ..	91%
7 Portland Term. 4s, 1961	92% ..	
7 Portland Term. 5s, 1961	103% ..	
1 Wiggin Terminal 5s/8s, 1945	9F ..	

REAL ESTATE SECURITIES

Key.	Bid.	Offer.
68 American Furniture Mart. Bldg. (Chi.) 6s, 1946	55% ..	56% ..
5 Andrew Jackson Hotel (Nashv.) 5s, 1949	50 ..	
4 Auditorium Hotel (Clev.), Inc. 5s, 12F	
10 Bagley Clifford Corp. 6s, (\$10M)	28% ..	
1 Book Washington Blvd. 5s/8s, (\$10M)	28% ..	
29 Boston Metro. Bldg. 5s, 1942	38 ..	
29 Bowdoin Sq. Garage 5s, 1949	14% ..	
96 Brown Hotel 1st 5s, 1949 (\$212C)	82 ..	
68 Bunte Bros. (Chi.) 6s, 1940	85 ..	
68 Carbide & Carbon Bldg. (Chi.) 6s, 1942	70 ..	
25 Carlton Hotel (Jax.) actuals	18F ..	
9 Chicago Title & Trust coll. 5s/8s	ser. c/d ..	
12 Detroit Hotel 5s, 1941	"A" ..	
68 Edgewater Beach Apartments (Chi.) 6s, 1946	c/d ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	26% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	27% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	28% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	29% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	30% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	31% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	32% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	33% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	34% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	35% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	36% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	37% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	38% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	39% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp. 2d 10-yr. 5s/8s	40% ..	
12 Elkhorn Bridge Corp		

Friday, February 22, 1935

A Comparison of Commercial Lighting Rates Charged by the Public Utilities

Continued from Page 314

pressed by percentage deviations from the average for the entire country do not vary very much as the amount con-

sument is increased, as indicated by Table V.

Again, the range of extreme deviations throughout the country, as expressed by the percentage deviations from the

United States averages, is also remarkably constant as the amount of electricity consumed in commercial lighting service increases, although there is slight tendency for the high extreme to be somewhat closer to the average as the consumption is expanded (Table VI).

As in the case of the study of domestic electric rates, the one outstanding

revelation is the tremendous difference in the cost of electric service. The above table shows that the cost of electricity for commercial service, within the range of 200 to 1,000 kwh. consumption, may be as much as 4.9 times as high in one place as in another. Would better merchandising methods help to eliminate some of these extreme differences?

Commercial Lighting Service—Base Cities Only

NEW ENGLAND STATES

State and City.	Net Charge. Kwh.	Net Monthly Bill For- ward Min. 200 Kwh.	Net Monthly Bill For- ward 600 Kwh.	Net Monthly Bill For- ward 1,000 Kwh.
Connecticut				
Bristol	\$1.30	\$14.75	\$34.75	\$54.75
Danbury	6.40	15.40	32.40	46.40
Greenwich	5.38	15.38	35.38	55.38
Hartford	1.00	17.45	33.45	49.45
Manchester	1.00	20.00	39.13	55.13
Meriden	4.75	14.75	34.75	54.75
Middletown	1.00	15.50	35.50	55.50
New Haven	1.00	10.50	30.20	48.60
New London	1.00	15.50	35.50	55.50
Norwalk	4.75	14.75	34.75	54.75
Stamford	1.00	15.00	39.00	63.00
Torrington	5.63	15.63	34.63	50.63
Waterbury	4.75	14.75	34.75	54.75
Maine				
Bangor	1.00	12.60	32.60	52.60
Lewiston	3.00	12.70	23.70	31.70
Milo	2.00	9.00	21.00	33.00
Portland	1.00	15.00	24.50	35.50
Rumford	1.00	14.40	35.10	49.50
Massachusetts				
Attleboro	.75	15.00	35.00	47.00
Beverly	.75	18.00	44.98	62.48
Boston	.75	14.00	41.25	66.25
Brockton	.75	16.00	32.40	42.85
Cambridge	.75	10.00	24.00	34.00
Fall River	.50	14.25	42.25	70.25
Fitchburg	.50	20.00	49.00	72.00
Gloucester	.65	20.00	51.00	76.67
Haverhill	.50	19.00	44.98	62.48
Lawrence	.75	18.00	36.45	52.65
Leominster	.75	17.00	31.00	43.00
Lowell	.75	18.00	42.38	64.38
Lynn	.75	13.00	33.00	53.00
Malden	.50	12.95	36.95	55.50
New Bedford	.75	11.97	22.42	31.92
North Adams	.75	16.00	39.00	55.00
Northampton	.75	11.00	30.10	50.10
Pittsfield	.75	17.00	33.25	46.00
Quincy	.50	13.00	24.00	34.00
Revere	.75	12.86	36.38	58.56
Salem	.75	16.25	38.75	55.50
Springfield	.67	11.00	30.00	39.00
Weymouth	.75	16.50	35.00	51.00
Worcester	.75	10.00	25.00	37.00
New Hampshire				
Berlin	1.00	13.25	29.25	45.25
Concord	1.00	17.40	39.00	55.00
Manchester	3.00	18.00	36.00	49.00
Portsmouth	2.55	16.55	31.50	43.50
Rhode Island				
Newport	4.50	17.30	48.30	76.30
Pawtucket	1.00	18.00	39.00	59.00
Providence	1.00	13.50	39.50	44.50
Woonsocket	1.00	18.00	39.00	59.00

Complete Report of Transactions in STOCKS AND BONDS ON

The New York Stock Exchange
The New York Curb Exchange
The New York Produce Exchange

FOR THE YEAR 1934

IN CONVENIENT PAMPHLET FORM Size 9" x 6"

Contents—1934 Stock Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, with the range for 1933 and 1934 and the high and low dates and total sales for 1934; Rights that expired during 1934; Stocks stricken from the list in 1934; 1934 Bond Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, with the range for 1933 and 1934, and the high and low dates and total sales for 1934. Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange for 1934. Stocks stricken from list, Expiried rights, Bonds stricken from list. 1934 Transactions on the New York Produce Exchange.

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TIMES SQUARE NEW YORK

EAST NORTH CENTRAL STATES

Illinois

Alton	.50	11.64	24.99	38.85
Aurora	.50	12.50	24.00	31.00
Belleville	1.00	10.40	25.50	37.90
Bloomington	.75	9.83	21.83	33.83
Champaign	.75	11.63	24.03	36.43
Chicago	.50	12.00	22.80	33.60
Danville	.75	11.63	24.03	36.43
Decatur	.75	9.83	21.83	33.83
East St. Louis	.50	10.19	21.59	33.38
Elgin	.50	12.50	31.50	47.50
Evansdale	.50	14.00	25.90	40.90
Freeport	1.00	13.50	28.50	39.50
Galesburg	.75	12.88	26.66	39.06
Granite City	.50	12.50	26.55	38.95
Kewanee	.75	12.88	26.66	39.06
Peoria	.75	11.13	25.75	37.95
Quincy	1.00	11.52	23.52	35.52
Rockford	.50	10.94	25.94	40.94
Rock Island	.50	11.50	28.50	42.50
Springfield	.50	9.90	23.87	36.00

Indiana

Evansville	1.00	11.25	18.76	25.96
Fort Wayne	.50	10.00	27.50	42.00
Gary	1.00	11.00	29.00	42.75
Hammond	1.00	12.40	33.00	49.00
Indianapolis	.65	10.58	26.75	42.75
Kokomo	1.00	9.90	25.90	41.90
Marion	.50	9.95	27.79	42.70
Michigan City	1.00	12.80	32.82	52.82
Muncie	3.00	9.95	27.70	44.10
New Albany	1.00	9.10	24.10	36.10
South Bend	3.00	9.95	27.70	44.70

Michigan

Battle Creek	.75	11.81	21.45	29.45
Bay City	.50	7.65	18.45	29.25
Detroit	.45	9.00	23.76	30.96
Houghton	1.00	15.10	41.10	61.10
Ironwood	.50	13.44	25.92	37.92
Jackson	.75	13.29	21.45	29.45
Pontiac	.45	9.00	23.87	36.00

Ohio

Akron	3.00	12.61	23.79	29.79
Alliance	6.00	13.00	26.50	38.50
Barberton	3.00	10.00	23.80	35.80
Canton	3.00	13.00	35.00	55.00

EAST SOUTH CENTRAL STATES

Alabama

Andalusia	3.50	14.16	37.16	55.16
Birmingham	.70	12.50	24.50	36.50
Montgomery	1.00	9.33	22.45	27.10

Kentucky

Ashland	1.00	11.25	32.25	50.25
Covington	.75	9.60	19.44	27.84
Lexington	1.00	14.36	35.42	53.97
Louisville	.60	10.00	28.50	46.50
Paducah	1.00	13.20	24.60	34.60

Mississippi

Jackson	5.00	17.00	38.00	58.00
Laurel	1.00	15.00	38.60	50.60
Meridian	1.00	16.60	38.60	50.60
Vicksburg	5.00	17.00	38.00	58.00

Tennessee

Chattanooga	1.00	9.33	22.83	27.73
Jackson	3.00			

Bond Transactions—New York Stock Exchange

For Week Ended Saturday, Feb. 16

For Annual Range to Feb. 9 See The Annalist of Feb. 15, 1935

Sales in 1000s.		High.		Low.		Last.		Net Chge.	
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS (Figures after decimals represent 32ds of 1 per cent.)									
Sales in 1000s.	Net								
1 Liberty	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.					
125 3/8s, 1932-47	104.24	104.14	104.20	+ .5					
2 1st 4s, 1932-47	103.20	103.10	102.16	- .6					
78 1st cv 4s, 1932-47	103.19	103.13	103.16	- .5					
34 1/2s, 41/4s, 44/4s, 47/4s, 50/4s, 53/4s, 56/4s, 59/4s, 62/4s, 65/4s, 68/4s, 71/4s, 74/4s, 77/4s, 80/4s, 83/4s, 86/4s, 89/4s, 92/4s, 95/4s, 98/4s, 101/4s, 104/4s, 107/4s, 110/4s, 113/4s, 116/4s, 119/4s, 122/4s, 125/4s, 128/4s, 131/4s, 134/4s, 137/4s, 140/4s, 143/4s, 146/4s, 149/4s, 152/4s, 155/4s, 158/4s, 161/4s, 164/4s, 167/4s, 170/4s, 173/4s, 176/4s, 179/4s, 182/4s, 185/4s, 188/4s, 191/4s, 194/4s, 197/4s, 200/4s, 203/4s, 206/4s, 209/4s, 212/4s, 215/4s, 218/4s, 221/4s, 224/4s, 227/4s, 230/4s, 233/4s, 236/4s, 239/4s, 242/4s, 245/4s, 248/4s, 251/4s, 254/4s, 257/4s, 260/4s, 263/4s, 266/4s, 269/4s, 272/4s, 275/4s, 278/4s, 281/4s, 284/4s, 287/4s, 290/4s, 293/4s, 296/4s, 299/4s, 302/4s, 305/4s, 308/4s, 311/4s, 314/4s, 317/4s, 320/4s, 323/4s, 326/4s, 329/4s, 332/4s, 335/4s, 338/4s, 341/4s, 344/4s, 347/4s, 350/4s, 353/4s, 356/4s, 359/4s, 362/4s, 365/4s, 368/4s, 371/4s, 374/4s, 377/4s, 380/4s, 383/4s, 386/4s, 389/4s, 392/4s, 395/4s, 398/4s, 401/4s, 404/4s, 407/4s, 410/4s, 413/4s, 416/4s, 419/4s, 422/4s, 425/4s, 428/4s, 431/4s, 434/4s, 437/4s, 440/4s, 443/4s, 446/4s, 449/4s, 452/4s, 455/4s, 458/4s, 461/4s, 464/4s, 467/4s, 470/4s, 473/4s, 476/4s, 479/4s, 482/4s, 485/4s, 488/4s, 491/4s, 494/4s, 497/4s, 500/4s, 503/4s, 506/4s, 509/4s, 512/4s, 515/4s, 518/4s, 521/4s, 524/4s, 527/4s, 530/4s, 533/4s, 536/4s, 539/4s, 542/4s, 545/4s, 548/4s, 551/4s, 554/4s, 557/4s, 560/4s, 563/4s, 566/4s, 569/4s, 572/4s, 575/4s, 578/4s, 581/4s, 584/4s, 587/4s, 590/4s, 593/4s, 596/4s, 599/4s, 602/4s, 605/4s, 608/4s, 611/4s, 614/4s, 617/4s, 620/4s, 623/4s, 626/4s, 629/4s, 632/4s, 635/4s, 638/4s, 641/4s, 644/4s, 647/4s, 650/4s, 653/4s, 656/4s, 659/4s, 662/4s, 665/4s, 668/4s, 671/4s, 674/4s, 677/4s, 680/4s, 683/4s, 686/4s, 689/4s, 692/4s, 695/4s, 698/4s, 701/4s, 704/4s, 707/4s, 710/4s, 713/4s, 716/4s, 719/4s, 722/4s, 725/4s, 728/4s, 731/4s, 734/4s, 737/4s, 740/4s, 743/4s, 746/4s, 749/4s, 752/4s, 755/4s, 758/4s, 761/4s, 764/4s, 767/4s, 770/4s, 773/4s, 776/4s, 779/4s, 782/4s, 785/4s, 788/4s, 791/4s, 794/4s, 797/4s, 800/4s, 803/4s, 806/4s, 809/4s, 812/4s, 815/4s, 818/4s, 821/4s, 824/4s, 827/4s, 830/4s, 833/4s, 836/4s, 839/4s, 842/4s, 845/4s, 848/4s, 851/4s, 854/4s, 857/4s, 860/4s, 863/4s, 866/4s, 869/4s, 872/4s, 875/4s, 878/4s, 881/4s, 884/4s, 887/4s, 890/4s, 893/4s, 896/4s, 899/4s, 902/4s, 905/4s, 908/4s, 911/4s, 914/4s, 917/4s, 920/4s, 923/4s, 926/4s, 929/4s, 932/4s, 935/4s, 938/4s, 941/4s, 944/4s, 947/4s, 950/4s, 953/4s, 956/4s, 959/4s, 962/4s, 965/4s, 968/4s, 971/4s, 974/4s, 977/4s, 980/4s, 983/4s, 986/4s, 989/4s, 992/4s, 995/4s, 998/4s, 1001/4s, 1004/4s, 1007/4s, 1010/4s, 1013/4s, 1016/4s, 1019/4s, 1022/4s, 1025/4s, 1028/4s, 1031/4s, 1034/4s, 1037/4s, 1040/4s, 1043/4s, 1046/4s, 1049/4s, 1052/4s, 1055/4s, 1058/4s, 1061/4s, 1064/4s, 1067/4s, 1070/4s, 1073/4s, 1076/4s, 1079/4s, 1082/4s, 1085/4s, 1088/4s, 1091/4s, 1094/4s, 1097/4s, 1100/4s, 1103/4s, 1106/4s, 1109/4s, 1112/4s, 1115/4s, 1118/4s, 1121/4s, 1124/4s, 1127/4s, 1130/4s, 1133/4s, 1136/4s, 1139/4s, 1142/4s, 1145/4s, 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2146/4s, 2149/4s, 2152/4s, 2155/4s, 2158/4s, 2161/4s, 2164/4s, 2167/4s, 2170/4s, 2173/4s, 2176/4s, 2179/4s, 2182/4s, 2185/4s, 2188/4s, 2191/4s, 2194/4s, 2197/4s, 2200/4s, 2203/4s, 2206/4s, 2209/4s, 2212/4s, 2215/4s, 2218/4s, 2221/4s, 2224/4s, 2227/4s, 2230/4s, 2233/4s, 2236/4s, 2239/4s, 2242/4s, 2245/4s, 2248/4s, 2251/4s, 2254/4s, 2257/4s, 2260/4s, 2263/4s, 2266/4s, 2269/4s, 2272/4s, 2275/4s, 2278/4s, 2281/4s, 2284/4s, 2287/4s, 2290/4s, 2293/4s, 2296/4s, 2299/4s, 2302/4s, 2305/4s, 2308/4s, 2311/4s, 2314/4s, 2317/4s, 2320/4s, 2323/4s, 2326/4s, 2329/4s, 2332/4s, 2335/4s, 2338/4s, 2341/4s, 2344/4s, 2347/4s, 2350/4s, 2353/4s, 2356/4s, 2359/4s, 2362/4s, 2365/4s, 2368/4s, 2371/4s, 2374/4s, 2377/4s, 2380/4s, 2383/4s, 2386/4s, 2389/4s, 2392/4s, 2395/4s, 2398/4s, 2401/4s, 2404/4s, 2407/4s, 2410/4s, 2413/4s, 2416/4s, 2419/4s, 2422/4s, 2425/4s, 2428/4s, 2431/4s, 2434/4s, 2437/4s, 2440/4s, 2443/4s, 2446/4s, 2449/4s, 2452/4s, 2455/4s, 2458/4s, 2461/4s, 2464/4s, 2467/4s, 2470/4s, 2473/4s, 2476/4s, 2479/4s, 2482/4s, 2485/4s, 2488/4s, 2491/4s, 2494/4s, 2497/4s, 2500/4s, 2503/4s, 2506/4s, 2509/4s, 2512/4s, 2515/4s, 2518/4s, 2521/4s, 2524/4s, 2527/4s, 2530/4s, 2533/4s, 2536/4s, 2539/4s, 2542/4s, 2545/4s, 2548/4s, 2551/4s, 2554/4s, 2557/4s, 2560/4s, 2563/4s, 2566/4s, 2569/4s, 2572/4s, 2575/4s, 2578/4s, 2581/4s, 2584/4s, 2587/4s, 2590/4s, 2593/4s, 2596/4s, 2599/4s, 2602/4s, 2605/4s, 2608/4s, 2611/4s, 2614/4s, 2617/4s, 2620/4s, 2623/4s, 2626/4s, 2629/4s, 2632/4s, 2635/4s, 2638/4s, 2641/4s, 2644/4s, 2647/4s, 2650/4s, 2653/4s, 2656/4s, 2659/4s, 2662/4s, 2665/4s, 2668/4s, 2671/4s, 2674/4s, 2677/4s, 2680/4s, 2683/4s, 2686/4s, 2689/4s, 2692/4s, 2695/4s, 2698/4s, 2701/4s, 2704/4s, 2707/4s, 2710/4s, 2713/4s, 2716/4s, 2719/4s, 2722/4s, 2725/4s, 2728/4s, 2731/4s, 2734/4s, 2737/4s, 2740/4s, 2743/4s, 2746/4s, 2749/4s, 2752/4s, 2755/4s, 2758/4s, 2761/4s, 2764/4s, 2767/4s, 2770/4s, 2773/4s, 2776/4s, 2779/4s, 2782/4s, 2785/4s, 2788/4s, 2791/4s, 2794/4s, 2797/4s, 2800/4s, 2803/4s, 2806/4s, 2809/4s, 2812/4s, 2815/4s, 2818/4s, 2821/4s, 2824/4s, 2827/4s, 2830/4s, 2833/4s, 2836/4s, 2839/4s, 2842/4s, 2845/4s, 2848/4s, 2851/4s, 2854/4s, 2857/4s, 2860/4s, 2863/4s, 2866/4s, 2869/4s, 2872/4s, 2875/4s, 2878/4s, 2881/4s, 2884/4s, 2887/4s, 2890/4s, 2893/4s, 2896/4s, 2899/4s, 2902/4s, 2905/4s, 2908/4s, 2911/4s, 2914/4s, 2917/4s, 2920/4s, 2923/4s, 2926/4s, 2929/4s, 2932/4s, 2935/4s, 2938/4s, 2941/4s, 2944/4s, 2947/4s, 2950/4s, 2953/4s, 2956/4s, 2959/4s, 2962/4s, 2965/4s, 2968/4s, 2971/4s, 2974/4s, 2977/4s, 2980/4s, 2983/4s, 2986/4s, 2989/4s, 2992/4s, 2995/4s, 2998/4s, 3001/4s, 3004/4s, 3007/4s, 3010/4s, 3013/4s, 3016/4s, 3019/4s, 3022/4s, 3025/4s, 3028/4s, 3031/4s, 3034/4s, 3037/4s, 3040/4s, 3043/4s, 3046/4s, 3049/4s, 3052/4s, 3055/4s, 3058/4s, 3061/4s, 3064/4s, 3067/4s, 3070/4s, 3073/4s, 3076/4s, 3079/4s, 3082/4s, 3085/4s, 3088/4s, 3091/4s, 3094/4s, 3097/4s, 3100/4s, 3103/4s, 3106/4s, 3109/4s, 3112/4s, 3115/4s, 3118/4s, 3121/4s, 3124/4s, 3127/4s, 3130/4s, 3133/4s, 3136/4s, 3139/4s, 3142/4s, 3145/4s, 3148/4s, 3151/4s, 3154/4s, 3157/4s, 3160/4s, 3163/4s, 3166/4s, 3169/4s, 3172/4s, 3175/4s, 3178/4s, 3181/4s, 3184/4s, 3187/4s, 3190/4s, 3193/4s, 3196/4s, 3199/4s, 3202/4s, 3205/4s, 3208/4s, 3211/4s, 3214/4s, 3217/4s, 3220/4s, 3223/4s, 3226/4s, 3229/4s, 3232/4s, 3235/4s, 3238/4s, 3241/4s, 3244/4s, 3247/4s, 3250/4s, 3253/4s, 3256/4s, 3259/4s, 3262/4s, 3265/4s, 3268/4s, 3271/4s, 3274/4s, 3277/4s, 3280/4s, 3283/4s, 3286/4s, 3289/4s, 3292/4s, 3295/4s, 3298/4s, 3301/4s, 3304/4s, 3307/4s, 3310/4s, 3313/4s, 3316/4s, 3319/4s, 3322/4s, 3325/4s, 3328/4s, 3331/4s, 3334/4s, 3337/4s, 3340/4s, 3343/4s, 3346/4s, 3349/4s, 3352/4s, 3355/4s, 3358/4s, 3361/4s, 3364/4s, 3367/4s, 3370/4s, 3373/4s, 3376/4s, 3379/4s, 3382/4s, 3385/4s, 3388/4s, 3391/4s, 3394/4s, 3397/4s, 3400/4s, 3403/4s, 3406/4s, 3409/4s, 3412/4s, 3415/4s, 3418/4s, 3421/4s, 3424/4s, 3427/4s, 3430/4s, 3433/4s, 3436/4s, 3439/4s, 3442/4s, 3445/4s, 3448/4s, 3451/4s, 3454/4s, 3457/4s, 3460/4s, 3463/4s, 3466/4s, 3469/4s, 3472/4s, 3475/4s, 3478/4s, 3481/4s, 3484/4s, 3487/4s, 3490/4s, 3493/4s, 3496/4s, 3499/4s, 3502/4s, 3505/4s, 3508/4s, 3511/4s, 3514/4s, 3517/4s, 3520/4s, 3523/4s, 3526/4s, 3529/4s, 3532/4s, 3535/4s, 3538/4s, 3541/4s, 3544/4s, 3547/4s, 3550/4s, 3553/4s, 3556/4s, 3559/4s, 3562/4s, 3565/4s, 3568/4s, 3571/4s, 3574/4s, 3577/4s, 3580/4s, 3583/4s, 3586/4s, 3589/4s, 3592/4s, 3595/4s, 3598/4s, 3601/4s, 3604/4s, 3607/4s, 3610/4s, 3613/4s, 3616/4s, 3619/4s, 3622/4s, 3625/4s, 3628/4s, 3631/4s, 3634/4s, 3637/4s, 3640/4s, 3643/4s, 3646/4s, 3649/4s, 3652/4s, 3655/4s, 3658/4s, 3661/4s, 3664/4s, 3667/4s, 3670/4s, 3673/4s, 3676/4s, 3679/4s, 3682/4s, 3685/4s, 3688/4s, 3691/4s, 3694/4s, 3697/4s, 3700/4s, 3703/4s, 3706/4s, 3709/4s, 3712/4s, 3715/4s, 3718/4s, 3721/4s, 3724/4s, 3727/4s, 3730/4s, 3733/4s, 3736/4s, 3739/4s, 3742/4s, 3745/4s, 3748/4s, 3751/4s, 3754/4s, 3757/4s, 3760/4s, 3763/4s, 3766/4s, 3769/4s, 3772/4s, 3775/4s, 3778/4s, 3781/4s, 3784/4s, 3787/4s, 3790/4s, 3793/4s, 3796/4s, 3799/4s, 3802/4s, 3805/4s, 3808/4s, 3811									

Bond Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

Sales in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	Net	Sales in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	Net	Sales in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	Net	Sales in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	Net
2 Fonda, J & G 2s-4s, '82 ctfs	31	31	31	-	1%	8 MI Spa & NW 4s, '47 7 Min & St L ref 4s, '49-50	51	49	51	+ 1%	1%	242 Penn R R 4s, 1984	1023	1024	1034	+ 1	1%	908 Util P & L 5s, '59, ww	31	25	30	+ 1%	54
2 Fran Sugar 7s, 1942-7s 26s	26	26	26	+ 1%	2 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	24 Do con 4s, 1950	117	117	117	-	1%	208 Do 5s, 1947	35	30	33	+ 3	54	
25 GANNETT 6s, 1943	102	102	102	-	3 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	24 Do gen 4s, 1950	117	117	117	-	1%	46 VANAD cv 5s, 1941	92	90	92	+ 1	21	
15 Gen Am Inv 5s, 1952	101	101	101	-	4 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	1 Va El & P cv 5s, '48-49	111	111	111	-	1%	1 Va Mid gen 5s, 1936	106	106	106	+ 1	2	
13 Gen Elec deb 5s, 1947	88	88	88	+ 1	5 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	17 Do ref 5s, 1944	112	111	112	+ 1	2							
34 Gen Elec 5s, 1949	94	90	89	+ 1	6 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	4 Va Hwy 1st 5s, A, 1932-1932	111	111	112	+ 1	2							
16 Gen Pub Svc 5s, 1939-40	95	74	74	-	7 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	4 Va S Wm 5s, 1938	83	83	83	+ 1	2							
21 Goodrich 6s, 1945	95	94	95	+ 1	8 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	10 V O & P 1st 4s, '34, as	3	3	3	-	2							
33 Do 6s, 1947	95	94	95	+ 1	9 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	14 Ver Sug 1st 7s, 1942, cts	3	4	4	+ 1	2							
76 Goodyear T & R 5s, 1937-1944	104	104	104	-	10 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	40 WARASIS 4s, 1978	171	165	164	-	1							
1 Gothenburg Cos 6s, 1933-1934	93	93	93	-	11 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	12 Do 4s, 1948	168	164	164	-	1							
20 Gothenburg Cos 6s, 1933-1934	93	93	93	-	12 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	62 Do 1st 5s, 1939	94	94	94	-	1							
11 Go Trunk of Can 7s, 1940-1954	105	105	105	-	13 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	3 Do 2d 5s, 1939	70	70	70	-	1							
47 Gt N Ry gen Ts, A, '36-92s	91	91	91	-	14 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	9 Do B & W 4s, 1976	174	164	164	-	1							
26 Gt Ns 5s, 1952	87	85	85	-	15 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	15 Do 5s, 1977	110	109	110	-	1							
6 Do gen 5s, C, 1973	84	83	83	-	16 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	19 Penn Dixie C 6s, 1941	78	77	78	+ 1	1							
5 Do gen 5s, D, 1976	76	75	75	-	17 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	20 Penn P & L 4s, 1951-1952	107	105	104	-	1							
29 Gulf Sta Steel 5s, 1942-94s	93	93	93	-	18 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	25 Gen G L & P ref 5s, 1974-1974	101	100	103	-	1							
8 Gulf, M & N 5s, 1950-70	60	59	59	+ 1	19 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	26 Do 1st 5s, 1943	111	111	112	+ 1	1							
43 HACk W 1st 4s, 1952	105	105	105	-	20 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	27 Portia & E 1st 4s, '46	70	70	70	-	1							
14 Har Ry-P 1st 4s, '54-94	94	94	94	-	21 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	28 Portia & E 1st 4s, '46	66	64	64	-	1							
2 Hock Valley 4s, 1966-1974	114	114	114	+ 1	22 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	29 Penn Marq 1st 4s, '46	166	164	164	-	1							
29 Houston Oil 5s, 1940-88	85	86	86	+ 1	23 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	30 Penn Marq 1st 4s, '46	166	164	164	-	1							
75 Hudson Coal 5s, 1962	44	43	43	-	24 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	31 Penn Marq 1st 4s, '46	166	164	164	-	1							
46 Hud & Man ref 5s, 1957-88	88	88	88	-	25 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	32 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
43 Do inc 5s, 1957	39	37	39	+ 2	26 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	33 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
6 Hudson Gas 1st 4s, '49-116s	75	75	75	-	27 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	34 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
18 ILL BELL TEL 5s, 1952-105s	105	105	105	-	28 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	35 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
14 Int C 1st 3s, 51(cash)	104	104	104	-	29 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	36 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
26 Int Cent col tr 4s-5s	57	55	55	-	30 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	37 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
10 Int ref 4s, 1955	84	83	83	-	31 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	38 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
10 Int ref 4s, 1955	83	82	82	-	32 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	39 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
7 Do 5s, A, 1955	82	82	82	-	40 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	40 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
4 Do 5s, A, 1955	81	80	80	-	41 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	41 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	42 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	42 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	43 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	43 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	44 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	44 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	45 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	45 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	46 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	46 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	47 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	47 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	48 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	48 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	49 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	49 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	50 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	50 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	51 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	51 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	52 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	52 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	53 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	53 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	54 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	54 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	55 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	55 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	56 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	56 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	57 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	57 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	58 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	58 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84	-	59 Do 5s, A, 1940	12	12	12	-	1%	59 Phillips Pet 5s, 1939	102	101	102	-	1							
12 Intl Bell 4s, 1952-55	84	84	84																				

Friday, February 22, 1935

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange

For Annual Range to Feb. 9 See The Annalist of Feb. 15, 1935

For Week Ended Saturday, Feb. 16

Net High. Low. Last. Change. Sales.

Stocks and bonds marked with an asterisk are fully listed on the Curb Exchange; others are dealt in as unlisted issues.

*AERO SUP MFG. B. 2 2 2 2 100

Aero Mfg. Cor (2%) 19% 19% 19% 19% 100

Alv. Inv. Inc. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Do war 38% 36% 36% 36% 100

Ala Grt So (k2) 45% 43% 43% 43% 100

Ala Pwr pf (6) 40% 40% 40% 40% 100

Do pf (7) 52% 48% 48% 48% 15,300

Allied Mills, Inc. 15% 13% 14% 14% 100

Aluminum Co of Am. 44% 43% 43% 43% 250

Am Corp (1%) 71% 70% 70% 70% 100

Am Crm. Ltd. 19% 18% 18% 18% 200

Am Beverage Corp. 62% 60% 61% 61% 100

Am Book Co (4%) 33% 32% 32% 32% 100

Am Clt. Plt. A (2%) 1% 1% 1% 1% 6,400

*Do B (10%) 17% 16% 16% 16% 100

Am Cyanamid 21% 21% 21% 21% 100

Am Fenders 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Am 1st pf. B. 15% 14% 14% 14% 6,400

Do 1st pf. D. 14% 14% 14% 14% 100

Am Gas & El (11.20) 88% 85% 85% 85% 2,000

Am Laundry 13% 13% 8% 9% 100

Am Lt. & T. (10.20) 18% 18% 18% 18% 1,000

Do pf (1%) 20,400

*Am Masicrabo 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Am Superpower 45% 45% 45% 45% 10,000

Do 1st pf. 10% 10% 10% 10% 100

Do pf 4% 4% 4% 4% 1,000

Am Thread pf (1%) 2% 2% 2% 2% 100

Appalach El P pf (7) 76% 76% 76% 76% 300

*Arcturus Radio Tube 1,000

Art Nat Gas. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Do A. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Do cu pf. 3% 2% 3% 3% 1,000

Armata Cork (25c)x1 21% 21% 21% 21% 400

*Art Met Wks (k2%) 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

Asso El Ind. Ltd. (k10.3) 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

*Ass G E. A. 5% 5% 5% 5% 1,700

Atl Const Fish 9% 8% 8% 8% 8,600

Atlas Corp 8% 8% 8% 8% 400

Do A (3) xd. 42% 47% 47% 47% 100

Do war 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

Atlas Plywood (kote) 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

*Auto Volt Mach (50c) 6% 6% 6% 6% 50

*Ax-Fish Tb. A (3.20) 58% 58% 58% 58% 100

BACCOCK & WILCOX

(40c)

Bellanca Aircraft 31% 30% 31% 31% 425

Benson & Hedges 3% 3% 3% 3% 100

*Bickford's Inc (70c) 9% 9% 9% 9% 600

*Bridg. Corp. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

*Do ev pf (43%) 45% 35% 39% 39% 200

*Blumenthal (8%) 3% 3% 3% 3% 800

Bourjols, Inc (k2) 4% 4% 4% 4% 700

Bower Roller Bear (1.34) 13% 13% 13% 13% 300

Brazil T. L. Machine 9% 9% 9% 9% 200

Brigadier Machine 6% 6% 6% 6% 100

Brill Corp A 6% 6% 6% 6% 100

*Bull. Mfg (60c) 6% 6% 6% 6% 100

Brit-Am Tob cou. B (35-3.5c) 20% 28% 28% 28% 1,500

Brit Celan, Ltd. rcts. 9% 8% 9% 9% 900

Brown Forman 32% 32% 32% 32% 3,100

Buckeye Pipe L (3.) 17% 16% 17% 17% 100

Do int. pf (5%) 77% 77% 77% 77% 400

Bunker Hill & S. 34% 32% 33% 33% 1,200

Burco, Inc. war. 7% 7% 7% 7% 100

Butler Bros 7% 7% 7% 7% 100

CABLE EL PR v/c 3% 3% 3% 3% 1,200

Calumet Gas Eng (1.60) 20% 20% 20% 20% 800

Canadian Ind Ale. 9% 9% 9% 9% 1,200

Carib Syndicate 2% 2% 2% 2% 600

Carnation Co (1) 17% 17% 17% 17% 400

Carol L & Lt pf (7) 60% 60% 60% 60% 2,400

Carrier Corp 6% 5% 5% 5% 200

*Catalin Corp pf (7) 103% 103% 103% 103% 225

Celanese Corp pf (7) 103% 103% 103% 103% 125

Celluloid Corp pf. 35% 35% 35% 35% 100

Do 1st pf. 78% 78% 78% 78% 100

Central Pow & L 7% 23% 23% 23% 100

Cen States Elec. 23% 21% 23% 23% 800

Do 7% pf. 2% 2% 2% 2% 100

Do cf. pt. new. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Do 6% pf. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

*Offering Pipe (40c) 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

*Charis Corp (11%) 13% 13% 13% 13% 300

Chi Mail Order (1.60) 16% 16% 16% 16% 1,000

Chi. Rivers & M. (1.40) 14% 14% 14% 14% 25

Childs Co pf. 2% 2% 2% 2% 100

Cities Service 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Do pf. B. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Chi Sv P & L 10% 10% 10% 10% 100

Do 37 pf. 12% 12% 12% 12% 200

City Auto St (k10c) 3% 3% 3% 3% 7,600

*Clev Tractor 7% 7% 7% 7% 200

*Colo Oil 7% 7% 7% 7% 300

Colt's Pat F Ar (1) 25% 27% 28% 28% 525

Colum G & Cv pf (5) 54% 48% 48% 48% 900

Cominith Edision (4%) 55% 54% 54% 54% 1,000

Cominith Edision (4%) 55% 54% 54% 54% 1,000

Conwith Edision (4%) 55% 54% 54% 54% 1,000

Conwith & So war. 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

Comy' P L & 1st pf. 17% 17% 17% 17% 800

*Compo S M stc (50c) 17% 16% 16% 16% 9,000

*Cons Aircraft 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Cons Corp 2% 2% 2% 2% 1,200

Cons Gas Ballo (3.60) 58% 58% 58% 58% 30

Cons Gas M & Sm (3%) 13% 13% 13% 13% 1,800

*Cons Retail Stores 2% 2% 2% 2% 1,200

*Do 8% pf. w. w. 40% 38% 38% 38% 2,300

Cord Corp (k25c) 34% 31% 31% 31% 100

Corroon & Reynolds 4% 4% 4% 4% 2,700

Cosden Oil (Maine) 12% 12% 12% 12% 850

Courtlandts 9% 9% 9% 9% 1,100

Crane Co. 11% 11% 11% 11% 600

Creco Petroleum 5% 5% 5% 5% 3,100

Crucker Wheeler 1% 1% 1% 1% 900

*Crown Central Brew. 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

Crown C Int, A (m75c) 8% 8% 8% 8% 600

Cuban Tobacco 33% 32% 33% 32% 13,100

Cucco Press (1.20c) 2% 2% 2% 2% 100

*Cuban Mexicana Min. 9% 9% 9% 9% 100

DAVENPORT HO (2) 14% 13% 13% 13% 500

Dietograph Prod. 6% 6% 6% 6% 300

*Distilled Liquors 15% 14% 14% 14% 1,200

Distill. Ltd. (27.34c) 22% 22% 22% 22% 17,300

Dom. Chemical (2.) 90% 87% 87% 87% 800

Driver Harris (k50c) 18% 17% 17% 17% 200

*Dabbler Condenser 4% 4% 4% 4% 75

Dakota Power (3.) 43% 43% 43% 43% 500

Danval Texas Sulphur 9% 9% 9% 9% 100

EAGLE PITCHER L. 4% 4% 4% 4% 600

East G & F pf (4%) 62% 62% 62% 62% 200

Eastern States Pwr. 61% 62% 62% 62% 400

Do pf. A. 31% 31% 31% 31% 100

Do pf B. 3% 3% 3% 3% 100

*Elster Elec 3% 3% 3% 3% 100

Elec Bond & Share.. 6% 6% 6% 6% 14,500

Do pf (5) 48% 47% 47% 47% 3,000

El Pw Assn. A (40c) 3% 3% 3% 3% 1,200

Empire Dist'l pf. 13% 12% 12% 12% 100

Emp G & 7% pf. 15% 15% 15% 15% 100

Empire Fur part (k1.) 10% 10% 10% 10% 100

*Equity Corp. 1% 1% 1% 1% 5,400

Eureka Pipe Line (4) 38% 37% 37% 37% 300

*Euro El. Ltd. A (60c) 7% 7% 7% 7% 100

Do deb. rts. 7% 7% 7% 7% 100

Evans Wallower Lead 7% 7% 7% 7% 3,400

*Ex-Cello Air & T. 7% 7% 7% 7% 100

Falcon Ind. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

*Faisla Brewing 3% 3% 3% 3% 600

*Faiders Mfg. C. 10% 10% 10% 10% 100

*Ferro Enamel (40c) 11% 10% 10% 10% 50

*Fiddle Brew. Inc. 11% 11% 11% 11% 100

First Nat. S 1st pf (7) 11% 11% 11% 11% 100

Flask Rubber 9% 9% 9% 9% 100

Do pf (6) 12% 12% 12% 12% 600

Flintkote Co. A 12% 12% 12% 12% 100

Fluorine Pw. 11% 10% 10% 10% 2,000

Ford M. Can (k11%) 31% 30% 30% 30% 100

*Ford M. Can (k11%) 31% 30% 30% 30% 100

*Ford M. Can (k11%) 31% 30% 30% 30% 100

*Foundation Co (For) 5% 5% 5% 5% 100

*Frost G & M ev pf (1.20) 15% 15% 15% 15% 100

*GARLOCK P (1) 21% 21% 21% 21% 100

General Alloys 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Gen Invest Corp. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Gen Rayon Co. Ltd. 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Gen Tire & Rubber 1% 1% 1% 1% 100

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—Continued

Net Sales in High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.						Net Sales in High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.						Net Sales in High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.						Net Sales in High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.					
Crane Co. 5s. 1940-	102%	102%	102%	+ 1%	12	Kans F & L 6s.A. 55.105%	105%	105%	-	4	Penn C L&P 4s.B. 77.93%	91%	93%	+ 2%	99	United L & P 5s.A. 58.87	85%	86%	-	14	Net Sales in High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Crucible Steel 5s. '40	99%	99%	99%	-	23	Do 5s. B. 1957-	103%	102%	+ 1%	16	Penn C L&P 4s.B. 77.99%	98	99%	+ 1%	13	Do 5s. 1975-	103%	101%	+ 1%	11	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Cudahy Pack 5s. '46-	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Kans Pow 5s. A. 47.85	85	85	-	2	Penn E 6s.A. 50.74	81	83	+ 1%	57	Do 5s. 1974-	103%	102%	+ 1%	30	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Do 5s. 1937-	103%	103%	103%	-	39	Do 5s. F. 1935-	78	78	-	10	Penn O 6s.A. 50.85	82	85	+ 2%	57	United L&R 5s. 52.46%	43	46	+ 3%	119	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Cumb C P&L 4s.B. '56	99%	99%	99%	-	22	Do 5s. B. 1959-	81%	81%	+ 2%	2	Penn S 6s.A. 50.92	81	84	+ 3%	156	Do 5s. A. 1952-	91%	91%	+ 1%	50	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
DALLAS F & LT 6s.						Kimberly Clark 5s. 43.103%	102%	102%	-	2	Penn S 6s.B. 50.94	81	84	+ 3%	2	Do 5s. A. 1952-	92%	92%	+ 1%	36	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
A. 1949-	109%	109%	109%	+ 1%	3	Koppe G Cokels 47.102%	102%	102%	-	21	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1953-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Do 5s. C. 1952-	105%	105%	105%	-	1	Lehigh P & L 6s.A. 52.192%	98	96	-	1	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1954-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Dayton P&L 5s. '41	108%	108%	108%	-	19	Leinenkugel's U 5s. 50.102%	102%	102%	-	10	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1955-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Del. El Pv 5s. '59-	92%	91%	91%	-	14	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.103%	103%	103%	-	10	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1956-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Derby G & E 5s. '46	87	87	87	+ 2%	6	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	33	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1957-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Det Cy Gas 6s.A. 47.104%	102%	101%	101%	-	49	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1958-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Do 5s. B. 1950-	97	96	96	-	69	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1959-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Dixie 6s. 6s.D. 50.102%	c o d	3%	3%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1960-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
ELEC P & L 6s. 50.102%	102%	102%	102%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1961-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
ELEC P & L 6s. 50.102%	102%	102%	102%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1962-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Elmira W. L & R 6s. 50.102%	102%	102%	102%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1963-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Elmira W. L & R 6s. 50.102%	102%	102%	102%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1964-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
FBIKIN-M'RS 5s. 42.100	96%	96%	96%	-	36	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1965-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Fed Water Sv 5s. 54.104	37%	37%	37%	-	106	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1966-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
F'Stone Cet M 5s. 48.104%	104%	104%	104%	-	39	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1967-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
F'Stone T&R 5s. 52.104%	104%	104%	104%	-	9	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1968-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Flin P & L 6s. 54.104%	104%	104%	104%	-	239	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1969-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Flin Pow 5s. A. 79.51	78%	78%	78%	-	66	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1970-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
GARY F. & G ext 5s.						Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1971-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
1944 xw. stp	74	74	74	-	32	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1972-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gatineau Pw 5s. 54.98%	97	97	97	-	11	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1973-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Do 5s. B. 1941-	97%	97%	97%	-	10	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1974-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Mot Acc 5s. 53.101%	101%	101%	101%	-	1	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1975-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Pub 6s. A. 54.82	82	82	82	-	13	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1976-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Refrac 5s. 55.101%	101%	101%	101%	-	122	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1977-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Pub 6s. 55.102%	102%	102%	102%	-	40	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1978-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Vene 6s. 1937-	6%	6%	6%	-	26	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1979-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. Gas & E. 5s.						Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1980-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. F. 5s. 36.105%	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1981-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. F. 5s. 38.105%	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1982-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. F. 5s. 39.105%	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1983-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. F. 5s. 40.105%	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s. 1984-	102%	101%	+ 1%	5	High. Low. Last. Chge. 1000s.		
Gen Wat Wks. F. 5s. 41.105%	105%	105%	105%	-	15	Long Is. 6s.A. 50.101%	101%	101%	-	18	Penn Power 5s. 50.106%	107	107	-	8	Do 5s							

Week Ended

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Saturday, Feb. 16

San Francisco
STOCK EXCHANGE.
STOCKS.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
110 Ala Jun G	174	174	174
2,373 Am Ins Fd	24	24	24
933 Ati Imp D En. A.	7	6	6
163 Bk N Al 145	144	145	
5,042 Byron Jack	8%	7%	8%
1,569 Cain Sugar	19%	21%	
100 Do 7% pf	21%	21%	
1,500 Calif Cop.	8%	8%	
380 Calif Cott M	11%	12%	
5 Cal Gov Pw	7%	25%	25%
2,601 Calif Pack.	42%	41%	41%
20 Calif Wat S pf	78	78	78
60 Calif W Sts Life Ins.	10%	10%	
3,907 Caterp Tr.	42	39%	41%
1,157 Czell Vtc.	4%	4%	4%
113 Do pf. A.	6%	6%	
10 Do B.	55%	65%	65%
29 Di Glor Fy pf	30	29	30
100 Eldor Oil W	19%	19%	
750 Emp Cap.	6	6	
120 Fire fd Ind	30%	30%	
162 Fire fd Ins	75%	75%	
10 F Nas Port	20%	20%	
1,874 Food Mach.	24%	24%	
150 Gold Min. A	16	15	
100 Do B.	24%	24%	
672 Gold State	5%	5%	
400 Island Pine.	4	4	
207 Haw C & S	47	48	
155 HomeF&MI	34%	36%	
100 Homo Plant.	26%	26%	
180 Hum Br. A	9%	9%	
156 Lang U.B.A.	8%	8%	
345 Les-Ci Salt.	25%	25%	
150 Linc Co pf.	30	29	
150 Long M. A.	9%	9%	
350 Magnavox	1	1	
196 March C M	2%	2%	
400 Mark St Ry pr pf	5%	5%	
525 Nat Auto F	5%	5%	
5,745 Natomats	9	9	
25 Na Imv	14%	14%	
99% Bk	40	40	
620 No Am Oil.	10%	10%	
15 Occid Ins.	23%	23%	
1,994 Pac G & E	14%	14%	
2,879 Do 6%	20%	20%	
420 Do 65% pf	18%	18%	
417 Pac Light.	21%	22%	
132 Do 6%	73	72	73
289 Pac PS n-y	8%	8%	
1,482 Pac T & T	72%	72%	
23 Do 6%	115%	117%	
588 Paraffine.	40%	40%	
369 Ry Eq & Rl 1st pf	12	12	
10 Do Ser 1	6%	6%	
400 Do Ser 2	5%	5%	
140 Rain & P	31%	31%	
145 Rain Bros.	9%	9%	
100 Schlesinger pf	2%	2%	
100 Shell O T	72%	72%	
472 South Pac.	14%	15%	
170 St Val Wat	6	6	
1,256 Std Oil Cal	30%	29%	
555 Tel Inv Cpt	35	35	
10 Th-Altec. A	2	2	
76 Tide W A O			
92% Bk	86%	85%	86%
17,390 Transamer.	5%	5%	
560 Oli Cal 16	15%	16	
820 Union Bug.	5%	5%	
104 Do 7% pf	18%	18%	
250 West P & S	11%	11%	
30 Yel Ch C. A.	6	6	
BONDS.			
\$3,000 L A G & El 5% 1948 108% 108%			
3,000 Pac G & El 5% 1948 107% 107%			
CURVE EXCHANGE.			
100 Alas Tread.	40	40	
219 Am T & T 104%	103%	103%	
500 Am Toll Br.	26	26	
120 Anglo Natl S	8%	8%	
3,285 Argonaut M	13%	14%	
100 Aviation	4%	4%	
15 Cal Ore Pw 6s. 27 pf26	26	26	
1,640 Citrus Serv.	1%	1%	
251 Cz Neol. Lt	47	47	
100 Coens Co. A.	75	75	75
35 Gt W Elec. Ch pf 100			
70 Haw Sugar 37	36%	36%	
700 Holly Dev.	.37	.37	
730 Idaho Dm.	3.10	3.10	
2,588 Ital Pet.	2%	2%	
1,891 Do pf 11%	3.85	1.10	
1,600 K Air & M	61	61	
1,000 L McJ & L	75%	75%	
2,500 L MjM&M O	04	04	
160 Oahu Sug.	21%	21%	
900 Occid Pet.	2%	2%	
1,735 PacAm Fish	11%	10%	
482 Pac Eat C	7%	7%	
100 Pct Oli	7%	7%	
900 Pine Hold.	13%	13%	
120 Radio Corp	5	5	
40 Shasta Wat	24%	24%	
257 So Cal Edi	11%	11%	
400 Do 6% pf	19	19	
100 Do 75% pf	22%	22%	
55 S P Gold G	18%	18%	
ODD LOT TRANSACTIONS.			
75 Atlas Corp.	7%	7%	
15 Cr. VIII Min.	24	24	
52 Gen Motors	30%	30%	
5 Sunset McK Sbk. B.	8%	8%	
23 So Cal Ed 5%	16%	16%	
Milwaukee STOCKS.			
Sales. High. Low. Last.			
15 Chain Belt	24	24	
150 Hecia Min.	7	6%	6%
103 Line Mat.	3%	3%	
25 Parker Pen.	13	13	
100 Un In S. C. 1.16	1.16	1.16	
775 Wis Bkhars	2%	2%	

Los Angeles
STOCK EXCHANGE.
STOCKS.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
200 Bandi Pete	3%	3%	3%
100 Barnsdall	6%	6%	6%
300 Bol Ch O.A.	3%	3%	3%
15,700 Buck Un O.	24	18	24
15,800 Do v t c.	24	18	22
13,133 Do pf .55	55	50	52%
9,734 Do pf vts .55	55	50	50
300 Chap Ice Cr	2%	2%	2%
100 Chrysler	39%	39%	39%
100 Do Akron	22%	22%	22%
200 Cln El Pr	10%	10%	10%
200 Enasco Steel	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Far & MBK	350	350	350
100 Globe G&M	7	7	7
10 G T&R(Cal)			
100 Do Akron	76	76	76
100 Do Atron	22%	22%	22%
1,500 Hancock Oil	12%	11%	12%
100 Do B.	1%	1%	1%
1,800 Do C.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do D.	9%	9%	9%
100 Do E.	5%	5%	5%
100 Do F.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do G.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do H.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do I.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do J.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do K.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do L.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do M.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do N.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do O.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do P.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Q.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do R.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do S.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do T.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do U.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do V.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do W.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do X.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Y.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Z.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do A.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do B.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do C.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do D.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do E.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do F.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do G.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do H.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do I.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do J.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do K.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do L.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do M.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do N.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do O.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do P.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Q.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do R.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do S.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do T.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do U.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do V.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do W.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do X.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Y.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Z.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do A.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do B.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do C.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do D.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do E.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do F.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do G.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do H.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do I.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do J.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do K.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do L.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do M.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do N.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do O.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do P.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Q.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do R.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do S.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do T.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do U.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do V.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do W.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do X.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Y.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do Z.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do A.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do B.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do C.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do D.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do E.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do F.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do G.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do H.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do I.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do J.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do K.	1.25	1.25	1.25
100 Do L.	1.25	1.25	1.25

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—Continued

Toronto STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS.				Toronto STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS.				Toronto CURB EXCHANGE STOCKS.				Toronto MINING DIVISION STOCKS.				Cleveland STOCKS.				Detroit STOCKS.			
Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
890 Abitibi	1.65	1.50	1.50	10 Riverside	29	29	29	18 R Simpson	107	106½	106½	5 Jaeger Mch.	5½	5½	5½	205 Uni Shirt	3½	3	3	205 Uni	3½	3	3
10 Do pf.	7½	7½	7½	5 Russell pf.	88	88	88	1,600 Roy Met.	5½	5½	5½	20 Kelly Isl.	12½	12½	12½	640 Univ. Cooler	A	3½	3½	640 Univ.	3½	3½	3½
30 Alta Pac G	41	41	41	32 Simpson	82½	82½	82½	1,600 Roy Met.	5½	5½	5½	20 Lamson Ses.	3½	3½	3½	1,250 Do B	1½	1½	1½	1,250 Do B	1½	1½	1½
3,996 Brit Am Oil	15½	15½	15½	55 Do	41½	41½	41½	100 Std Pav.	1.10	1.10	1.10	120 McKee B.	11½	10½	10½	2,000 Warner	1½	1½	1½	2,000 Warner	1½	1½	1½
892 Beauharnois	6½	6½	6½	28 Tip Top	94½	94½	94½	5 Do pf.	14	14	14	24 Metre Brick	4	4	4	180 Young	19½	19½	19½	180 Young	19½	19½	19½
15 Beauty Bros	12	12	12	84 Twin City.	4½	4½	4½	35 Sup PetOrd	22½	22	22	8 Mohawk R.	1	1	1	30 Amer. Rad.	14	13½	13½	30 Amer. Rad.	14	13½	13½
55 Do pf.	92	92	92	2,330 Union Gas.	5½	5½	5½	1 Tm Rib pf.	114	114	114	101 Nat Carb p.	140½	140½	140½	63 Amer. T & T.	104½	103	103	63 Amer. T & T.	104½	103	103
358 Bell Tel	135	13½	134	258 United Stl.	3½	3½	3½	5 TorElev pf.	121	121	121	30 Nat Refin.	3½	3½	3½	102 Borden	24½	24	24	102 Borden	24½	24	24
37 Blue Rib pf.	27	26	26	4,565 H Walkers.	25½	25½	25½	490 W'kerv Br.	3½	3½	3½	6,000 Read A.	.52	.52	.52	40 Borg Warner	30½	30	30	40 Borg Warner	30½	30	30
4,553 Brazilian	10	9½	9½	2,531 Do pf.	17½	17½	17½	5,120 Reo Gold.	1.40	1.30	1.30	13,560 Com & South	1½	1½	1½	25,060 Sisco	2.75	2.65	2.65	25,060 Sisco	2.75	2.65	2.65
925 Bowes Dist.	80	70	70	6,011 W. Fl.	1	1	1	5,720 So Pet.	.06	.06	.06	750 So Pet.	.06	.06	.06	1 Do pf.	97	97	97	1 Do pf.	97	97	97
425 Built Prod.	29	30	30	170 Weston G.	(new)	41	41½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,240 Royal	1.15	1.15	1.15	1,240 Royal	1.15	1.15	1.15	1,240 Royal	1.15	1.15	1.15
168 Burt F.	33½	33	33½	10 Winn Elec.	4½	4½	4½	4,000 Pickle Cr.	2.60	2.49	2.49	5 Do pf.	14	14	14	5 Do pf.	14	14	14	5 Do pf.	14	14	14
247 Can Pack.	55	54½	54½	11 Zimmerman	pf.	78	78	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	100 Std Pav.	1.10	1.10	1.10	100 Std Pav.	1.10	1.10	1.10	100 Std Pav.	1.10	1.10	1.10
95 Can Bread.	3½	3½	3½	176,500 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
27 Do A. pf.	71½	71½	71½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
20 Do B. pf.	21	21	21	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
380 Can Cement.	7½	7½	7½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
132 Can F.	6½	6½	6½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
50 Can F.	3½	3½	3½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
810 Can F.	11½	9	11	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
24 Can F.	19	19	19	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
5 Can Pks pf.	11½	11½	11½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
240 Can Can.	5½	5½	5½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
16 Do 1st pf.	93	71½	71½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
70 Do 2d pf.	87	87	87	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
10 Cdn C&F	14½	14½	14½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
95 Can G.	61½	61½	61½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
885 Can Ind A.	9½	9½	9½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
98 Can Oil.	12½	12½	12½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
9 Do pf.	126	125	125	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
1,625 C P.R.	12½	12½	12½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
1,910 Dom StlC.	11	10	10	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
6 E. St. Prod.	65	65	65	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
79 Easy Wash	3	3	3	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
5,566 FFmri	33	33	33	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05
3,150 Ford A.	31½	30½	30½	82,650 Bagamac.	13	10½	10½	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05	10.05	1,600 Pioneer G.	10.20	10.05									

Banking Statistics—Brokers' Loans—Gold Reserves

Statement of Member Banks

PRINCIPAL RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF REPORTING MEMBER BANKS IN
91 LEADING CITIES
(Millions of dollars)

	All Reporting		Chicago		New York		City		
	Feb. 13	Feb. 20	Feb. 13	Feb. 14	Feb. 6	Feb. 14	Feb. 20	Feb. 13	Feb. 21
On securities:	1925	1935	1934	1935	1935	1935	1935	1934	1934
To brokers & dealers:	1925	1935	1934	1935	1935	1935	1935	1934	1934
In New York:	\$707	\$679	\$760	\$26	\$16	\$542	\$564	\$744	
Outside New York:	185	163	145	24	27	32	58	59	46
To others:	2,144	2,150	2,626	181	180	228	810	814	979
Total	\$3,016	\$2,992	\$3,531	\$231	\$233	\$276	\$1,410	\$1,437	\$1,769
Acceptances and commercial paper:	428	429	—	49	52	—	227	222	—
Loans on real estate:	969	969	—	18	19	—	131	131	—
Other loans:	3,154	3,136	—	214	218	—	1,193	1,198	—
Total	\$4,551	\$4,534	\$4,755	\$281	\$289	\$296	\$1,551	\$1,551	\$1,707
Total all loans:	\$7,567	\$7,526	\$8,286	\$512	\$522	\$572	\$2,961	\$2,968	\$3,476
INVESTMENTS:									
U.S. Govt. obligations:	\$7,198	\$7,227	\$8,867	\$841	\$833	\$500	\$3,090	\$3,117	\$2,553
Oblig's fully guaranteed by U.S. Gov.	633	616	—	81	81	—	275	277	—
Other securities:	2,847	2,839	2,939	221	215	279	981	1,010	1,067
Total investments:	\$10,678	\$10,682	\$8,806	\$1,143	\$1,129	\$779	\$4,346	\$4,404	\$3,620
TOTAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS:	\$18,245	\$18,208	\$17,092	\$1,655	\$1,651	\$1,351	\$7,307	\$7,392	\$7,096
Reserve with F.R. Bk.	\$3,450	\$3,493	\$2,010	\$388	\$404	\$353	\$1,826	\$1,765	\$850
Cash in vault:	292	275	235	38	36	42	53	57	42
Net demand deposits:	14,100	13,998	11,332	1,503	1,514	1,120	6,882	6,864	5,368
Time deposits:	4,448	4,446	4,344	386	327	621	618	686	
Government deposits:	1,136	1,224	991	43	44	62	574	623	717
Due from banks:	1,860	1,801	1,413	198	170	175	72	77	76
Due to banks:	4,422	4,363	3,204	491	486	327	1,985	1,948	1,320
Borrowed from F.R. Bk.:	1	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
All other assets:	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ASSETS:									
Gold certificates on hand and due from U.S. Treasury:	\$5,516,081	\$5,449,639	\$3,712,311	\$2,128,108	\$2,072,723	\$920,073			
Redemption fund—F.R. notes:	15,852	16,549	41,503	1,307	1,535	8,901			
Other cash:	253,317	246,771	213,904	70,710	70,085	52,072			
Total reserves:	\$5,785,250	\$5,730,959	\$3,967,718	\$2,200,125	\$2,144,343	\$981,676			
Redemption fund—F.R. Bank notes:	250	250	12,159	—	—	2,930			
Bills discounted:									
Secured by U.S. Govt. obligations, direct and/or fully guaranteed:	2,719	3,451	18,927	1,420	1,976	11,251			
Other bills discounted:	3,207	3,059	47,540	2,517	2,297	20,405			
Total bills discounted:	\$5,926	\$6,510	\$66,467	\$3,937	\$4,273	\$31,656			
Bills bought in open market:	5,501	5,502	75,111	2,100	2,101	5,614			
Industrial advances:	18,729	18,375	—	1,321	1,201	—			
U.S. Government securities:									
Bonds:	395,748	395,726	442,775	139,944	139,945	167,783			
Treasury notes:	1,511,675	1,511,683	1,031,256	472,770	472,770	347,621			
Certificates and bills:	522,925	522,925	957,704	157,604	157,603	301,351			
Total U.S. Govt. securities:	\$2,430,348	\$2,430,334	\$2,431,735	\$770,318	\$770,318	\$816,755			
Other securities:	—	—	1,293	—	—	783			
Total bills and securities:	\$2,460,504	\$2,460,721	\$2,574,606	\$777,676	\$777,893	\$854,808			
Due from foreign banks:	87	805	3,400	319	317	296			
F.R. notes of other banks:	18,649	16,763	15,027	5,609	4,474	3,442			
Uncollected items:	42,633	415,332	396,209	130,064	91,351	99,587			
Bank premises:	49,436	49,436	52,383	11,598	11,598	11,424			
All other assets:	45,814	46,349	116,619	32,132	32,508	48,296			
Total assets:	\$8,843,343	\$8,720,615	\$7,138,121	\$3,157,523	\$3,062,684	\$2,003,459			
LIABILITIES:									
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation:	\$3,127,655	\$3,118,015	\$2,970,309	\$658,731	\$657,286	\$609,925			
Federal Reserve Bank note circulation—net:	1,242	1,192	197,750	—	—	52,655			
Deposits:									
Member bank—reserve account:	4,644,795	4,580,341	2,830,118	2,117,029	2,039,529	1,038,251			
U.S. Treasurer—gen. acct.:	38,422	72,312	165,546	7,628	44,170	18,594			
Foreign bank:	13,629	13,567	4,871	5,145	5,083	2,762			
Other deposits:	178,973	167,945	127,349	114,348	100,680	32,684			
Total deposits:	\$4,875,819	\$4,834,165	\$3,127,884	\$2,244,150	\$2,189,462	\$1,092,291			
Deferred availability items:	495,913	426,371	382,533	132,640	95,497	87,831			
Capital paid in:	146,953	146,928	145,309	56,714	59,714	58,510			
Surplus (Section 7):	144,893	144,893	138,383	49,964	49,964	45,217			
Surplus (Section 13b):	12,751	12,447	—	877	877	—			
Reserve for contingencies:	30,821	30,822	22,524	7,501	7,501	4,737			
All other liabilities:	7,296	5,782	153,429	3,949	2,383	52,293			
Total liabilities:	\$8,843,343	\$8,720,615	\$7,138,121	\$3,157,523	\$3,062,684	\$2,003,459			
Ratio of total reserves to deposit and F.R. note liabilities combined:	72.3%	72.1%	65.1%	75.8%	75.3%	57.7%			
Contingent liability on bills purchased for foreign correspondents:	\$366	\$366	\$4,635	\$166	\$166	\$1,706			
Commitments to make industrial advances:	12,940	12,540	—	4,930	4,765	—			

Comparative Statement of Federal Reserve Banks

	Condition Feb. 20, 1935	Total Bills	Total U.S. F.R. Notes Due Mem'r's	*Ratio, %
District.	Total Reserve.	Discounted.	Gov't Secur. in Circulation.	Res. Acct. &c.
Boston	\$434,173,000	\$79,000	\$157,679,000	\$265,952,000
New York	2,200,125,000	3,937,000	720,318,000	\$58,731,000
Philadelphia	307,177,000	701,000	167,120,000	234,466,000
Cleveland	413,263,000	409,000	213,024,000	303,766,000
Richmond	199,320,000	246,000	103,562,000	138,744,000
Atlanta	126,066,000	189,000	94,333,000	126,378,000
Chicago	1,081,333,000	200,000	420,843,000	77,467,000
St. Louis	209,349,000	13,000	108,200,000	138,722,000
Minneapolis	147,550,000	—	65,619,000	104,802,000
Kansas City	199,965,000	77,000	91,844,000	116,194,000
Dallas	126,152,000	37,000	71,475,000	48,073,000
San Francisco	340,777,000	38,000	166,331,000	198,987,000

*Ratio of total reserves to deposit and F.R. note liabilities combined, 72.3.

Reichsbank

(Thousands of Reichsmarks)	*Feb. 15	*Feb. 7.	*Jan. 31,	*Jan. 15,	*Feb. 15,
Gold coin and bullion:	79,979	79,844	79,782	79,186	79,156
Reserve in foreign currencies:	4,667	4,646	4,630	4,580	4,481
Bills of exchange and checks:	3,573,129	3,528,055	3,619,734	3,345,540	3,495,943
Silver and other coins:	240,455	237,906	221,463	345,229	279,159
Notes on other banks:	11,961	9,816	4,667	17,181	13,593
Advances:	62,525	63,906	81,238	56,169	56,244
Investments:	755,543	756,389	759,481	758,411	762,638
Notes in circulation:	3,437,043	3,525,470	3,660,096	3,428,919	3,563,192
Other maturing obligations:	796,648	774,255	821,968	938,807	933,610

90TH ANNUAL STATEMENT

DECEMBER 31, 1934

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

A MUTUAL COMPANY FOUNDED IN 1845 INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

To the Policy-holders and the Public:—

On the occasion of the ninetieth annual report of the New York Life, it is fitting to review briefly its record of accomplishment since it began business on April 12, 1845.

Founded when this country was young and sparsely settled, the New York Life has forged steadily ahead, spreading the benefits of its protection over millions of people and contributing, through the investment of its funds, to the Nation's development. Having always been a mutual company, it has declared over one billion dollars in dividends payable to policy-holders. Since 1845 it has met every obligation through every panic, war and epidemic.

During the past year the Company paid or credited \$157,000,000 to living policy-holders, and \$70,000,000 to the beneficiaries of those who died.

The Company's assets were \$2,109,505,224 at the close of 1934, an increase of \$98,562,112 over the previous year. The gain in assets during the single year 1934 is greater than the total amount which the Company accumulated in assets during the first forty-four years of its history.

During the year 1934 our investments in Government, State and Municipal Bonds increased \$146,918,786. A decrease of \$17,000,000 in policy loans and an increase of over \$60,000,000 in new insurance issued during the year reflect the general improvement of business in 1934.

The following table shows the diversification of the Company's assets at the end of 1934. All bonds eligible for amortization are carried at their amortized value determined in accordance with the law of the State of New York. All other bonds, including bonds in default, and all guaranteed and preferred stocks, are carried at market value as of December 31, 1934.

	Assets Dec. 31, 1934	Per Cent of each item to Total Assets
Cash on Hand or in Bank.....	\$36,449,562.46	1.73
United States Government, direct, or fully guaranteed Bonds.....	208,726,056.38	9.89
State, County, Municipal Bonds.....	191,270,360.25	9.07
Public Utility Bonds.....	159,151,938.01	7.54
Industrial and Other Bonds.....	21,670,306.29	1.03
Railroad Bonds.....	341,910,539.57	16.21
Canadian Bonds.....	44,445,022.61	2.11
Foreign Bonds.....	2,067,183.26	.10
Preferred and Guaranteed Stocks.....	69,610,789.00	3.30
Real Estate (<i>Including Home Office</i>)..	97,212,901.52	4.61
First Mortgages, City Properties.....	459,805,821.86	21.80
First Mortgages, Farms.....	12,527,521.11	.59
Policy Loans.....	396,467,101.27	18.79
Interest & Rents Due & Accrued.....	31,877,282.34	1.51
Other Assets.....	36,312,838.44	1.72
TOTAL ASSETS	\$2,109,505,224.37	100%

The liabilities of the Company, which include reserves to meet all contractual obligations, were \$1,994,134,579.

Included in liabilities, the Company has set up a Special Investment Reserve of \$28,000,000 not required by law, and reserves of \$45,734,207 for dividends payable to policy-holders in 1935.

Surplus funds reserved for general contingencies on December 31, 1934, amounted to \$115,370,645.

Total insurance in force, represented by 2,649,953 policies, was \$6,661,514,072. The total new paid for insurance in 1934 was \$440,000,000. In addition, men and women paid \$45,000,000 to the Company for annuities to provide a guaranteed life income.

April 12, 1935, marks the Ninetieth Anniversary of the New York Life. In view of its financial strength and its long record of fidelity in the fulfillment of its obligations, this mutual company continues to merit the confidence and patronage of its policy-holders and the public.

Thomas A. Berencser
President

A more complete report listing the securities owned by the Company, together with an illustrated booklet describing the Company's ninety years of service to policy-holders, will gladly be sent upon request. Write to the Company's Home Office at 51 Madison Avenue, New York, or to any of its Branch Offices throughout the United States and Canada.

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New Haven, Conn.

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Palo Alto, California
(Elected January 9, 1933)

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Chemical Bank & Trust Co.

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